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INTRODUCTION
This thesis contains two parts: Chapter 2 and 3 look into the long-run impacts of early-
life conditions;1 Chapter 4 evaluates the improvements in air quality and the enforce-
ment of environmental regulation after introducing air pollution monitors in the city.2
Two seemingly disparate topics, however, both look into the basic needs of human be-
ings. The motivation is to make people healthy when they live well when they are ed-
ucated, and they will be more productive (Przeworski, 1986). Hence, expenditures in
clean air, food, and health represent an investment in the most valuable resource we
have, the people themselves (Ohlin, 1938). This is the focus of many current public poli-
cies across the world. All three chapters in the thesis center around the implementation,
the effectiveness, and the mechanism of policies which can provide those essentials. The
thesis also benefits from the “credibility revolution” (Angrist and Pischke, 2010) that uses
econometric tools to build causal relationships.
The next two chapters start from the famous fetal origins hypothesis, which was first
proposed by Epidemiologist David Barker (Barker and Osmond, 1986; Barker, 1990). Ex-
tensive studies have documented that the period of gestation has significant impacts on
the health, education, income for an individual ranging from infancy to adulthood. The
hypothesis, although not initially proposed by economists, is quickly matched with the
“credibility revolution” in the economic research (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). The fetal
1Chapters 2 and 3 are based on Deng and Lindeboom (2019, 2020).
2Chapter 4 is based on Axbard (2020).
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hypothesis is tested extensively given that the in utero period is very well defined. Chil-
dren subjected to an external shock in utero can often be compared to similar children
born a little earlier or later who escaped the shock. However, several important pieces
are missing from this vast literature, which is the focus of the Chapter 2 and 3 of the
thesis.
The first challenge of the fetal literature is a lack of measure in individual exposure.
Most research exploits exogenous variation in the early-life conditions and relates this to
outcomes later in life to identify the causal effect credibly. The exogenous variation usu-
ally comes from a “natural experiment” that causes some individuals to be more likely
to be affected by adverse conditions than others. Importantly, the “natural experiment”
is abstracted to macro environment indicators, which can be the event’s timing or the
event’s location. Researchers classify individuals to the “treatment” or “control” group
by linking their birth information to the event’s information. The long-run causal im-
pact equals the difference in health later in life between these two groups. Some research
moved beyond that by also using the intensity of the “natural experiment”. The idea is
to compare individuals from “high treatment” areas to “low treatment” areas, but this
is often done using a parametric model. Therefore, a series of challenges emerge about
the specification choice in econometric analyses. To the best of my knowledge, most
studies choose linear functions due to simplicity, while there is very little justification for
these choices. Ultimately, the research constraint is partly due to the lack of individual
exposure measures to the “natural experiment”.
Chapter 2 reexamines the long-run impact of early-life nutritional shortage caused
by the Great Chinese Famine, the second most studied famine (after the dutch hunger
winter). The Famine occurred from 1958 to 1961 and is considered “the worst famine
in human history”. There is a consensus in the literature that the Famine was a direct
consequence of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, an economic and social campaign led by the
Communist Party from 1958 to 1961 (Kung and Lin, 2003; Meng, Qian, and Yared, 2015).
However, existing studies often disagree with each other about the long-run impact on
health later in life. Firstly, the heterogeneity in reduced-form findings might come from
the differences in famine exposure (Van den Berg, Pinger, and Schoch, 2016). Secondly,
the misspecification of the famine indicator in econometric analyses might be a second
reason that conflicting results are often documented in the literature. To advance on
this, Chapter 2 develops a new two-sample method and aims to obtain an estimate of
the average causal effect of early-life hunger on health later in life.
We follow Van den Berg, Pinger, and Schoch (2016) and use individual hunger recall
information to evaluate the strength of the association between the Famine indicator
1
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and an actual hunger episode. The sample to estimate the strength are individuals aged
above 13 during the Famine, which are older than the sample to look at long-run im-
pacts. We find a nonlinear relationship between mortality rates, the commonly used
famine indicator, and the individual experience. Therefore, we estimate a Two-Sample
Instrumental Variable (TSIV) model with log-transformed mortality rates as the instru-
mental variable. To decrease the model dependency in the two-sample setting, we pre-
process the data and homogenizes different samples using a nearest-neighbor matching
algorithm. Estimates from the model show that early-life hunger leads to an increase in
the risk of diabetes, hypertension, and obesity for females, while no effects are found for
males.
Since the start of the literature (Almond, 2006; Van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Por-
trait, 2006), much of early “fetal origins” work has focused on demonstrating the impact
of extreme, traumatic experiences (disease outbreak, recessions, famines, severe envi-
ronmental shocks, etc.) in early life. The evidence from different countries is strikingly
consistent. More and more recent research interests have shifted to understand the long-
run impacts of exposure to a purposeful large-scale distribution of resources (“mild”
shocks, Almond, Currie, and Duque, 2018). Recent researches add new evidence that
a wide range of factors in the early years matter to child development. However, slightly
different from the early literature, which looks that extreme experiences, there is often
considerable heterogeneity in the effects of specific “mild” shocks. Some of the hetero-
geneity may be due to parental responses that either exacerbate or mitigate the effects.
Understanding of the heterogeneity is, therefore, the research theme of the Chapter 3 of
the thesis.
Chapter 3 investigates the long-run impacts of a nationally implemented salt iodiza-
tion program on school-aged children’s cognition in China. The national program fol-
lows the worldwide campaign initialed by WHO to eradicate Iodine Deficiency Disor-
ders (IDD). The policy was very ambitious that all the salt in the market is regulated to
contain iodine since late 1994.3 We digitized biennial goiter data sets collected by lo-
cal health agencies and the World Health Organization (WHO). The goiter data is then
linked to recent survey data sets. Exploiting the policy’s timing and historical iodine defi-
ciency variations across provinces, we look into the causal impact of iodine deficiency in
utero. The analysis focuses on in-utero exposure as the medical literature relates iodine
deciency in the first trimester to impaired neurodevelopment. We find strong positive
program effects on human capital formation for girls. Yet, we do not see any improve-
ment in cognition for boys. There are reasons to believe the biological difference can
322 (out of 1800) counties were exempted due to high iodine content in the drinking water.
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explain our findings. However, such a “nuclear” explanation is not consistent with all
the existing literature.
Figure 1.1: High-end Iodized Salt Sold in China (2018)
Notes: Made in Friesland using seawater from the Wadden Sea (Waddenzee).
Our empirical strategy, similar to others used in the literature, interacts with the sud-
den introduction of the new salt (blip 1) with a short critical period (blip 2).4 The com-
pact nature of these two blips is what helps to estimate the causal effect. The kind that
the treatment is well defined is always good to have a credible identification. The sim-
plicity of the empirical design is so attractive that we, as economists, often forget that hu-
man beings respond to incentives, shocks, and public policies. Parents can reinforce or
compensate for shocks by increasing or decreasing their investments. The investments
can be monetary investments but, maybe importantly, can also be the time investments
to their children.
An appealing explanation of the gender difference in our empirical findings is the
difference in parental investments. The differences are deeply rooted in gender norms,
which are important in East and South-East Asia and the Middle East and North Africa.
A vast literature has shown that females from these areas receive fewer investments from
parents and are likely not to reach their full potential in education, health, and personal
autonomy. The second part of the Chapter 3 is the first attempt to link the literature on
4Bleakley (2010b) terms the strategy “a blip-blip” design.
1
9
gender preferences with the research on the long-term impacts of early-life conditions.
We show that gender differences begin early in life. Meanwhile, our evidences add evi-
dence on how fetal disadvantage is unfolded over the life cycle.
A simple model of the human capital formation with parental investments helps ra-
tionale the gender differences in program effects. Parents optimally choose their invest-
ments based on their preferences, budget constraints, and the human capital production
function. The reduced-form program effect is broken down into the biological effect and
the behavioral effect. The behavioral effect includes parental efforts that might mitigate
or reinforce the biological effect. Our empirical finding is in line with the behavioral ef-
fect hypothesis that may differ by gender. Before the salt iodization policy, parents may
have countered initial adverse shocks for boys and less so for girls. Therefore, when boy
preferences are relevant, girls may benefit more from nationally implemented programs.
Salt-iodization program might crowds out private parental investments in cognition.5
The simple model of human capital formation highlights three fundamental ele-
ments of the literature aiming at boosting human capital formation: parental prefer-
ences, budget constraints, and the production of human capital. Past interests have
been mainly on identifying the production function, which measures the effectiveness
of the parental input. Some recent studies use either RCT or conditional cash transfer
to exploit the variation in parental resources, essentially the variation in budget con-
straints. However, parental preferences were largely ignored by the literature. Chapter 3
aims to fill this gap. A direct conclusion from the study is that large scale programs can
have positive (and possibly) unintended effects on gender equality in societies with son
preference. More importantly, any policy design on human capital formation should
carefully consider behavioral responses from parents.
Like food and nutrition discussed in the first two chapters, clean air is another neces-
sity for human beings. However, new pollution levels in emerging economies like China
and India exceed the highest levels ever recorded in rich countries. Heavy air pollution
reduces lifespans, decreases productivity, and has long-term impacts of early childhood
exposure to air pollution on adult outcomes. Despite ambitious environmental laws in
many countries worldwide, the enforcement of these regulations is often weak. Holding
government officials accountable for this lack of enforcement is, in turn, often marred
by inadequate information about environmental quality.
Chapter 4 studies whether better environmental monitoring can solve this issue and
improve the effectiveness of the policy. The paper uses the introduction of a nation-
5Other consequence of the policy is that parents might divert their investments into other skill dimensions,
notably for boys. Indeed, we find some program effects on non-cognitive skills for boys, but not for girls.
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Figure 1.2: Countries with National Environmental Laws
Notes: This graph shows countries with national environmental laws (UN, 2019). Data
comes from the Environmental Law Institute.
wide pollution monitoring program in China to investigate the impact of installing ad-
ditional monitors on both pollution concentration and government enforcement of pol-
lution regulations. 177 cities were required to set up air quality monitors in 2015. The
size of each city determines the number of air pollution monitors. Satellite measured air
pollution is lower for cities with more monitors after monitors were set up in 2015. Since
most regulations are set at the national level, all these cities should comply with the same
governmental law. It’s reasonable to believe that the difference in program effects is the
policy implementation difference, which depends on local officials.
Empirical analysis of new enforcement data precisely confirms this conjecture. The
reduction in air pollution is arguably driven by a significant increase in regulatory en-
forcement activities. Exploiting georeferenced enforcement records, we find that firms’
growth is driven by firms located within 20km from a monitor, whereas firms beyond
20km face no change in enforcement. The geographic pattern echos the UN report last
year that lack of enforcement is one of the most significant obstacles to combat climate
change and pollution.
An examination of possible mechanisms shows that local officials’ career concerns
can explain a big part of our findings. Mayors who are about to retire put minimal ef-
forts in regulating industrial firms. Consequently, effects on the pollution reduction of
better monitoring disappear when the mayor of the city is retiring. We also document
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that when monitors are insulated from government influence and external parties are re-
sponsible for providing information, the effect of an additional monitor on enforcement
and reductions of pollution are both more substantial.
Both Chapter 3 and 4 show that policies with good purposes can generate unin-
tended (not necessarily harmful) impacts. Universal Salt Iodization (USI), which targets
the total population, decreases gender inequality as parents compensate more for boys.
Similar to the adjustment of parental investment to their children, politicians respond to
the introduction of new information. The mayors with incentives shift their focus from
the economic development to the environmental target. And firms which happened to
reside close to those monitors now are bearing additional abatement costs. Our data
indeed shows the decrease in air pollution with extra monitors. Still, we also need to
keep in mind that such a policy imposes different firms’ standards from separate loca-
tions. The discretion in enforcement practice distorts resource allocation, which might
harm the long-run economic development. All these findings can be traced to the 4th
principle of “ten principles in economics” from Econ101: people respond to incentives.

2
HUNGER 1
2.1. INTRODUCTION
A large number of observational studies have demonstrated that health and economic
disparities may have roots early in life. This relationship has been shown studies that
examine the association between birth weight and later-life health and socioeconomic
outcomes, as well as from studies that use “natural experiments” that cause some indi-
viduals (the treated) to be more likely to be affected by adverse conditions than others
(the controls). In natural experiments, researchers mostly use contextual factors at an
aggregate level to proxy for individual circumstances early in life. Examples of natu-
ral experiments include epidemics (Almond, 2006), economic conditions (Van den Berg,
Lindeboom, and Portrait, 2006) and famines (Chen and Zhou, 2007; Lumey, Stein, and
Susser, 2011). This paper adds to this literature by looking at the long-run consequences
of actual exposure to hunger early in life.
In empirical applications, there are often limits to using aggregate indicators as a
proxy for individual conditions. First, being born when the event in question took place
is not equivalent to actually being exposed to adverse conditions. For example, researchers
have used famine in a region as a proxy for being exposed to hunger. However, living in a
food-deprived area is not equivalent to actually experiencing hunger, even if the famine’s
timing and location are precisely known. Wealthier households may still have sufficient
food, or some parts of an exposed area may be less affected by the famine. Also, there is
1This chapter is based on Deng and Lindeboom (2020).
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often uncertainty about the location and timing of the famine. For instance, the famine
may be preceded by a prolonged period of food insecurity, so it is not always clear when
the famine started. Most studies rely on historical evidence about the famine’s evolution,
and in some cases (such as the Chinese Famine), there may be conflicting information
from historical sources. In these cases, researchers have limited information to justify
the choices underlying their empirical approach, how they define the “treatment” pe-
riod, which famine indicator they use, or the functional form of the parametric model.
Without information on actual exposure among the survivors, the estimates are, at best,
attenuated intention-to-treat (ITT) effects, but they may be biased.2
One solution is to use more granular data about hunger prevalence, such as excess
mortality rates or food prices. But these may also be imperfect proxies for the nutritional
environment, since they may not include informal trade systems (for prices) or other
contextual factors that affect mortality rates and exaggerate (or attenuate) the intensity
of the famine. The other alternative is to use actual hunger experience. Recently, this
information has become available in a few data sets, such as the European Household
Survey on Retirement and Aging (SHARE) and the Chinese Family Panel Survey (CFPS).
These data resolve uncertainty about the precision of famine proxies and provide causal
evidence about the treatment effect of actual hunger exposure on later life outcomes.
The data richness is a significant advantage when studying the long-run impacts of early
childhood conditions. In this paper, we use hunger recall information to estimate the ef-
fect of undernourishment early in life on health, measured by the Metabolic Syndrome
Index (Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond, 2016). We develop a Two-Sample Instru-
mental Variable (TSIV) method that relaxes the homogeneity assumption in standard
TSIV methods and can deal with two samples from different populations.
In a recent paper, Van den Berg, Pinger, and Schoch (2016) developed a TSIV ap-
proach to examine the causal effect of early-life hunger exposure on later life health
outcomes among SHARE respondents from 3 European countries. They estimate the
strength of the association between the famine and actual hunger, and the effect of
hunger on height. Hunger recall information is also imperfect because those experi-
encing hunger at very early ages have much less hunger recall than respondents who
were older during the famine. To avoid this problem, Van den Berg, Pinger, and Schoch
(2016) use another sample of older siblings with more reliable hunger recall information
to measure the association between the famine and hunger experience.
The idea of combining two samples can be traced back to Angrist and Krueger (1992)
2For example, a weak correlation between the aggregate indicator and actual exposure, which is often caused
by model misspecification, will bias the parameter estimates.
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and was further developed in Inoue and Solon (2010). Two-sample methods implicitly
assume homogeneity between the two samples.3 However, this homogeneity assump-
tion may not always be satisfied in practice. Very young children are, in general, frailer
than older children, adolescents, and prime-aged adults. Therefore, very young children
surviving a famine are more likely to have better biological traits or to come from more
affluent families than their older counterparts. As a consequence, for the primary sam-
ple of those who are exposed early in life, the distribution of observed and unobserved
confounding factors,is likely to be different from the distribution in the second (auxil-
iary) sample of older individuals. If there is heterogeneity in confounding factors, our
estimates of the causal effect will be biased when the parametric model is misspecified.
Van den Berg, Pinger, and Schoch (2016) solve this by using discrete instruments
and covariates and stratifying the samples into a finite set of homogeneous subsamples.
When the famine’s start and end are not precise, or if there is substantial variation in the
famine’s intensity across regions, one may want to rely on continuous instruments such
as excess mortality rates or prices. Researchers would prefer a method that accommo-
dates continuous instruments and covariates.
To combine information from two different samples in a robust way, we propose
combining non-parametric preprocessing during the first step with a second-step re-
gression estimator, as in Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2007). The first step decreases the
model dependency on functional forms of the parametric causal inference in the sec-
ond step. We derive properties of the proposed post-matching sample estimators and
show that the estimator in the matched sample asymptotically recovers the actual re-
gression coefficient in the primary (target) sample. Importantly, our results are valid for
continuous treatment variables and continuous instruments. Monte Carlo simulations
show that, when preprocessing restores homogeneity across the two samples, classical
two-sample methods return unbiased estimates, while in the raw (i.e., not preprocessed)
data, both the first stage and the second stage effects are biased.
Using the two-step method, we reexamine the long-run health impact of the Great
Chinese Famine. The Great Chinese Famine has been studied extensively. Early studies
(Chen and Zhou, 2007; Almond, Edlund, Li, and Zhang, 2010) documented substantial
effects on height, wealth, and cognitive function in later life. On the other hand, there
is conflicting evidence from more recent studies.4 These differences may be the result
3Recent developments (Zhao, Wang, Spiller, Bowden, Small et al., 2019) of the two-sample model have pointed
out the importance of this implicit homogeneity. They focus on heterogeneity between distributions of the
instrumental variables in two samples. In practice, the distributions are usually similar enough in both sam-
ples when instruments are defined at an aggregate level (as in our study).
4For example, the study by Kim, Fleisher, and Sun (2017) uses nationally representative data and finds that
famine exposure has no effects on later-life chronic conditions, while studies based on regional representative
2
16 2. HUNGER
of different studies exploiting different historical sources and using (slightly) different
instruments. We focus on individuals born during or shortly before the famine (1957–
1962).5 Unlike previous Chinese famine studies, we use hunger recall information and
supplement the primary data set with a second sample of much older individuals born
between 1910 and 1947. For these older cohorts, hunger recall error biases are less of a
problem. We use this second (auxiliary) sample to estimate the effect of famine exposure
on the probability of reporting hunger.
We use nearest-neighbor matching to homogenize the distributions of covariates in
the two samples and examine the relationship between famine exposure and the prob-
ability of reporting hunger. Virtually all previous papers implicitly assume a linear rela-
tionship between famine indicators and actual hunger exposure among the survivors.6
We find that the linear approximation for the first stage does not fit the data and requires
a logarithmic transformation of excess mortality rates (EDR) to make the relationship
linear. This nonlinear relationship between EDR and hunger experiences has conse-
quences for the previous contributions in the Chines Famine literature that estimated
reduced-form models that were linear in the instruments. Next, we estimate the impact
of hunger on an index of metabolic syndrome and find that early-life hunger for females
leads to a 0.4 standard deviation increase in later life metabolic syndrome. This number
is much larger than previous estimates in the literature. For males, we find much smaller
and insignificant effects.
Our analysis makes four important contributions to the literature on long-run ef-
fects. We are the first study on the Chinese famine to provide evidence on the strength of
the famine-hunger association. Our first stage results also validate the commonly used
instruments in this literature to proxy undernourishment. We find a strong association
between the aggregate famine indicators and reported hunger experience. However, this
association is not a simple linear relationship. This nonlinearity might explain some of
the conflicting findings in the literature.7 Second, we make a methodological contri-
bution to the two-sample instrumental variable model. We show that heterogeneity in
confounded covariates in the auxiliary and primary samples can bias estimates of the
data (see, e.g., Huang, Li, Wang, and Martorell (2010), Li, Jaddoe, Qi, He, Lai, Wang, Zhang, Hu, Ding, Yang
et al. (2011)) find significant results. Meng and Qian (2009) and Xu, Li, Zhang, and Liu (2016) also find null
results.
5We use individuals born after the famine, 1963–1967, in a placebo test in section 2.5.4.
6Depending on the data set and the empirical design, the famine is usually approximated by province-level
mortality rate or projected county-level cohort loss after the famine. These instruments in the literature are
included linearly in the reduced-form regression equation.
7Studies looking at provinces with high mortality rates during the famine might find a very small effect, since
the mortality rate is not informative for hunger at high mortality rates. We show a weak first-stage (F-stat <
10) when using a linear function in section 5.2.
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causal effect. We propose using a non-parametric method to process the data before the
parametric econometric analyses. Our simulation results show that estimates are less
model-dependent when preprocessing balances the primary and the auxiliary samples.
Third, we provide new evidence on the long-run impact of early-life hunger expe-
riences. All but one of the previous papers in this area used reduced-form approaches
that include famine indicators rather than actual hunger experience. They thus estimate
intention-to-treat (ITT) effects. We show that in the Chines famine, the causal treatment
effects are much larger than the intention-to-treat effects found in this literature. Fi-
nally, our paper discusses the exclusion restriction required in IV famine studies. In our
context, where we aim to assess the effect of undernourishment and use hunger recall
information, we have to assume that the famine affects children only via hunger, and
that there are no other channels. Although the famine’s primary impact is food restric-
tion, we cannot exclude other potential impacts such as stress and/or infectious diseases
that often accompany famines.8 Thus, it is likely that the exclusion restriction is violated.
Violations of the exclusion restriction are relevant when interpreting reduced-form ITT
estimates. We adopt a recently proposed exercise that bounds the treatment effect un-
der weaker assumptions (i.e., that relaxes the strict exclusion restriction Conley, Hansen,
and Rossi, 2012). Our bounding exercises shed light on the nutrition contribution of the
famine’s impact relative to all other potential channels. We conclude that our main re-
sults hold under much weaker assumptions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 briefly describes the
historical background, institutional setting, and important features of the Great Chinese
Famine. In section 2.3, we describe the data sets we use in this study and discuss our
malnutrition indicator and our outcome variables. Section 2.4 introduces our empiri-
cal model, discusses our identification assumptions, and addresses potential threats to
identification. Section 2.5 presents our main results.
2.2. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH
2.2.1. THE GREAT CHINESE FAMINE
The Great Chinese Famine occurred from 1958 to 1961 and is widely considered “the
worst famine in human history”. During the Famine, at least 16.5 million individuals
perished in rural areas.9
8The famine lasted a few years, and during a prolonged period of undernourishment, the disease environment
may change.
9See Sen (1981) and Ravallion (1997) for estimates of total famine casualties. More detailed evidence can be
found in Yang (1998); Yao (1999); Meng, Qian, and Yared (2015).
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Since 1949, the central government adopted the Stalinist development model, which
emphasized investment in industrial sectors. The rural sector had to provide resources
for investment and raw materials for production. To accommodate high investment
in industry, the government initiated a large scale land reform, followed by an aggres-
sive collectivization policy. During the land reform period (1950–52), redistribution of
landlord-held land and other property boosted agricultural production. Major indica-
tors of productivity in the rural sector, such as grain and cotton outputs, had double-
digit growth rates during this period. Collectivization of the rural sector followed im-
mediately after this rapid growth period. It started with the “Five-Year Plan” (1953–57),
in which peasant households were organized into agricultural producers’ cooperatives.
This reform dramatically slowed agricultural growth rates.
On the eve of the famine, the central government in China controlled food produc-
tion, distribution, and consumption. Approximately 80% of the population worked in
the agriculture sector. Grain was harvested and stored communally, and private stores
of grain were prohibited. The central government procured grain produced in rural ar-
eas from communal depots after the fall harvest. Procured grain was fed to urban work-
ers, exported to other countries in exchange for industrial equipment and expertise, and
stored in reserves as insurance against natural disasters. The grain retained by the rural
regions was used to feed the peasants in communal kitchens, which were established so
that the collective could control the preparation and consumption of food. Furthermore,
the government prevented peasants from migrating and, consequently, peasants could
only consume the food distributed to their collective.
There is a consensus in the literature that the Great Chinese Famine was a direct
consequence of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, an economic and social campaign led by
the Chinese Communist Party from 1958 to 1961 (Kung and Lin, 2003; Meng, Qian, and
Yared, 2015). During the campaign, the political climate encouraged provincial leaders
to overstate grain production and even export grain to signal the success of Mao’s Great
Leap Forward (see Meng, Qian, and Yared, 2015). Despite a severe shortage of food,
China was a net grain exporter in 1960 (Yao, 1999; Lin and Yang, 2000).
2.2.2. RELEVANT FEATURES OF THE FAMINE
The famine lasted until 1962, but some researchers have argued (see Tan, Zhibo, and
Zhang, 2015, for an example) that birth and death rates in some provinces had already
returned to normal levels by 1961. The precise end date for the famine is not clear for
all provinces. With hunger recall data from the CFPS, we can address this issue in more
detail (see section 2.3). The famine also featured considerable variation in severity across
2.2. BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH
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regions. In 1960 death rates for two adjacent provinces could differ by more than five-
fold. For instance, in 1960 the province of Anhui had a death rate of 1.84%, while the
neighboring province of Jiangsu had a death rate of 0.29%.
Figure 2.1: Average and Spatial Variation in Famine Severity
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Notes: Figure 2.1a: The solid line plots mean mortality rates, which are average mortality
rates across provinces in each year. The dashed line is the standardized variance in mor-
tality rates across provinces in year t . Figure 2.1b: The solid line plots the de-trended 1%
size of the birth cohort born in year t . The dashed line is the normalized cross-county
variance in birth cohort sizes. Source: Meng, Qian, and Yared (2015)
To better depict the variation in severity across regions during the Great Chinese
Famine, we present some graphical evidence from Meng, Qian, and Yared (2015). Fig-
ure 2.1a plots average mortality rates and the normalized variance in mortality rates over
time (the cross-province standard deviation divided by the cross-province mean). The
figure shows that during the famine (denoted by the two vertical lines), both mean mor-
tality and the variance in mortality rates spiked. Our empirical strategy exploits the vari-
ation in famine induced mortality rates across provinces. Figure 2.1b provides comple-
mentary county-level evidence. The figure plots mean and cross-county standardized
variance in cohort size.10 This figure shows a clear drop in cohort size and increased
variance during the famine.
2.2.3. SELECTED FAMINE STUDIES
For an overview of famine studies, we refer to Van den Berg and Lindeboom (2018). Here
we highlight the results from the two most widely studied famines: the “Dutch Hunger
Winter” and the Chinese Famine. The Dutch Hunger Winter (December 1944–April 1945)
is the most studied famine in the epidemiological and demographic literature on long-
10Note that the cohort size reflects mortality as well as the fertility effects of the famine. See also 2.5.4.
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run effects. The Dutch Hunger Winter has a number of features that are advantageous
for researchers: it arrived unexpectedly, lasted for a short period, and took place in a rel-
atively stable society with thorough data collection. See Lumey, Stein, and Susser (2011)
for an excellent review of studies that used this famine. Studies using this famine found
effects on blood glucose levels, diabetes, severe obesity, high blood pressure (hyperten-
sion), and schizophrenia. (Ravallion, 1997; Roseboom, de Rooij, and Painter, 2006; Stein,
Kahn, Rundle, Zybert, van der Pal-de Bruin, and Lumey, 2007; Scholte, Van den Berg,
and Lindeboom, 2015) find negative effects on labor market outcomes and hospitaliza-
tion outcomes for those exposed in the first trimester of gestation.
The Great Chinese Famine is perhaps the second most used famine in the literature
on the long-run effect of exposure early in life. Li and Lumey (2017) provides an exten-
sive review and meta-analysis of the medical and epidemiological research. They con-
clude that the literature has found effects for overweight, type 2 diabetes, hyperglycemia,
metabolic syndrome, and schizophrenia. However, most studies vary substantially in ex-
posure definition, control selection, and analytical methods. Consequently, when con-
trolling for these differences, they conclude that “most effects commonly attributed to
the famine can be explained by uncontrolled age differences between exposed and con-
trol groups”.11 One of the earliest economics papers (Chen and Zhou, 2007) finds sub-
stantive effects for height, labor supply, and earnings. Their findings are confirmed by
Meng and Qian (2009), who addressed measurement error of famine exposure by ex-
ploiting unique institutional determinants. (Almond, Edlund, Li, and Zhang, 2010) uses
data from the China Population Census 2000 to look at the effect of famine exposure
on literacy, labor market status, wealth, and marriage market outcomes. They find that
exposed women marry later and have less educated spouses. They also find evidence
for the Trivers-Willard hypothesis that the sex-ratio of the offspring of exposed parents
favors daughters. Few economic studies target specific chronic conditions such as dia-
betes and hypertension. One exception is Kim, Fleisher, and Sun (2017), who do not find
effects on chronic diseases such as hypertension.
2.3. DATA
2.3.1. HUNGER RECALL
Our main data come from the China Family Panel Study (CFPS), a large-scale, nation-
ally representative panel survey conducted by the Institute of Social Science Survey at
Peking University. Currently, four waves are available, 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016. The
11This is in line with Xu, Li, Zhang, and Liu (2016), who find that estimates of the famine effects are sensitive
to the choice of health indicators, measures of famine severity, and regression model specifications.
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baseline wave (hereafter CFPS-2010) is collected through a multistage probability sam-
pling procedure and consists of 14,798 households. All adults living in the household are
interviewed, leading to a total sample of 34,425 adult observations.
Similar to the SHARE survey, the CFPS-2010 survey included a question on hunger
recall. The survey asked: “Have you experienced starvation for more than one week?
If so, when did it start, when did it end, and where did it happen?” Since the question
only requires the experience to last more than one week, we don’t know how many weeks
in total respondents have experienced food shortage in each year.12 A critical aspect of
this hunger experience measurement is that the question did not explicitly mention the
Great Chinese Famine. The question only asked about general hunger experiences. The
non-response rate for the hunger experience question is very low at 0.055.13 Most of the
hunger experiences happened during the Great Chinese Famine, which occurred more
than 50 years before the survey. Hunger responses related to the great Chinese famine
are likely to be subject to recall bias, especially for respondents born close to the famine.
Figure 2.2 supports this suspicion.
Figure 2.2: Probability of Reporting Hunger Conditional on Famine Exposure
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The figure displays the fraction of individuals in the raw data who report hunger as
a fraction of those who were alive during the famine period. The horizontal axis is the
respondent’s age in 1962; the vertical axis is the fraction of individuals who experienced
hunger during the famine (1958–1962). The fraction of hunger recall increases with age
12Ideally, we would consider a “dose-response” specification if a more refined measure of hunger were avail-
able. Instead of a dummy treatment variable, we also use the number of years exposed to hunger before age
five. The findings are similar.
13This is close to the non-response rate in the SHARE survey.
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during the famine and stabilizes at about 30 percent after age 12.14 We see no gender
differences in reports of hunger during the famine period. Our primary sample contains
individuals born before and during the famine, whose own recall of malnutrition around
birth and in the first years of life is likely to suffer from significant recall bias. To over-
come this problem, we follow the idea introduced by Van den Berg, Pinger, and Schoch
(2016) to use recall information from individuals who experienced the famine at an older
age to proxy for actual hunger exposure for individuals in the primary sample.
2.3.2. THE PRIMARY AND AUXILIARY SAMPLE AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
In the primary analysis, we restrict the sample to include individuals born between 1958
and 1962 and who lived in rural areas. After dropping individuals with missing infor-
mation on the outcome variable (discussed below), we are left with 958 males and 972
females from 27 provinces. Very few people migrated during the famine (Chen and Zhou,
2007). This is also true for our sample of people living in rural China: only 4% live out-
side their province of birth at the time of the interview. For the reported health outcome,
we pool data sets from the first three waves of CFPS (CFPS-2010, CFPS-2012, and CFPS-
2014).15 We look at three chronic diseases: hypertension, diabetes, and obesity. The
first two conditions are derived from a question also used in other social surveys: “Has
a doctor ever told you that you suffer from. . . ”. Obesity is defined as a body mass index
(BMI) exceeding 29 (B M I > 29). We used self-reported height and weight to calculate
BMI. We construct a Metabolic Syndrome Index by grouping information on all three
chronic conditions. As discussed by Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007); Hoynes, Schanzen-
bach, and Almond (2016), aggregating multiple measures to an index improves statistical
power. The index is the average of the standardized z-scores for each component.16 High
values of the index are associated with worse health.
To construct an auxiliary sample that is less susceptible to recall bias, we select fe-
males born between 1910 and 1947, aged 15–52 in 1962. If the female in the auxiliary
sample is the mother of the individual in the primary sample, we include this observa-
tion as a proxy for the individual’s hunger exposure. We found that 10% of matches are
between the individual from the primary sample and his/her mother. For the remaining
14Several validation studies match recall data with actual outcomes and find that the recall data is reliable
when individuals reach adult ages (see, for example, O’malley, Bachman, and Johnston (1983) on teen drink-
ing behavior).
15The fourth wave, CFPS-2016, does not collect information on some of the health conditions we need for our
health index (hypertension, diabetes, and height.
16We calculate the z-score by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. We calculate both
the mean and standard deviation using the primary analysis sample (i.e., individuals born between 1957 and
1962 in all three waves of CFPS ).
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individuals in the primary sample, we match on the village of birth (or if not available,
county of birth, or province of birth) and next on age and literacy.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Female sample Male sample
Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD
Panel A: Primary sample - basic information
Age at 2010 958 50.40 1.88 972 50.59 1.88
Mother literate 958 0.15 0.36 972 0.18 0.39
Mother birth year 958 1931.39 7.26 972 1931.03 7.67
Panel B: Primary sample - health outcomes
Hypertension 2522 0.04 0.19 2618 0.02 0.15
Diabetes 2522 0.01 0.10 2618 0.01 0.09
Obesity 2522 0.04 0.21 2618 0.04 0.19
Metabolic syndrome(index) 2522 0.02 0.64 2618 -0.02 0.54
Panel C: Auxiliary sample
Mother literate 3682 0.24 0.43 3682 0.24 0.43
Mother birth year 3682 1925.88 15.58 3682 1925.88 15.58
Notes: Author’s tabulations of CFPS-2010, CFPS-2012, and CFPS-2014. Panel A summarizes background
information for individuals born in rural area between 1957 and 1962. Panel B pools chronic conditions
data from three waves of CFPS. The Metabolic Syndrome Index is the z-score from subtracting the mean
and dividing by the standard deviation. Both the mean and standard deviation are calculated using the
analysis sample (individuals born between 1957 and 1962 in all three waves of CFPS). High values of the
index are associated with worse health. Panel C displays the background information in the auxiliary
sample, which includes all individuals born prior to 1947.
We report summary statistics for the primary and auxiliary samples in Table 2.1.
Panel A reports summary statistics in the primary sample for the main outcome and
age and literacy status for the individual’s mother. We report summary statistics for the
health outcomes collected in CFPS2010, CFPS-2012, and CPFS-2014 in Panel B. Panel C
reports summary statistics for the auxiliary sample (born between 1910 and 1947). We
use the same auxiliary sample for the male and female sub-samples. Comparing the pri-
mary sample with the auxiliary sample, we see that mothers’ literacy rates in the primary
sample are much lower than mothers’ literacy rates in the auxiliary sample. We also see
that mothers’ age in the auxiliary sample is about six years older than the mothers of
individuals in the primary sample. This invalidates classical two-sample IV methods.
Below we extend our two-sample IV method so that we can apply it when the two sam-
ples have different distributions of observed and unobserved characteristics.
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2.4. TWO-SAMPLE IV MODELS WITH HETEROGENEOUS SAM-
PLES
Many researchers have used data combination methods to identify the causal effect
when no single sample contains all relevant variables (see Ridder and Moffitt, 2007, for a
review). Most empirical applications of two-sample methods implicitly assume homo-
geneity between the primary sample and the auxiliary sample. Table 2.1 in section 2.3
showed substantial differences in age and literacy status between the (proxy) mothers
in the primary and auxiliary samples. Ignoring that these samples differ in important
ways will result in first-stage estimates that are not relevant for the primary sample and
thus irrelevant for the treatment effect in the second stage (in the primary sample). We
consider a framework that is similar to Van den Berg, Pinger, and Schoch (2016):
Yi =ψ(Di , Xi ,Ui ), (2.1)
where Di denotes severe hunger during childhood for individual i . Y denotes health in
adulthood. X denotes a vector of observed covariates. We are interested in the causal ef-
fect of hunger experiences (D) in early-life on later-life outcomes (Y ). There are a num-
ber of challenges to identifying the causal effect: D is likely to be endogenous, and D
is systematically misreported or not in the same data set as Y . The most widely used
approach is to find a contextual factor (Z ) that is an instrument for D and estimate
the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. For instance, researchers have used being born in
a famine-stricken area or excess mortality rates in an area as an instrumental variable
for undernourishment early in life.
In practice, we set up a parametric framework, e.g. a linear model, to approximate
the true causal model (2.1):
Yi = γDi +πXi +Ui , (2.2)
where i indexes the individual. γ is the causal effect of hunger early in life on later-life
health, our parameter of interest. When the model has one endogenous variable and one
instrumental variable, the estimates of γ consist of two components: the reduced-form
(or ITT) estimates (2.3)
Yi = γ0Zi +π0Xi +Wi ; (2.3)
and, when hunger experience information (Di ) is available, the first stage regression
(2.4)
Di = γ1Zi +π1Xi +Vi . (2.4)
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Most papers in the famine literature use the linear function (2.3) to estimate ITT effects.
Note, however, that this linearity assumption implicitly assumes a linear relationship
between the treatment variable Di and the instrumental variable Zi . This assumption
may not be innocuous. When hunger information D is available, we can use two-stage
least squares (TSLS) estimators. From Vansteelandt and Didelez (2018) and Buja, Brown,
Berk, George, Pitkin, Traskin, Zhang, and Zhao (2019), we know that the TSLS estimator
is consistent for γ even if the linear instrument-exposure model is misspecified. Even
when the relationship between the treatment and the instrument is non-linear, we can
still recover γ by separately estimating two linear equations (2.3) and (2.4).
The TSLS estimate of the local average treatment effect is equivalent to the ratio of
the reduced-form and first-stage estimates: γ = γ0/γ1. With variables in two different
samples, we can estimate two equations separately: we use the primary sample to es-
timate the reduced-form equation and the auxiliary sample to estimate the first-stage
equation. In our study, we use the sample of children born during the famine to estimate
the reduced-form equation, and the auxiliary sample of adults during the famine to esti-
mate the first-stage equation. Although TSLS is robust to model misspecification in the
one-sample setting, this robustness property does not carry over to the two-sample set-
ting (TSIV, Angrist and Krueger, 1992). A recent literature (Zhao, Wang, Spiller, Bowden,
Small et al., 2019; Shu and Tan, 2020) investigates a similar question, the impact of het-
erogeneity between distributions of the instrumental variable in two different samples.
Usually this is not a problem in economic studies that use natural experiments, since the
instrument is taken at an aggregate level.17 Here we are concerned with heterogeneity
in the distribution of covariates (observed and possibly unobserved) between the two
samples.
Van den Berg, Pinger, and Schoch (2016) solve the problem of heterogeneous sam-
ples by stratifying the data into homogeneous subsamples and then integrating over a
finite set of possibilities to obtain a non-parametric Wald estimator of the treatment ef-
fect. This approach is convenient in their application, where both the treatment variable
and the instrument are binary. In situations like ours, where information on the start and
end of the famine is unclear and there is variation in intensity across regions, researchers
may want to rely on continuous instruments Zi such as excess mortality rates (EDR) or
prices. Continuous instruments make it impossible to apply their non-parametric esti-
mator in these situations.
17For instance, in the literature on long-run effects of early childhood conditions, contextual factors at the
regional level are used to instrument for individual conditions early in life. The problem of heterogeneity
in the distribution of instruments is likely to be more relevant in genomics applications, where a specific
genomics instrument is at the individual level.
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In our study, we use children born during or shortly before the famine to estimate
equation (2.3), and people who were already adults to estimate equation (2.4). Mortality
profiles are generally U-shaped, implying higher mortality rates for the very young and
the very old, and low mortality rates for adults in their prime years. Therefore, the mor-
tality impact of a famine at very young ages is likely to be different from the mortality
impact at adult ages. The famine will, therefore, differently affect cohorts and thus result
in differential mortality selection across different cohorts. Further, young children sur-
viving the famine are more likely to come from families with favorable biological traits
and/or from (wealthier) families who had better access to food. Table 2.1 showed that
there were substantial differences between the distribution of covariates in the primary
sample and the auxiliary sample. Two-sample estimates using the original (i.e., raw un-
balanced) samples are therefore biased. In Appendix A, we illustrate the bias of TSIV
estimates using simulation exercises.
Two-sample instrumental variable (TSIV, Angrist and Krueger, 1992) and two-sample
two-stage least squares (TSTSLS, Inoue and Solon, 2010) are two widely used paramet-
ric estimators. Following Ho, Imai, King, and Stuart (2007), we propose a two-step ap-
proach to address the issue of heterogeneous samples. In the first step, we employ non-
parametric preprocessing, such as nearest-neighbor matching, to balance the covariate
distributions between the primary sample and the auxiliary sample. In the second step,
we perform a parametric analysis using the primary sample and the matched individuals
from the auxiliary sample.
The non-parametric preprocessing in the first step decreases the dependence on
parametric modeling assumptions in the second step. The simplest way to understand
our approach is to consider one-to-one-exact matching. This matches each individual
in the primary sample to a close match in the auxiliary sample. After the matching pro-
cedure, the preprocessed auxiliary sample is balanced with the primary sample, with
any unmatched auxiliary units discarded. With all units in the primary sample matched,
this procedure eliminates dependence on the functional form of the parametric analy-
ses in the second step. As a result, misspecification in the second step is less likely to be
a source of bias. This type of two-step procedure is often called “doubly robust”.
To formalize this idea, we show that the matched post-matching two-sample estima-
tor is consistent. In the first step, two samples are matched based on observables X .18
With the matched sample, a two-sample IV model is estimated following equations (2.3)
and (2.4). Let Ri be an indicator variable equal to 1 if the i th unit is drawn from the
18In practice, the matching can be based on different sets of observables X in each step. However, to simplify
notation, we use the same observables X in both steps.
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primary population, and 0 otherwise. Now suppose that we are able to observe D in the
target population (primary sample), and let β= [γ1,π1] be the vector of regression coeffi-
cients from regression (2.4) in the target population (i.e., the primary sample). Similarly,
let β̃ = [γ̃1, π̃1] be the vector of regression coefficients obtained from regressing D on Z
and X in the matched sample.
Assumption 1 (Random Sampling). The primary sample, S = (Yi , Zi , Xi )N0i=1, is a sample
obtained from N0 draws from the population distribution of (Y ,D, Z , X ). The auxiliary
sample, S = (Di , Zi , Xi )N1i=1, is a sample obtained from N1 draws from the population
distribution of (Y ,D, Z , X ).
Like Abadie and Imbens (2012), we assume that the data consist of a random pri-
mary sample and a random auxiliary sample to simplify the discussion. Let S∗ be the
matched sample generated by matching each unit in the primary sample, i , to the auxil-
iary sample, J (i ) without replacement. We only consider one-to-one matching, since the
auxiliary sample in our empirical application (section 2.5) is only slightly larger than the
primary sample. We choose the sets of matches J (i ) to minimize the sum of the match-
ing discrepancies,
∑N0
i=1 d(Xi , X j (i )). Similar to the matching literature, we assume that
the sum of matching discrepancies vanishes quickly enough to allow asymptotic unbi-
asedness as the sample size (N ) increases.
Assumption 2 also ensures that the support of the common variables (X ) in the pri-
mary population is contained within the support in the auxiliary population.
Assumption 2 (Support Condition). Let X1 = supp(X |R = 1) and X0 = supp(X |R = 0),
then X1 ⊆X0.
We now describe the population distribution targeted by the matched sample, S∗.
Let P (·|R = 1) and P (·|R = 0) be the source distributions of (Y ,S) that we draw the pri-
mary and auxiliary samples in S from, and let E [·|R = 1] and E [·|R = 0] be the corre-
sponding expectation operators. For given P (·|R = 1) and P (·|R = 0) and a given number
of matches M , we dene a matching target distribution, P∗ , over the triple (Y ,S,W ), as
P∗((Y ,S) ∈ A|R = 1) = P ((Y ,S) ∈ A|R = 1) and
P∗((Y ,S) ∈ A|R = 0) = E [P ((Y ,S) ∈ A|R = 0, X )|R = 1].
The first expression holds because the primary sample is our matched targeting distri-
bution. The second expression, the distribution of (Y ,S) in the auxiliary sample, is gen-
erated by integrating the conditional distribution of (Y ,S) given X and R = 0 over the
distribution of X given R = 1 in the primary sample.
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Assumption 3 (Propensity Score Equality). P (D = 1|Z , X ,R = 0) = P (D = 1|Z , X ,R = 1)
Assumption 3 requires predictive invariance for the treatment between the two het-
erogeneous populations. This assumption is similar to the idea of selection-on-observables.
Proposition 1. Under regularity conditions, the regression coefficients (β̃) of D on Z and
X in the matched sample, S∗, asymptotically recover the analogous regression coefficients
(β) in the population of the primary sample.
Proposition 1 formalizes the idea that the first-stage estimates of the matched sample
recover the parameters of the matching target distribution (i.e., the distribution of the
primary sample). We prove Proposition 1 in Appendix A. Note that our results are valid
for continuous treatment variables (D) and continuous instruments (Z ).
We illustrate this proposition using Monte Carlo simulation.19 The covariates are
drawn from uniform distributions in both the primary and auxiliary samples. The sup-
port of the distribution is designed to be larger in the auxiliary sample. Therefore, the
simulated covariates are heterogeneous across the two samples. Additionally, the re-
lationship between the endogenous variable and the instrumental variable depends on
covariates. Without knowing the actual data generating process, estimates from a heuris-
tic (misspecified) linear model using the auxiliary sample are an average effect over the
population in the auxiliary sample, which is likely to be different from the average effect
over the population in the primary sample. The simulation results show that both the
first-stage and second-stage estimates are biased using the original (unprocessed) data.
The non-parametric matching procedure restores homogeneity across samples, and af-
ter this preprocessing, classical two-sample IV returns unbiased estimates.
2.5. REEXAMINING THE LONG-RUN EFFECT OF CHINESE FAMINE
In the previous section, we developed a two-step procedure to combine information
from heterogeneous samples. In this section, we apply the method to estimate the causal
effect of famine induced undernourishment early in life on later-life health. The Great
Chinese famine has been studied extensively, and all studies use regressions like (2.3).
These studies resulted in different and sometimes conflicting conclusions. This discrep-
ancy is largely due to differences in instruments Z , different data sets, different selec-
tions made in the construction of the analysis sample, and different specifications for
the reduced-form regression (2.3), see Li and Lumey (2017).
19We discuss the details of the simulation in Appendix A.
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2.5.1. NEAREST-NEIGHBOR MATCHING
We use nearest-neighbor matching based on village of birth, mother’s age, and literacy
to balance the two samples. When village of birth information is not available, we match
individuals on county of birth, ensuring that the matched pairs have similar family back-
ground characteristics. Cao, Xu, and Zhang (2020) has documented that counties with
large family clans experienced lower mortality during the famine. Table 2.2 presents the
balanced primary and auxiliary samples after applying nearest-neighbor matching. As
an out-of-sample test, we also show summary statistics for two father’s characteristics,
which the matching algorithm does not target. The percentage of literate fathers is bal-
anced between the primary and auxiliary samples. Our matching algorithm significantly
improves balance for the average age of the father. The mean age difference decreases
from 5 to 1.5 after the matching procedure. This improvement signals that the balance
between the primary and auxiliary samples has been improved significantly, even for
variables we did not explicitly target.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics – Matched Sample
Female sample Male sample
Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD
Panel A: Matched primary sample
Age at 2010 956 50.40 1.88 970 50.59 1.88
Mother literate 956 0.15 0.36 970 0.18 0.39
Mother birth year 956 1931.37 7.26 970 1931.04 7.68
Panel B: Matched auxiliary sample
Mother literate 956 0.13 0.33 970 0.16 0.37
Mother birth year 956 1930.63 10.12 970 1930.43 10.35
Notes: Author’s tabulations of CFPS-2010. Panel A summarizes background information for individuals
in the matched primary sample. Panel B summarizes background information for individuals in the
matched auxiliary sample.
2.5.2. RESULTS FROM TWO-SAMPLE IV MODELS
The excess mortality rate (EDR) is commonly used in studies of the Chinese Famine
(Chen and Zhou, 2007; Almond, Edlund, Li, and Zhang, 2010), as well as in other stud-
ies (for instance, Bleakley (2007) use it as a measure of disease prevalence). We take
province-level mortality rates from Meng, Qian, and Yared (2015) and construct our in-
strumental variable (i.e., the excess death rate in 1960) following Chen and Zhou (2007).
We define the excess death rate in 1960 as the gap between the death rate in 1960 and
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the average death rate in the three years before 1959.
Figure 2.3: Mean Hunger Experiences versus EDR/log(EDR)
F-stat = 7.42
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(a) Mean Hunger Experiences versus EDR
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(b) Mean Hunger Experiences versus log(EDR)
Notes: Figure 2.3a and 2.3b present two binned scatter plots of the relationship be-
tween the percentage of respondents who had hunger experiences during the famine
and excess mortality rates in 1960. The excess death rate in 1960 is the gap between the
death rate in 1960 and the average death rate in the three years before 1959. Figure 2.3a
uses raw excess mortality rates, while Figure 2.3b uses the log-transformation of excess
mortality rates. The points on the figure plot the mean hunger experiences within each
EDR/log(EDR) percentile bin. The best-fit line is estimated using an OLS regression on
the underlying micro data. F-statistics for both regressions are reported separately.
We first check that our instrument is relevant for the excess mortality rate. Figure 2.3a
presents a binned scatter plot of the relationship between hunger experiences and ex-
cess mortality rates. The points on the figure plot the percentage of respondents who
had hunger experiences during the famine. Interestingly, a linear relation, which is im-
plicitly assumed by most famine studies, does not do a good job capturing the relation-
ship between EDR and hunger. The percentage of individuals who reported any hunger
experience remains more or less stable at 40% for excess mortality rates above about 15.
This implies that, for high excess mortality rates, the instrument is no longer informative
for actual hunger exposure. Indeed, the associated F-test of the linear regression is 7.42,
suggesting that the (linear) EDR is a weak instrument. This may explain why studies that
restrict their analysis to provinces with high mortality rates generally find small effects.20
An arbitrary solution would be to restrict the sample by leaving out provinces with
extremely high mortality rates. However, this will considerably decrease the sample size
and may generate selection bias.21 Instead, we decided to take a log-transformation of
excess mortality rates in the province where the individual lived (log(EDR)). Figure 2.3b
20A large proportion (7/10) of regional studies surveyed in Li and Lumey (2017), which look at high mortality
areas, finds insignificant impacts.
21The marginal survivor at high mortality rates will be different from the marginal survivor at lower mortality
rates.
2.5. REEXAMINING THE LONG-RUN EFFECT OF CHINESE FAMINE
2
31
shows that the relation between hunger experiences and the log(EDR) can be captured
well by a linear function. The associated F-statistic for the regression is well above 10.
Table 2.3: First-stage – the Effect of Famine Intensity on Hunger
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hunger
All All Female Female Male Male
log(EDR) 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Mother literate -0.020 0.0025 -0.044*
(0.026) (0.041) (0.023)
Age -0.00094 -0.00081 -0.0022
(0.0064) (0.0090) (0.0099)
Observations 1926 1926 956 956 970 970
F-Stat 26.18 26.18 32.92 32.92 14.93 14.93
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of hunger between 1957–1962 on log(EDR) (EDR is
short for excess death rates). We estimate the model on the matched auxiliary sample. The stratification
by gender is based on the gender variable in the primary sample. Standard errors, clustered by province
of the birth, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table 2.3 presents our estimation results from the first-stage linear regressions based
on the auxiliary sample, with an indicator for hunger (recall) as the dependent variable.
The table includes regressions without controls (columns 1, 3, and 5) and regressions
with controls (2, 4, and 6). As controls, we include age and literacy status for the (proxy)
mother. The table also presents estimates for the full sample (cf. Figure 2.3b) and esti-
mates by gender. Across all specifications, we find highly significant effects of the instru-
ment (log(EDR)) and F-statistics that well exceed 10, indicating that there is no problem
of weak instruments (Staiger and James, 1997).
Table 2.4 presents TSIV estimates of the treatment effect on the matched primary
sample. The table shows that famine-induced hunger increases the standardized metabolic
syndrome index by about 0.38. The ITT estimate from the reduced-form regression (2.3)
equals 0.032 (see Table B2 of Appendix B for the full table). For males, the coefficients are
small and insignificantly different from zero. These findings are at odds with a number
of studies on the long-run health effects of adverse conditions in early childhood. Most
of these studies find boys to be more sensitive to adverse conditions early in life. Our re-
sults are, however, in line with findings from other studies of the Great Chinese Famine.
See e.g. Almond, Edlund, Li, and Zhang (2010) who also find stronger effects for females.
Table B1 in Appendix B shows results for the separate components of the metabolic syn-
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Table 2.4: Effects of Hunger at Age 0–5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Metabolic syndrome (index)
Female Female Male Male
Hunger before age 5 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.045 0.062
(0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20)
Mother literate 0.028 0.031
(0.034) (0.026)
Age 0.013*** 0.0050
(0.0041) (0.0043)
Observations 2517 2517 2612 2612
Notes: The results are based on TSIV estimates from separate regressions. All regressions use the
log(EDR) as the instrumental variable on the (matched) primary sample of individuals born between
1957 and 1962 from three waves of the China Family Panel Survey (CFPS). Standard errors clustered by
province appear in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
drome index. For females, we find significant effects for all individual components (al-
beit only at the 10% level). Interestingly, for males we only find a significant effect on
obesity.
A significant proportion of previous studies that examine the Chinese Famine use the
linear EDR in regressions like (2.3) as an instrument/proxy for the severity of the famine.
To highlight that our two-step two-sample method’s is robust to functional form mis-
specification, we also present the instrumental variable estimate using the linear EDR
in Table B3 of Appendix B. The table shows that all four IV estimates are very close to
our main estimates using the log-transformed EDR (Table 2.4). Due to the weak instru-
ments, the standard errors are much larger. However, the similarity in the IV estimates’
magnitudes in Table B3 and Table 2.4 provides additional support for our preprocessing.
Specifically, these results support our claim that homogeneity between the two samples
decreases biases due to model misspecifications.
2.5.3. ROBUSTNESS TO VIOLATIONS OF PERFECT EXOGENEITY
One limitation of our instrumental strategy is that the exclusion restriction required
for a causal interpretation of the IV estimates may not be satisfied in our context.22
Famines may be accompanied by increased stress. Epidemiological studies find that pre-
natal stress exposure in humans is associated with later-life health outcomes, in partic-
22This is less of a problem in famine studies that estimate reduced-form regressions that include famine indi-
cators to obtain ITT effects on later life health. However, for these studies, the exclusion restriction assump-
tion is relevant if one wants to interpret the ITT effect as being driven solely by undernourishment.
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ular memory problems, decreased learning, depression, and dementia (Selten, van der
Graaf, van Duursen, de Wied, and Kahn, 1999; Heffelfinger and Newcomer, 2001). Fur-
ther, during a prolonged period of undernourishment the disease environment may
change, which may increase the prevalence of infectious diseases. This may affect later-
life health and socioeconomic outcomes (Almond, 2006). So, while we expect hunger to
be the most important channel through which a famine affects later life outcomes, it is
likely that alternative channels directly affect later-life health as well.
To examine the robustness of our TSIV estimates, we relax the assumption of perfect
exogeneity and derive bounds on the true effect of malnutrition early in life on later-
life health following Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012). We only perform this analysis for
females.23 Consider a generalization of the standard IV model that allows the instrument
Z to enter linearly in the second-stage regression,
Yi = γDi +λZi +πXi +Ui . (2.5)
Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012) shows how to obtain consistent estimates of the ef-
fect of interest (here γ, the effect of famine-induced undernourishment on health) if λ is
known. By choosing a set of fixed values for λ=λ0 and running separate regressions for
each value of λ= λ0, we can evaluate the sensitivity of the IV estimate of γ to violations
of the exclusion restriction.24 Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012) choose the ITT estimate
of the reduced-form regression as the relevant values of λ= λ0. In our case these values
come from equation (2.3). With an ITT estimate of 0.032 (see Table B2 of Appendix B) for
females, we examine the sensitivity of our TSIV estimate for λ ∈ [0,0.02].
We plot the TSIV estimates for different values of λ in Figure 2.4. The (straight) red
line is the point estimate of γ under different values of λ. The dotted line is the 95%
confidence interval. λ = 0 corresponds to the assumption that the famine affects later
life health only via hunger (D). Indeed, the point estimate at λ= 0 is about 0.38. Higher
values of λ are associated with more important alternative channels and hence smaller
coefficients for hunger. For instance, with λ equal to 0.016, we assume that only 50% of
the famine affects health via undernourishment.
Figure 2.4 shows that the straight line of point estimates for γ is relatively flat. Specifi-
cally, at λ= 0.016, γ is about 0.2 and still significantly different from zero. The IV estimate
only becomes insignificantly different from zero for higher values ofλ. To reject the long-
run impact of undernourishment, one must assume that at least 50% of the effect of the
23The previous section only showed significant effects for females.
24Another approach to finding this sensitivity is to use a sub-sample for which the instrumental variable does
not affect the treatment variable (van Kippersluis and Rietveld, 2018). In our setting, urban cohorts in the
famine are one candidate. However, since the urban cohort is so small, we don’t pursue this approach.
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Figure 2.4: 95% Confidence Intervals to Exclusion Restriction Violations
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Notes: The graph shows how the IV estimate of the effect of hunger in early life on hy-
pertension changes when the exclusion restriction λ= 0 is violated. Estimates and con-
fidence intervals come from estimating Equation (2.5) for females at different xed values
λ = λ0. The red line is the point estimate under different values of lambda; the dotted
line is the confidence interval. We control for fixed effects for year of birth, province of
birth and year of interview. Family controls include mother’s literacy and age.
famine is due to channels other than undernourishment. Overall, this exercise indicates
that our results are robust to moderate violations of the exogeneity assumption. The
strength of the first-stage estimates may be important for this finding. Documented in
Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2012), minor deviations from the exclusion restriction may
greatly decrease precision when instruments are weak. Table 2.3 showed that the first
stage estimates were strong and robust when additional covariates are included. Fig-
ure 2.4 shows that the benefit of having a strong instrument is that biases will be small
when perfect exogeneity is violated.
2.5.4. ADDITIONAL ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND SELECTION ISSUES
In this section, we explore some additional specification checks to examine the robust-
ness of our findings. Table 2.5 presents these additional specifications. Columns 2 and
4 present estimates of hunger’s effect with additional controls (age and literacy status
of the mother) in the regression; columns 1 and 3 report estimates without additional
controls.
Our mortality rate information is at the province level, so we use standard errors
clustered at the province of birth in our main specification. We also consider clustering
at the village of birth. We present these results in Panel A of Table 2.5. Clustered standard
errors by the province of birth are in parentheses; standard errors clustered at the village
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Table 2.5: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Metabolic syndrome (index)
Female Female Male Male
Panel A: alternative clustering
Hunger before age 5 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.045 0.062
(0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20)
[0.20] [0.20] [0.28] [0.29]
Observations 2517 2517 2612 2612
Panel B: small sample window
Hunger before age 5 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.059 0.074
(0.12) (0.12) (0.22) (0.22)
Observations 1859 1859 2040 2040
Panel C: control for migration
Hunger before age 5 0.36*** 0.36*** -0.014 -0.0070
(0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20)
Observations 2387 2387 2534 2534
Panel D: placebo test using cohort 1964-1967
Hunger before age 5 -0.22 -0.23 -0.26 -0.21
(0.20) (0.20) (0.35) (0.36)
Observations 2707 2707 2519 2519
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. All regressions use the log(EDR) as the instrumental
variable. In columns (2) and (4), we control for mother’s literacy and age. In Panel B, we drop individ-
uals born in 1962. In Panel C, we drop individuals for whom the residing province is different from the
province of birth. In Panel D, we estimate the same model using individuals born between 1964 and
1967. Standard errors clustered by province appear in square brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
level are in square brackets. Standard errors clustered at the village level are slightly
larger than those at the province level, but the estimates for females remain significant
at the 5% level. We also calculated standard errors clustered at the county of birth and
found similar results.
We also use a slightly smaller sample by restricting our sample to individuals born
between 1958 and 1961. Although recent studies (Tan, Zhibo, and Zhang, 2015) show
that the food shortage problems in some provinces were still present in 1962, the earlier
literature often assumed that the famine ended in 1961. An advantage of this age/cohort
restriction may be that the instrument is less noisy. However, the smaller sample size
may reduce statistical power. Panel B of the table shows that the effects for females be-
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comes larger and the standard errors are actually somewhat smaller.
Third, we check the impact of migration. CFPS collects very detailed information on
the province of birth. While across province migration is limited (only 4%), our matching
algorithm may perform worse for individuals who migrated.25 To check this, we drop
4% (82 cases) of individuals who do not live in their province of birth at the time of the
survey. We report these results in Panel C of the table; our estimates are hardly affected
by this restriction.
Additionally, we conduct a placebo exercise. Recall that we use variation in the peak
excess mortality rate across provinces and link these mortality rates to individuals born
in these provinces between 1958 and 1962. To examine whether other (province-level)
confounding effects may drive our results, we apply our two-step estimator to the co-
horts born between 1964 and 1967. The choice of the 1964–1967 cohort for the placebo
exercise is motivated by the literature that uses a DiD design, where the cohort born after
the famine is used as a control. We report the results of this exercise in Panel D. The esti-
mates have the wrong sign, but they are all insignificant. These results support the idea
that our findings are driven by famine-induced hunger and not other mortality-related
confounding factors that vary by province.
Finally, we conduct falsification tests to demonstrate the statistical power of our in-
ferences by assigning a pseudo-treatment. We randomly assign province of birth and
thus log(EDR) to each respondent in the main sample (cohort 1958–1962). If our iden-
tification strategy is valid, estimates using these pseudo-samples should be centered
around zero. In Figure 2.5, we plot the distribution of the t-statistics from 5,000 esti-
mated pseudo-treatment effects for males and females. The two distributions are both
centered around zero. To address our model’s statistical power, we mark the location of
the t-statistic of the baseline treatment effects in the distribution of pseudo-treatment
effects in Table 2.4. We also report the share of the pseudo-treatment t-statistics that
exceed the actual t-statistic of the baseline model (in absolute values). These p-values
support our design and the statistical power of our exercises.
A famine, especially when it lasts for a prolonged period, leads to selective mortality
and selective fertility. Starting with selective fertility, Roseboom (2010) show that during
the Dutch Hunger Winter of 1944 about half of the women in exposed areas did not men-
struate. For the same famine, Stein, Susser, Saenger, and Marolla (1972) found that fertil-
ity reductions primarily occurred in families from lower socioeconomic classes. Besides
fertility leading to a selective sample of births, there might also be differential mortality.
In utero, mortality is likely to occur more often among frail fetuses. Frailty may depend
25Non-migrants are more likely to be linked to a family residing in the same village.
2.5. REEXAMINING THE LONG-RUN EFFECT OF CHINESE FAMINE
2
37
Figure 2.5: Pseudo-treatment Effects
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Notes: Pseudo-treatment vs. actual hunger exposure: the distribution of t-statistics
resulting from 5,000 random assignments of treatment to individuals, as well as the
t-statistics from the actual treatment through hunger exposure (red line). “p-values”
report the share of the pseudo-treatment t-statistics that are larger than the actual t-
statistics.
on biological traits or poor living conditions for women during the gestational period. In
addition to in utero mortality, mortality may also occur between birth and the survey in
2010. The extent to which these selection effects take place will vary with the intensity of
the famine. In the context of the Chinese famine, with substantial regional variation in
famine intensity, this will lead to systematic differences in province populations, leading
to biased inferences.
We examine the possible influence of the selection effects by looking at cohort sizes.
We expand the CFPS data by including all individuals born between 1950 to 1966. We
count the number of observations for each birth year and regress these cohort sizes on
a linear time trend. Next, we use the ratio between observed cohort sizes and predicted
sizes to plot the detrended cohort loss series. The resulting detrended series based on the
CFPS closely resembles the detrended series based on the Census in 1990 (see Figure B1
of the Appendix B).
Figure 2.6 plots the detrended time series for literate and illiterate mothers. The fig-
ure shows a clear drop in cohort size of about 40–50 percent, indicating the importance
of selective fertility and mortality. These cohort size reductions are in line with the find-
ings in Roseboom (2010) and Scholte, Van den Berg, and Lindeboom (2015) for the Dutch
Hunger Winter. It is important whether the cohort size-reduction differs by socioeco-
nomic status. Figure 2.6 shows that there are only small differences in cohort size loss by
socioeconomic status as measured by literacy status. This further supports the idea that
our estimates are isolating the effect of hunger on later-life health.
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Figure 2.6: Cohort Loss by Mother’s Literacy
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Notes: Figure 2.6 plots the detrended relative cohort sizes by mother’s literacy using
CFPS-2010.
2.6. CONCLUSION
Undernourishment early in life may have lasting effects on health and socioeconomic
outcomes later in life. Most of the epidemiological and economic literature has pro-
duced intention-to-treat (ITT) effects from reduced-form regressions that relate later life
outcomes to indicators of famine exposure early in life. This paper uses an indicator of
actual hunger experience early in life from a hunger recall question in the China Fam-
ily Panel Survey (CFPS). To estimate the effect of undernourishment on later life health,
we develop a novel Two Sample IV (TSIV) approach that can deal with differences in the
distribution of observable and unobservable factors in the two samples. Using the CFPS
data, we find convincing evidence for long-term impacts on late-life chronic conditions
of early-life malnutrition for females, but not for males.
Using hunger recall information has two clear advantages over previous studies. First,
it allows us to examine the relationship between hunger experiences among survivors
and the commonly used famine indicator (excessive death rates). This helps justify in-
struments used in this literature, as well as providing insight into the proper specifica-
tion of the reduced-form regressions used in the extensive famine literature. Concern-
ing reduced-form regressions, we find a non-linear relationship between hunger recall
and the commonly used famine indicator (excess mortality rate). A linear specification
leads to weak instrument problems. The previous literature on the Chinese famine, in
essence, estimated linear relationships between the outcome of interest and famine ex-
posure. This may, in part, explain the differences in findings across studies. Second,
A. ADDITIONAL THEORETICAL RESULTS
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with hunger recall information we can estimate the causal effect of undernourishment
on later-life health. We show that these effects are robust to potentially mild and moder-
ate violations of the exogeneity assumption.
The TSIV method developed in this paper can deal with differences in the distribu-
tion of observables and unobservables in the two samples. It first uses a non-parametric
matching procedure to balance both samples, making the second-step less sensitive to
misspecifications. This ‘double robust’ estimator is relevant in light of the recent in-
terest in collecting and using recall information. Recall information, especially when it
relates to experiences from ten or more years ago, may be subject to recall errors and
may require auxiliary data to retrieve the relevant associations from the first stage equa-
tion in the TSIV model. In this framework, information on channels other than nutri-
tion could be added and used to disentangle the relevance of different channels through
which famines can affect later-life health. We leave this to future work.
A. ADDITIONAL THEORETICAL RESULTS
PROOF OF THE PROPOSITION 1
Proof. Let Q(·|R = 1) and Q(·|R = 0) represent the distributions of (D,S) given R = 1 and
R = 0, respectively. We use the notation D(0) to represent the latent D in the primary
sample. Therefore, the regression coefficient in the primary sample, our target, is dened
by EQ(·|R=1)[(D(0)−K ′b)2].
EQ(·|R=1)[(D(0)−K ′b)2] = EQ(·|R=1)[EQ(·|R=1)[(D(0)−K ′b)2|X ]] (2.6)
= EQ(·|R=1)[EQ(·|R=0)[(D(0)−K ′b)2|X ]] (2.7)
= E [E [(D −K ′b)2|X ,R = 0]R = 1] (2.8)
= E∗[(D −K ′b)2|R = 0] (2.9)
In the last equation, the first equality follows from the law of iterated expectations; the
second equality follows from propensity score equality. The last two equations follow the
definition of the matching target distribution. Until here, we have shown that matching
under propensity score equality allows us to reproduce the first stage setting for the pri-
mary sample. Therefore, the regression coefficient in the primary sample is recovered
using the matched sample.
To further establish the large sample property of β̃ as N1, N0 −→ 0, let β̃ be the vector of
sample regression coefficients obtained from regressing D on K = [Z , X ] in the matched
2
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sample,
β̃= argmin 1
N
∑
i∈S∗
(D −K ′b)2) = ( 1
N
∑
i∈S∗
K K ′)−1
1
N
∑
i∈S∗
K D. (2.10)
From 6-9, the matching procedure makes sure 1N
∑
i∈S∗ K K ′
p−→ H . H = E(K K ′) is the
Hessian, which is invertible by assumption.
β̃−β= ( 1
N
∑
i∈S∗
K K ′)−1
1
N
∑
i∈S∗
(K D −K K ′β) p−→ 0 (2.11)
To make sure that H is invertible, we need to a list of regulation conditions. Low-level
assumptions can be found in Abadie and Imbens (2012).
To identify the treatment effect in a two-sample setting, we also need following stan-
dard assumptions in the instrumental variable model.
Assumption A1 (Instrument Relevance). Z ⊥̸ D|X
Assumption A2 (Instrument Independence). Z ⊥ U |X
Assumption A3 (Exclusion Restriction). Y ⊥̸ Z |D, X ,U
With additional assumptions A1-A3, two-sample estimators (TSIV or TSTSLS) after
matching can recover the local average treatment effect in the population of the primary
sample.
SIMULATION STUDY
We investigate the finite-sample properties of our proposed two-step methods. The
main focus is to evaluate the performance of the two-step approach we proposed. R
codes for performing the simulations are provided in the Supplementary Material.
Let U (a,b) be the uniform distribution on [a,b]. R is an indicator variable, equal to 1
or 0 for the primary or auxiliary sample, respectively. To model the heterogeneity in two
samples, X |R = 1 ∼U (0,1) and X |R = 0 ∼U (0,2).
For the primary population, we generate data according to
Y = 0.5D +X +U , (2.12)
the endogenous variable D is defined as
D = 0.5X Z +X 2 +V , (2.13)
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where Z is distributed as N (0,1) and (U ,V ) are distributed independently of (Z , X ) as(
U
V
)
∼ N
(
0
0
)
,
(
1 0.5
0.5 1
)
. (2.14)
For each simulation, we generated an i.i.d. sample of size N0 = 500 and recorded only
(Y , Z , X ) from the primary population and generated an i.i.d. sample of size N0 = 1000
and recorded only (Y , Z , X ) from the auxiliary population. The two samples are then
merged into one. We consider the following post-matching regression specifications,
the first-stage equation:
D = τ1Z +β1X +V ; (2.15)
the second-stage equation,
Y = τ0D +β0X +U . (2.16)
As we have one endogenous variable and one instrumental variable, we can estimate
the model using either TSIV or TSTSLS. The specification is incorrect relative to the con-
ditional expectation E [D|Z , X ] for the first-stage equation. For our simulation results,
we will focus on estimators of τ0. For the simulation, τ0 = 0.5 under the matching target
distribution.
Table A1 summarizes the results based on 1,000 repeated simulations. In a regression
that uses the full sample without matching, both TSIV and TSTSLS estimates of τ0 are bi-
ased under misspecication. After matching, both TSIV and TSTSLS yield valid estimates
for τ0.
Table A1: Monte Carlo Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TSIV TSTSLS
Full sample Post-matching Full sample Post-matching
τ0 0.23 0.47 0.27 0.55
(0.033) (0.067) (0.037) (0.076)
τ1 0.49 0.24 0.49 0.24
(0.034) (0.067) (0.036) (0.069)
Notes: Target parameter: coefficient τ0 = 0.5 and τ1 = 0.25. The results based on 1,000 repeated simula-
tions. DGP can be found in Section A.
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Figure B1: Cohort Loss in CFPS
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Notes: The figure compares the relative survivor birth cohort sizes in our data set (CFPS-
2010, the solid line) with the relative cohort sizes in Meng, Qian, and Yared (2015) (Cen-
sus1990, the dashed line).
Table B1: Effects on Separate Components
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Components
Metabolic High blood
syndrome (index) Diabetes pressure Obesity
Panel A: Female
Hunger before age 5 0.37*** 0.033* 0.075* 0.064*
(0.14) (0.020) (0.039) (0.035)
Observations 2517 2517 2517 2517
Panel B: Male
Hunger before age 5 0.052 -0.034 -0.042 0.15***
(0.20) (0.034) (0.064) (0.049)
Observations 2612 2612 2612 2612
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. All regressions use the log(EDR) as the instrumental
variable. The sample contains all individuals born between 1957 and 1962 in three waves of CFPS. Three
components, diabetes, hypertension, and obesity, are dummy indicators constructed from CFPS. Stan-
dard errors clustered by province appear in square brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level respectively.
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Table B2: Reduced-form Estimates at Age 0-5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Metabolic syndrome (index)
Female Female Male Male
log(EDR) 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.0026 0.0035
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Mother literate 0.027 0.028
(0.031) (0.026)
Age 0.013*** 0.0048
(0.0044) (0.0043)
Observations 2517 2517 2612 2612
Notes: The results are based on reduced-form estimates (2.3) from separate regressions. All regressions
use the (matched) primary sample of individuals born between 1957 and 1962 from three waves of the
China Family Panel Survey (CFPS). Standard errors clustered by province appear in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table B3: Effects of Hunger at Age 0-5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Metabolic syndrome (index)
Female Female Male Male
Panel A: log(EDR) as the instrumental variable
Hunger before age 5 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.045 0.062
(0.14) (0.14) (0.20) (0.20)
Mother literate 0.028 0.031
(0.034) (0.026)
Age 0.013*** 0.0050
(0.0041) (0.0043)
Observations 2517 2517 2612 2612
Panel B: EDR as the instrumental variable
Hunger before age 5 0.42* 0.43* 0.063 0.11
(0.22) (0.23) (0.30) (0.31)
Mother literate 0.021 0.031
(0.033) (0.028)
Age 0.013*** 0.0052
(0.0043) (0.0045)
Observations 2517 2517 2612 2612
Notes: The results are based on TSIV estimates from separate regressions. All regressions are based on
the (matched) primary sample of individuals born between 1957 and 1962 from three waves of the China
Family Panel Survey (CFPS). Panel A uses the log(EDR) as the instrumental variable. Panel B uses the
EDR as the instrumental variable. Standard errors clustered by province appear in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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IODINE 1
3.1. INTRODUCTION
Iodine deficiency early in pregnancy can have significant, irreversible effects on the brain
development of the fetus (Cao, Jiang, Dou, Rakeman, Zhang, O’donnell, Ma, Amette,
DeLong, and DeLong, 1994) and can, therefore, have important consequences for hu-
man capital formation of children and subsequent socioeconomic outcomes. Indeed,
the large medical literature (see Zimmermann, 2011, for a systematic literature review)
has found adverse effects of iodine deficiency on later life growth and development, in
particular when exposed early in life. Using historical data, recent economics papers
such as Feyrer, Politi, and Weil (2017); Adhvaryu, Bednar, Molina, Nguyen, and Nyshad-
ham (2020) found that cohorts exposed to higher levels of iodine intake have higher labor
force participation rates, higher incomes and also higher probabilities of entering top-
tier occupations with higher cognitive demands. Although the benefits of micro-nutrient
improvement have been documented for decades, still only around 66% of households
have access to iodized salt globally.2 Further, little is known about pathways between
early in life exposure and adult productivity and earnings. This impedes our understand-
ing of how developmental trajectories unfold over the life course and who benefits most
1This chapter is based on Deng and Lindeboom (2019).
2In 2007, an estimated 31.5% of school-age children (266 million) had insufficient io-
dine intake. In the general population, this amounted to 2 billion people. See also:
WHO, www.who.int/nutrition/publications/micronutrients/FNBvol29N3sep08.pdf, UNICEF,
www.who.int/nutrition/topics/idd/en/.
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from large scale interventions.
Our contribution to the extent of literature is to consider and account explicitly for
possible interactions with gender preferences in receiving parental investments early in
life. These differences are deeply rooted in gender norms, which are important in East
and South-East Asia and the Middle East and North Africa. The idea that gender prefer-
ences play a role in the western world cannot be excluded either. Biased gender norms
may already have an impact on children very early in life and might explain heteroge-
neous gender effects found in the literature on the long-run effects of early life shocks
(Field, Robles, and Torero, 2009; Maccini and Yang, 2009; Adhvaryu, Bednar, Molina,
Nguyen, and Nyshadham, 2020). This paper examines the effect of a massive, nation-
ally implemented salt iodization program in China. Evidence of differential program
effects by gender would not only provide new interpretation to gender differences in the
impact of early in life shocks found in the literature but also shed light on predictions
of theoretical models of human capital formation that allow parents to make compen-
satory and reinforcing investments in different dimensions of human capital. Parental
child preferences play an important role in such investments. If compensatory invest-
ments of parents are relevant, then large scale interventions may crowd out (or reinforce)
private investments and may also affect skills dimensions initially not aimed. Public pol-
icy can, therefore, have positive (and possibly) unintended effects on gender equality in
societies where gender norms are important. Understanding mechanisms underlying
program effects are crucial as any intervention would be blind without knowledge of the
mechanisms underlying behavioral responses.
To fight against iodine deficiency-related diseases around the country, the Chinese
government implemented a national program of regulating salt to contain iodine in Oc-
tober 1994. At the same time, biennial province-based monitoring was introduced to
record the use and iodine content of household salt, along with urinary iodine concen-
trations among schoolchildren. After the introduction of the program, the urinary io-
dine concentration reached satisfactory levels from 1995 onward, and the percentage of
children who had goiter3 dropped rapidly. Given the importance of iodine during the
gestational period for brain development (Cao, Jiang, Dou, Rakeman, Zhang, O’donnell,
Ma, Amette, DeLong, and DeLong, 1994; Zimmermann, 2011), we, in the first instance,
focus on the potential impact of this policy on cognitive ability and school attainment of
children who are affected in utero.
3Iodine is an essential component of hormones produced by the thyroid gland. Iodine deficiency can lead to
an enlarged thyroid gland located at the base of the neck, which is the most visible consequence of iodine
deficiency. Goiter in adulthood does not have severe consequences, while iodine deficiency in utero can lead
to impaired neurodevelopment of the child and post-birth cognitive disabilities.
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For this, we link iodine deficiency information across locations collected at the start
of the intervention to nationally representative rural samples drawn from the China
Family Panel Studies (CFPS). A unique aspect of the CFPS survey is that math and vocab-
ulary ability from standardized tests were collected besides information on educational
attainment and schooling. Similar to Shah and Steinberg (2017), our human capital mea-
surements in the CFPS have the advantage that the same questions were given to each
individual in the survey, no matter whether he/she is currently enrolled in school or not.
With this data set, our empirical design does not suffer from selection bias caused by
censoring individuals who had already left school. To identify the long-term benefits of
the salt iodizing policy, we use the national salt iodizing program as a quasi-experiment
and exploit geographic variation in goiter prevalence before the intervention. So, we es-
sentially compare improvements in math and vocabulary ability as well as educational
attainment and years of schooling of cohorts conceived before and after the salt iodiza-
tion in areas with varying pre-intervention goiter prevalence. Additionally, we make sure
that we are comparing outcome variable trends (by birth cohort) across high and low goi-
ter province of birth in their deviation from each region’s average trend. We also include
an extensive set of controls, such as pre-treatment province characteristics interacted
with cohort dummies to flexibly control for confounding factors at the province level that
might deferentially affect cohorts. Our difference-in-differences estimates show that the
salt iodization policy has substantial and significant effects on cognition for girls. A one
standard deviation (12%) decrease in the pre-intervention regional goiter rate is asso-
ciated with an increase of 15% in female math and vocabulary test scores. We also see
significant increases in educational attainment and the schooling of women. Yet, for
men, we find much smaller and insignificant effects. The improvement in human capi-
tal translates to an about 5% increase in income for females.4
Gender preferences are important in China. We present a model of human capital
accumulation and parental investments as one potential way to rationalize the empiri-
cal results described above. In this model, gender preferences play a part, and parental
investments interact with different endowments at birth. The model suggests that with
preferences on boys, parents tend to compensate more for boys than girls when they are
disadvantaged at birth. The model’s predictions are in line with our finding of strong and
sizable effects for girls and small and insignificant effects for boys. On the other hand,
the model suggests that parental investments can be diverted to different dimensions
of skills, such as non-cognitive skills, when there is no need to compensate for the cog-
4To calculate the increase in income, we use the results in Wang (2013), who finds that one year of additional
schooling raises income with 15% in China.
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nitive disadvantage at birth. Similarly, with preferences on boys, the diversion will be
stronger for boys than for girls. Indeed, we find that the program has positive effects for
boys on non-cognitive skill measures. We find no impact on girls in these non-cognitive
skill dimensions. Similar to Dahl, Kotsadam, and Rooth (2017); Dhar, Jain, and Jayachan-
dran (2018); Dossi, Figlio, Giuliano, and Sapienza (2019), we proxy gender preferences by
gender attitudes, specifically, about the appropriate roles and rights of women and girls.
Across all outcomes, we find that the gains in cognition are most significant for girls
born in regions with the strongest son preferences. For boys, we see an opposite hetero-
geneous treatment effects of iodized salt across districts with different gender attitudes.
All the evidence above suggests that gender preferences are an indispensable pathway
to explaining the gender difference in the program effects.
Our study contributes to at least four strands in the literature. Firstly, we add to the
literature on the long-term effects of early-life conditions. Much of early “fetal origins”
work (see, among others, Almond, 2006; Van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Portrait, 2006)
has focused on demonstrating the impact of extreme, traumatic experiences (disease
outbreak, recessions, famines, severe environmental shocks, etc.) in early life. Recent
studies (see Niemesh, 2015; Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond, 2016; Feyrer, Politi,
and Weil, 2017; Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie, 2018; Adhvaryu et al., 2020) have shifted
the focus to estimating gains to exposure to a purposeful large-scale distribution of re-
sources. The nationally implemented intervention in China started just after the launch
of the 1993 WHO campaign. The program is, to the best of our knowledge, the largest
of its kind. It is also a commonplace, moderate intervention, and has, therefore, rele-
vant external validity—this aids policymakers in optimizing similar policies in the fu-
ture. Furthermore, while there exist a large body of studies that look at the impact of in
utero exposure to the quantity of food (see Lumey, Stein, and Susser, 2011, for an excel-
lent review of the famine literature), only a few studies (e.g. Field, Robles, and Torero,
2009; Feyrer, Politi, and Weil, 2017; Adhvaryu et al., 2020) have looked at the long-run
effects of food quality or nutrient intake.
Secondly, and related to the above, we contribute to the discussion on intermedi-
ate proxy indicators of long-term outcomes. Adhvaryu, Bednar, Molina, Nguyen, and
Nyshadham (2020); Feyrer, Politi, and Weil (2017) examines the long term effect of a
salt iodization program, promoted by a private firm, on lifetime income at later ages.
Adhvaryu, Bednar, Molina, Nguyen, and Nyshadham (2020) find an about 10% income
increase for those exposed to the iodine program. We look at the effect of a public pro-
gram on childhood cognition and education and find substantial effects. Our study thus
adds to a full picture of how early-life disadvantage unfolds over the life course. We use
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measurements of human capital that include standardized numeracy tests for all chil-
dren, as opposed to most of the previous literature, which only focuses on school enroll-
ment. A few recent studies such as (Figlio, Guryan, Karbownik, and Roth, 2014; Almond,
Mazumder, and Van Ewijk, 2015; Bharadwaj, Lundborg, and Rooth, 2017; Shah and Stein-
berg, 2017) take a similar approach as we do by examining the effects of events in early
childhood on cognitive test outcomes during the school years. Most studies use admin-
istrative data of developed countries, where standardized tests cover most of the school-
going children at a certain age. In developing countries, however, a substantial share of
the children is already out of school at young ages, and therefore, a similar strategy will
only partly measure the effectiveness of the intervention. Moreover, if collected, most
human capital measurements are self-reported performance measures, which makes
the comparison across individuals difficult. Our work complements the literature with
evidence from a vast developing country by using a data set where the results of stan-
dardized math and verbal tests are collected for all children, in and out of school.
Thirdly, we also shed light on the literature about child gender preferences. Gender
biases favoring males, particularly in education, are more extensive in developing coun-
tries like China and India. Females in those countries often receive fewer investments
from parents (see, for example, Oster, 2009; Jayachandran and Kuziemko, 2011; Bharad-
waj and Lakdawala, 2013; Barcellos, Carvalho, and Lleras-Muney, 2014) and are likely
not to reach their full potential in education, health, and personal autonomy. In our cur-
rent study, the iodine policy has positive (possibly unforeseen) spillovers to females. Our
study therefore also speaks to the relevance of early life conditions in explaining gender
differences in socioeconomic outcomes later in life.5
Finally, our heterogeneous analysis that includes gender preferences is motivated by
theoretical models of human capital formation. In such models, often dynamic comple-
mentarities between investments at different stages of childhood are considered (Cunha,
Heckman, and Schennach, 2010). A handful of studies (Adhvaryu, Molina, Nyshadham,
and Tamayo, 2015; Gunnsteinsson, Adhvaryu, Christian, Labrique, Sugimoto, Shamim,
and West Jr, 2018; Duque, Rosales, and Sanchez, 2018; Aguilar and Vicarelli, 2018; Rossin-
Slater and Wüst, 2018) attempt to identify these dynamic complementarities empirically.
For this, they use exogenous variation at different stages of the life cycle and generally
cannot find evidence for dynamic complementarities. However, as pointed out by Mala-
mud, Pop-Eleches, and Urquiola (2016), parents might increase investments in the child
to counter the adverse effects of the initial shock. This may confound the impact of sub-
5See Almond and Currie (2011) who call for work that integrates work on son preference with work on fetal
origins.
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sequent shocks. They furthermore argue that human capital outcomes for children are
the result of parental preferences, the family budget constraint, and the shape of the
child health production technology. This makes it challenging to interpret reduced form
effect estimates. We use parental gender attitudes as a proxy for parental preferences to
identify one of the channels in children’s human capital formation and find that gender
preferences are important in the formation of the human capital of school-aged chil-
dren.
Our results point towards four observations that are relevant for the strands of lit-
erature referred to above: the relevance of parental investment responses in mitigating
the effects of adverse shocks early in life; that child gender preferences are important for
these investments decisions; that large scale interventions may crowd out private invest-
ments and may also affect skills dimensions initially not aimed at; large scale programs
can have positive and possible unintended effects on gender equality in societies where
boy preferences are important.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief overview of
Iodine Deficiency Disorders (IDD), the Universal Salt Iodization (USI), and related liter-
ature. Section 3.3 describes the data used in the analysis. Section 3.4 outlines empirical
model and Section 3.5 discusses the results of the models. We zoom in on our find-
ing of differential effects by gender in section 3.6. This section presents a simple model
where gender preferences may differently affect parental investment in girls and boys.
We introduce gender attitudes as a proxy for gender preferences and examine whether
the program’s effects on cognitive and non-cognitive skills vary with gender attitudes.
Section 3.7 summarizes our findings, places these findings into context and concludes.
3.2. BACKGROUND
Iodine is an essential component of the hormones produced by the thyroid gland and
is therefore essential for human life (Zimmermann, 2011). Insufficient iodine intake
causes many disorders from the fetal stage to adulthood, the most common of which
is an enlargement of the thyroid gland. Although this enlargement, called goiter, is the
most visible symptom of iodine deficiency, besides being inconvenient, it has no severe
consequences. However, fetal exposure to iodine deficiency may lead to impaired neu-
rodevelopment. The brain damage caused by severe iodine deficiency in this stage of life
is often irreversible.
The knowledge that iodine can help prevent goiter has existed since the mid-1800’s
(Zimmermann, 2008). It was not until 1895 that iodine was first discovered in the thy-
roid gland (Baumann, 1896). Switzerland was the first country in the world to introduce
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iodized salt in 1922. The United States introduced iodized salt in 1924 after the exec-
utive Council of the Michigan State Medical Society officially endorsed iodized salt. In
1993, the World Health Organization (WHO) proposed a worldwide campaign to eradi-
cate IDD. The primary intervention strategy for IDD control is Universal Salt Iodization
(USI), a notably simple, universally effective, and particularly cheap instrument. The
World Bank reports that it only costs approximately $0.05 per child per year.
Historically, endemic goiter was found particularly in the mountain regions in China.
For instance, in the 1940s, more than 20% of the residents of Kunming, the capital of the
province of Yunnan, had goiter (Simoons, 1990). The Chinese Academy of Preventive
Medicine had estimated that about 450 million people lived in iodine-deficient areas,
with more than 30% of the population considered at risk of IDD (see Chen and Wu, 1998).
The iodine deficiency disorders problem was acknowledged as a public health threat,
and in response to this in 1993, the State Council of China announced the Universal Salt
Iodization (USI) policy to eliminate IDD by 2000.
The Universal Salt Iodization was a national strategy. As the recommended strategy
for controlling IDD, the USI requires that all edible salt, including salt for food processing
and household use, is iodized. Accordingly, all counties throughout China should sup-
ply iodized salt (except for very few (22 out of 1800) officially approved counties). The
challenge of the policy was to increase salt iodine levels sufficiently to bring the median
urinary iodine concentration of children into the 100–199 ţg/L range and at the same
time maintaining the optimal urinary iodine concentration (MUIC) levels of pregnant
women (150–249 ţg/L). To reach the desired intake of iodine, the State Council enacted
in October 1994 the national regulation of salt iodization. The level of salt iodization
during the manufacturing process was set at 50 mg/kg in 1994.
Besides, between 1993 and 1995, a national monitoring system was built to track
trends in goiter prevalence among school children aged 8-10. The monitoring was held
between March and June 1995. In our empirical analyses (see section 3.4), we will use the
outcome of this monitoring exercise as the pre-policy distribution of iodine deficiency
levels across the different provinces. Note that this is a few months after the implementa-
tion of the Salt Iodization Program. Therefore, a concern may be that the cross-province
variation in goiter rates does not reflect the pre-policy distribution of iodine deficiency
rates. It is important to stress that the literature has documented lags of at least one year
before goiter rates normalize after iodine repletion (Pardede, Hardjowasito, Gross, Dil-
lon, Totoprajogo, Yosoprawoto, Waskito, and Untoro, 1998; Jooste, Weight, and Lombard,
2000; Zimmermann, Hess, Adou, Toresanni, Wegmüller, and Hurrell, 2003).6
6Pardede, Hardjowasito, Gross, Dillon, Totoprajogo, Yosoprawoto, Waskito, and Untoro (1998) and Jooste,
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Figure 3.1: Goiter Distribution in 1995
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(13.9,20.7]
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No data
Notes: Figure 3.1 reports goiter rates (%) (among schoolchildren aged 8-10) in 1995.
Darker areas represent higher goiter rates.
Sources: National Iodine Survey 1995
Figure 3.1 shows the pre-policy spatial distribution of iodine deficiency levels of schoolchil-
dren aged 8-10. Pre-policy (1995) goiter rates among children under ten years old do not
differ significantly by gender (Sun, 2018). The dark areas (mostly western and northern
provinces) indicate high prevalence rates (up to 43.3%), while the light areas (southeast)
indicate low prevalence rates. For our empirical analyses, it is of importance to know
whether the Universal Salt Iodization policy was effective in increasing the urinary io-
dine concentration levels in the population. We turn to this below in the data section.
3.3. DATA
3.3.1. GOITER DATA
The base, pre-policy, geographic distribution of goiter prevalence before the salt iodiza-
tion policy (see Figure 3.1) came from the 1995 National Iodine Survey on goiter rates7
among schoolchildren.8 In each provincial survey, a multistage, probability proportional
Weight, and Lombard (2000) documented non-significant reductions in the size of the thyroid gland among
children age 12 in South Africa one year after the introduction of iodized salt. Zimmermann, Hess, Adou,
Toresanni, Wegmüller, and Hurrell (2003) found in children aged 8-9 in Cote d’Ivoire even two years after the
salt intervention only an eight percent reduction in the goiter rates.
7The goiter rate is defined as the percentage of schoolchildren who have either Class I or Class II goiter. Class
I goiter in normal posture of the head cannot be seen, and it is only found by palpation. Class II goiter is
palpable and can be easily seen. Goiter rates in previous studies are the prevalence of Class II goiter as the
information mostly comes from historical data.
8Although there was no representative measures of goiter prevalence before 1995, goiter prevalence of 15 areas
(from 10 provinces) were measured in three consecutive years (1991, 1992, and 1993). The average goiter rate
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to the population size cluster sample was obtained. The county served as the primary
sampling unit, and in each province, 30 counties (clusters) were selected from a county
population list. In each selected county, a school was then sampled at random. Chil-
dren aged 8 to 10 years at the time of the survey served as the index population. For
each cluster, 40 children were selected at random from the enrollment list. All children
were examined for thyroid size by palpation.9 Therefore, the goiter rate is defined as the
percentage of schoolchildren who have either Class I or Class II goiter. The sample sizes
by province ranged from 1,200 to 2,400 (mean, 1,259). Our goiter data has an impor-
tant advantage over goiter measures used in some recent studies like Feyrer, Politi, and
Weil (2017); Adhvaryu, Bednar, Molina, Nguyen, and Nyshadham (2020) who use goiter
prevalence among military recruits. This index population consists of young and healthy
and as such may not be a representative measure of local iodine deficiency problems.
The survey was held every two or three years, enabling us to track the effectiveness
of the Universal Salt Iodization program over time. Indeed, the program was proved to
be very effective. By 2002, provinces converged to very low child goiter rates, so that
provinces with high pre-eradication levels of goiter experienced the largest reductions.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.2a that shows average goiter rates (%) across China over
1995-2002. The average goiter rate decreased from 20% in 1995 to around 5% in 2005.
Figure 3.2b shows the post-campaign decline in goiter rate versus pre-campaign levels.
Of importance for our empirical analyses is that this figure shows that the policy was
effective in bringing down goiter rates for all provinces.
3.3.2. THE SAMPLE, OUTCOME VARIABLES AND CONTROL VARIABLES
THE SAMPLE
The micro-level data used in this study come from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS).
The CFPS is a large-scale nationally representative panel survey conducted by the So-
cial Science Survey Institute at Peking University. Three waves of the survey have been
published until 2017. The CFPS baseline wave (hereafter CFPS-2010) selected a total
of 14,798 households, containing 33,600 adults and 8,990 children. A second and third
wave of the CFPS followed the same individual from the households in 2012 and 2014
(hereafter CFPS-2012 and CFPS-2014). A standard math and verbal tests were carried out
in CFPS-2010 and CFPS-2014. For all three waves, educational attainment was recorded.
Besides cognitive measures also, some non-cognitive measures were collected. We pro-
vide more information on these measures in section 3.6. To maintain the consistence of
is 12.9, 15.9, and 13.6 in these 15 areas, which supports that the decline of goiter prevalence started from 1995.
9In some provinces, part of the children were also examined by ultrasound.
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Figure 3.2: Goiter Prevalence Before and After the Intervention
5
10
15
20
G
oi
te
r R
at
e 
(%
)
1995 2000 2005
Year
(a) Goiter Rates Decline
0
10
20
30
40
D
ec
re
as
e 
in
 g
oi
te
r r
at
e 
af
te
r I
od
is
ed
 s
al
t
0 10 20 30 40
Pre-Iodised Goiter Rate
(b) Before and After the Intervention
Notes: Figure 3.2a reports time-series data on mean goiter rate (among schoolchildren
aged 8-10) across country between 1995 to 2005. Figure 3.2b shows the post-intervention
decline in goiter rate versus pre-intervention levels across China.
Sources: National Iodine Survey 1995-2005
the sample selection, we pool the baseline wave (CFPS-2010) and the third wave (CFPS-
2014) together. The data include accurate birth information, such as year, month of
birth, place of birth, and whether individuals were born in a rural area. We restrict our-
selves to those born in the rural areas (81% of the total population). The intervention is
likely to be cleaner for those born in a rural area, as in the urban areas people had better
access to micronutrient food supplements.10 The survey also collects respondents’ mi-
gration history. Migration at young ages is very low (less than 3%). The Salt Iodization
policy was implemented in October 1994. We include cohorts born between July 1990
and June 2000. At the base wave (CFPS-2010), these individuals were between 10 and 19
years old. This leaves us with 4039 children at the baseline survey. For 4021 children in-
dividuals, we have all the key information on test scores and education. The third wave
(CFPS-2014) included the same math and verbal tests as the baseline wave. We, there-
fore, added this third wave to our baseline data. This resulted in 441 additional children.
However, due to sample attrition between 2010 and 2014, we also lost 1069 individuals.11
In the end, we have 7414 observations on schooling (3856 males and 3558 females) and
6420 observations on test scores (3310 male and 3110 female test scores). In the analyses,
we link these individual observations to the pre-policy goiter rates.
10The use of such supplements are also likely to vary by parental Socio-Economic Status (SES), which in itself
correlates strongly with our cognitive and educational outcomes measures.
11In section 3.5.3, we show that the main findings are robust to the sample attrition by only using the data in
the baseline.
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VARIABLES
Educational attainment is an ordered categorical variable ranging from one to four (illit-
erate, graduated from primary school, middle school, and high school). In the regression
analysis, we use a dummy variable, indicating whether individuals have graduated from
primary school. The number of years in school measures schooling. As alternative mea-
sures of human capital, we also use a math test and a verbal test designed by the CFPS
team. Both tests were presented to the students, irrespective of their age. The math
test was designed to test for primary and secondary school math knowledge and con-
sists of twenty-four mathematical problems. Questions were sorted in order of increas-
ing difficulty, and each of those questions counted for one point. Similarly, the verbal
test consists of thirty-four Chinese characters based on the language textbooks again.
Characters, which counts for one point each, are sorted in order of increasing difficulty.
Therefore, full scores of the math and language test are 24 and 34, respectively. Note
that as we measure cognition and schooling at fixed points in time, older children will
perform better. It will, therefore, be important to control for age in the later regressions.
Our primary empirical strategy controls for age in a very flexible way by fully exploiting
the panel structure of the data set. Particularly, we always control for CFPS wave by age
(dummies) interactions. Additionally, CFPS waves by cohort interactions are included to
make sure we are always comparing individuals with same age. The sample also includes
basic socio-demographic variables, such as age, gender, parental educations, birth order,
and family size.12 In our empirical strategy, it will be important to control for the possi-
ble mean reversion. Therefore, we supplement the set of individual controls with a series
of province-level pre-policy characteristics. All these variables are listed in Appendix A,
where we also describe how variables are constructed.
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of socio-demographic variables by gender for
provinces with high initial (pre-policy) goiter rates (goiter rates above the median of 17%)
and low initial goiter rates (goiter rate prevalence less than 17%) for cohorts born before
the implementation of the program (1991-1994).13 The Table shows that parental edu-
cation is higher in regions with low initial goiter rates. The table also shows that female
outcomes on test scores and education are slightly better than the outcomes for males.
However, the table also shows that the differences in schooling and test scores between
high and low goiter regions are larger for girls than for boys.
12Families in the rural area were regularly exempted from the one-child policy. For example, rural married
couples were allowed to have a second child if the first child was female (Zhang, 2017). The sex ratio in our
sample of rural born children is about 1.07, which is lower than 1.12 (i.e., the sex ratio at birth in the 1990s
documented in Jayachandran (2015)).
13In the Appendix, we provide results for the cohorts born after the implementation of the salt iodization policy
(Table A2).
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
High Goiter Provinces Low Goiter Provinces
Females Males Females Males
Outcomes
Educational Attainment 2.96 2.93 3.13 3.03
[0.85] [0.86] [0.76] [0.78]
Illiterate 0.053 0.066 0.016 0.0090
Primary School 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.26
Middle School 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.43
High School or above 0.29 0.27 0.34 0.31
Schooling 9.95 9.78 10.5 10.2
[3.11] [3.23] [2.58] [2.59]
Math Test Scores 15.3 15.2 16.3 15.6
[5.67] [5.89] [4.90] [5.39]
Verbal Test Scores 26.3 25.2 27.0 25.3
[7.23] [7.75] [5.94] [7.17]
Demographics
Age 19.1 19.3 19.4 19.4
[2.58] [2.58] [2.55] [2.62]
Father’s Educational Attainment 2.29 2.26 2.52 2.56
[0.96] [0.99] [0.93] [0.90]
Mother’s Educational Attainment 1.70 1.72 2.10 2.04
[0.87] [0.87] [0.92] [0.90]
Birth Order 1.59 1.57 1.61 1.79
[0.83] [0.79] [0.82] [0.94]
Family Size 4.89 4.57 4.89 4.67
[1.47] [1.44] [1.42] [1.52]
Number of observations 810 895 795 926
Notes: Author’s tabulations of CFPS-2010 and CFPS-2014. Sample consists individuals born in rural area
between July 1990 and June 1995. We label a province as high/low goiter if its goiter rate is above/below
17% (median).
3.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
3.4.1. BASELINE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
As we discussed in the previous section, salt iodization was rolled out nationwide in
October 1994. Therefore, no province could serve as a pure control group. As a proxy
for pre-policy iodine deficiency rates, we use province goiter rates among 8-10 years
old children at the start of 1995 (see Figure 3.1). Like, among others, Bleakley (2010a);
Adhvaryu, Bednar, Molina, Nguyen, and Nyshadham (2020), we use a difference-in-
differences design. In this way, we compare trends in various outcome measures in
provinces with different levels of iodine deficiency before implementing the salt iodiza-
tion program.
We define someone as treated if the entire gestation period14 is after the date of the
14As is generally done in the literature, we use a nine-month gestation period.
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implementation of the salt iodization program. All others are considered to be con-
trols. In section 3.5, as a robustness check, we also consider alternative definitions to
assign treated and controls in groups. In contrast to earlier studies that used the 1924
salt iodization policy in the U.S., the Chinese iodized salt campaign was implemented
rapidly across the entire country. At the start of 1995, more than 80% of the families had
already access to iodized salt. Two years later, this has increased to 95%.
During the gestational period, iodine primarily affects the fetus’ neurodevelopment,
with consequences for postnatal cognitive functioning (Cao, Jiang, Dou, Rakeman, Zhang,
O’donnell, Ma, Amette, DeLong, and DeLong, 1994; Zimmermann, 2011). Therefore, we
focus in the first instance on the impact of the salt iodization policy on cognitive ability
and school attainment of children who are affected in utero. For this, we use the follow-
ing baseline regression:
Yi pt =β0 +β1Postt ×Goi terp +Xi ptρ+δp +γt +ϵi pt (3.1)
where outcome Yi pt is either the logarithm of the cognitive test scores (math and ver-
bal), educational attainment as well as the number of schooling years for individual i ,
who was born in province p, in year t . Postt indicates whether the individual was con-
ceived after the introduction of iodized salt. Goi terp is a measure of pre-eradication
endemicity in individual i ’s province of birth. As mentioned above, we use goiter rates
collected in the National Iodine Survey held at the start of 1995. The mean goiter rate is
20%, and the standard deviation is 12%.
The vector Xi pt includes individual characteristics: parents education and family
size, and mean-reversion controls.15 First, we follow Bleakley (2010b) and construct the
mean-reversion control by interacting provincial average educational attainment in the
1990 Census with the dummy variable Postt . Second, we control for many baseline
province pre-treatment characteristics interacted with cohort dummies. In our base-
line model, we control for hospitals per capita in 1991, hospital beds per capita in 1991,
and the sex ratio in Census1990, again all interacted with cohort dummies. In a robust-
ness check (section 3.5.3), we additionally control for the number of schools per capita
in 1991, poverty rates in 1993, and average household income in 1991 all interacted with
cohort dummies.16
To take into account age effects and the year of survey effects, CFPS wave by age
15If the oldest cohorts had high Iodine Deficiency Disorders and low human capital because of some mean-
reverting shock. We might expect human capital gains for the subsequent cohorts, even in the absence of a
direct effect of the salt iodization policy on productivity.
16The provincial poverty rates in 1993 are obtained from Woo, Li, Yue, Wu, and Xu (2004). The average house-
hold income in 1991 is constructed from the National Fixed Point Survey.
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(dummies) interactions are also included. Additionally, CFPS waves by cohort interac-
tions are included to account for differential trends in the outcome variables. δp and
γt are province and birth cohort fixed effects. δp and γt are province and birth cohort
fixed effects. Note that the birth cohort fixed effects are important here as our outcome
variables are measured in 2010 and 2014, which implies that those exposed to the salt
iodization are much younger than the controls. We also control for region-specific lin-
ear trends in all models.17 We run specification (3.1) separately for males and females.
We also consider alternative specifications in section 3.5.3. Of prime interest is the con-
tinuous treatment variable Postt ×Goi terp that proxies potential iodine exposure. Re-
call from Figure 3.2b that the salt iodization policy was very effective in reducing goiter
rates in all provinces to very low levels. So while the parameter β1 in a strict sense is the
intention-to-treat effect, the high compliance rates make it very close to the treatment
effect.
3.4.2. DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION
Since our estimates use the cross-province convergence in goiter rates created by the
introduction of iodized salt (Figure 3.2a and 3.2b), convergent pre-trends across high
and low-base goiter rate provinces prior to 1995 are a concern. Therefore, we also use
an event study design to test for the common pre-trends assumption formally. More
specifically, we run the following regression:
Yi pt =β0 +
2000∑
t=1990
βt ×Goi terp +Xi ptρ+δp +γt +ϵi pt , (3.2)
where βt gives the cohort-specific relationship between pre-eradication endemicity and
later-childhood outcomes.18 If salt iodization affected the human capital formation of
exposed cohorts, these effects should be visible in a break from pre-existing trends in βt .
This method will also shed light on the partial effects of iodine exposure in late child-
hood (rather than in utero) if such effects exist.19 Note that all individuals born in 1995
or later are exposed to iodized salt from conception onward. Individuals born in 1994 ex-
perience higher iodine intake in their year of birth; thus, this cohort is partially exposed
17The regions consist of several provinces. See Table A1 of the Appendix A for the precise definition.
18In practice, β1994 represents estimates of individuals born between July 1994 and June 1995, and β1995 for
the cohort born between July 1995 and June 1996, etc. We made such adjustments because individuals born
after July 1995 were conceived after implementing the salt iodization policy. Similarly, the 1993 cohort are
those born between July 1993 and June 1994.
19See Zimmermann (2011) for a comprehensive summary of the role of iodine in human growth at different
stages in life. For example, neonatal iodine deficiency may cause endemic cretinism. Deficiency during
childhood and adolescence may impair mental functioning and delay physical development.
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to higher iodine levels in utero and fully exposed from birth onward. Individuals born in
1993 experience higher iodine from age one onward, and those born in 1992 experience
higher iodine from age two onward. Since we normalize the 1994 cohort coefficient to
zero, our analysis essentially tests for differential effects of exposure relative to exposure
at age one and older. If there are additional benefits to having access to iodine between
conception and age 1, we would expect the coefficients β1995+ to be positive. Similarly,
if iodine at age 1 has an additional benefit relative to iodine exposure at age two or older,
we would expect coefficients β1993− to be negative.
3.5. RESULTS
3.5.1. BASELINE RESULTS
Table 3.2 reports the main results of two separate regressions of our basic model (Equa-
tion 3.1): one for men in Panel A and the other for women in Panel B. In all the regressions
discussed in this section, the coefficients of interest are the post-by-goiter rate interac-
tion, which represent the effect of salt iodization on our outcomes of interest. The co-
efficients in all tables have been multiplied by 12, the inter-quartile (25-75) range of the
goiter distribution. The size of the effect is scaled to be the effect of moving from a rela-
tively high goiter province to a low goiter province. Although the following tables only re-
port the coefficient of interest, in all specifications, we include controls for province and
year of birth fixed effects, birth order, family size, parents’ characteristics, region-specific
linear trends, a series of mean reversion controls, age and the survey year controls. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the province-of-birth level to allow for arbitrary correlation
of the errors for individuals born in the same province. We also report two-way clustered
standard errors by province and family (in parenthesis) to take account of situations
where there are multiple children in a family. The standard errors of two-way cluster-
ing are almost identical to the usual cluster robust standard errors. Given that our data
only contain 28 provinces, we produce statistical inference based on the wild-bootstrap
approach (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008). The associated wild-bootstrap stan-
dard errors (in angle brackets) turn out to be similar to the usual cluster robust standard
errors. For all four human capital measures, we identify significant effects of the inter-
vention for females. A one standard deviation decrease in the pre-intervention goiter
rate is associated with about 4% increase in the probability of graduating from primary
school, a 10% increase in schooling, 14% increase in math and 12% increase in verbal
test scores. For males, the coefficients are substantially smaller in magnitude and not
significant for any of the outcome variables.
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Table 3.2: Iodine Exposure and Human Capital Attainment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Test Verbal Test Primary Schooling
ln(scores) ln(scores) School ln(years)
Panel A: Males
Post × Goiter 0.0298 0.0605 0.0171 0.0228
[0.0508] [0.0511] [0.0226] [0.0411]
(0.0566) (0.0666) (0.0234) (0.0370)
〈0.0553〉 〈0.0492〉 〈0.0210〉 〈0.0428〉
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.517 3.083 0.497 2.108
Observations 3310 3310 3791 3654
Panel B: Females
Post × Goiter 0.137 0.117 0.0382 0.108
[0.0372]*** [0.0556]** [0.00811]*** [0.0202]***
(0.0310)*** (0.0468)** (0.0134)*** (0.0185)***
〈0.0312〉*** 〈0.0507〉** 〈0.0122〉*** 〈0.0152〉***
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.543 3.170 0.528 2.123
Observations 3110 3110 3510 3386
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. All regressions control for fixed effects specific to
birth province and birth year, birth order, family size, parents’ education, region-specific linear trends,
survey wave by age interactions and survey wave by cohort interactions. Mean-reversion controls
include provincial average educational attainment in the 1990 Census interacted with the dummy for
treated cohorts, hospitals per capita in 1991, hospital beds per capita in 1991, and the sex ratio in
Census1990 all interacted with cohort dummies. Standard errors clustered by province appear in square
brackets. Two-way clustered standard errors by province and family appear in parenthesis. Standard
errors based on wild-bootstrap approach (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008) with 999 replications
appear in angle brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
3.5.2. RESULTS FROM THE EVENT STUDY
Crucial for the causal interpretation of our coefficients is the assumption of common
pre-intervention province trends in the outcome variables. In order to test for differen-
tial pre-trends, we run regressions of the form specified in Equation (3.2). The Figure 3.3
plots the estimated coefficients (βt ) of the event study for females. Results for males
are reported in Appendix B (Figure B1). The figure shows that the trends leading up to
the year of the intervention are identical and insignificant from the 1994 effect. This
gives confidence in the validity of the common trend assumption. Figures 3.3a and 3.3b
show that math and verbal scores of females increase shortly after the intervention with
about 10%. For educational outcomes (Figure 3.3c and 3.3d), we see a similar picture
(about 10% for both educational attainment and years of schooling, respectively). While
there is some variation in the effect size of the program across the cohorts, the 95 per-
cent confidence intervals overlap for all cohorts. This suggests that females born in the
later cohorts obtain comparable benefits from the adoption of iodized salt. The results
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for males in Appendix B point at insignificant effects for all outcome variables and all
cohorts.
Figure 3.3: Event Study
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Notes: The sample includes all female respondents from two waves of the survey (CFPS-
2010 and CFPS-2014). Each point reflects the coefficient estimated on an interaction
term between the birth year (compared to 1995) and the pre-intervention (base) level
of the goiter rate in the birth-province. Capped spikes represent 95 percent confidence
intervals. All models condition upon birth province and birth year fixed effects and the
full set of controls used in our main analysis.
3.5.3. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
There are several reasons why trends in educational outcomes across birth cohorts might
differ across provinces. In this section, we explore some additional specification checks
to make sure that our baseline results can be interpreted as causal. Table 3.3 presents
these additional specifications/checks. Here we restrict ourselves to the results of ro-
bustness checks for females. The same robustness checks for males are reported in Ta-
ble B1 of Appendix B.
3
62 3. IODINE
Table 3.3: Robustness Checks (Female)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Test Verbal Test Primary Schooling
ln(scores) ln(scores) School ln(years)
Panel A: raw test scores
Post × Goiter 0.814 0.667 0.0399 0.493
[0.239]*** [0.439] [0.00783]*** [0.108]***
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.90 25.23 0.530 8.730
Observations 3110 3110 3522 3386
Panel B: additional controls
Post × Goiter 0.108 0.106 0.0230 0.0842
[0.0437]** [0.0509]** [0.0224] [0.0346]**
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.543 3.170 0.530 2.123
Observations 3110 3110 3522 3386
Panel C: drop partial exposed group
Post × Goiter 0.124 0.113 0.0386 0.106
[0.0395]*** [0.0536]** [0.00754]*** [0.0183]***
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.540 3.169 0.529 2.120
Observations 3026 3026 3426 3297
Panel D: only using baseline wave 2010
Post × Goiter 0.129 0.105 0.0442 0.100
[0.0310]*** [0.0468]** [0.0142]*** [0.0185]***
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.491 3.128 0.343 1.975
Observations 1861 1861 1906 1906
Panel E: small sample window
Post × Goiter 0.137 0.136 0.0322 0.0899
[0.0278]*** [0.0495]** [0.0106]*** [0.0201]***
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.580 3.196 0.553 2.146
Observations 2529 2529 2877 2755
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. All regressions except Panel B use the same
controls as the baseline model in Table 3.2. In Panel B, we control for birth-region and birth-year specific
interaction instead, and we additionally control for schools per capital in 1991, poverty rates in 1993,
and average household income in 1991 all interacted with cohort dummies. Standard errors clustered
by province appear in square brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
Data: CFPS-2010 and CFPS-2014
To ensure that the logarithm transformation does not drive our finding, we run the
same regression using raw math and verbal scores as dependent variables. The results
reported in Panel A show that the conclusions from the baseline models remain to hold
and that the functional specification does not drive the findings.
Another concern of our identification strategy is mean reversion. In the baseline,
we control for many baseline province pre-treatment characteristics interacted with co-
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hort dummies. To further decrease the concern for mean reversion, we also control the
number of schools per capita in 1991, poverty rates in 1993, and average household in-
come in 1991 all interacted with cohort dummies. The provincial poverty rates in 1993
are obtained from Woo, Li, Yue, Wu, and Xu (2004). The average household income in
1991 is constructed from the National Fixed Point Survey. Instead of region-specific lin-
ear trends, we control for the region of birth by birth year interactions. The results of
this exercise, reported in Panel B, show that the effects remain significant and are quan-
titatively similar (if not, larger) than the baseline estimates. A one standard deviation
decrease in the pre-intervention goiter rate is associated with a roughly 15% increase in
cognitive ability and 11-13% in educational outcomes for females.
In section 3.3, we assigned individuals into the treatment group if the full gestation
period was after October 1994. All others, the partially exposed and those who were not
exposed, were placed in the control group. This assumes that the gestational period was
precisely nine months and that those whose gestational period partly lies after October
1994 are not exposed in utero. This classification is perhaps a bit too conservative. Panel
C reports the results using the sub-sample where the partially exposed children (born in
April, May, and June 1995) are dropped from the analyses. The results in Panel C show
that this hardly affects the estimates.
The verbal and math test remained the same over the 2010 and 2014 wave. In the
basic specification, we pooled the observations from the 2010 and the 2014 wave. Indi-
viduals in our analysis are in their late teen ages/early-adulthood, and therefore as we
do in the regressions controlling for age is important. However, using information from
all waves has a threat that individuals might learn from the test results in the first wave.
This makes the second wave test scores inappropriate as a measurement of develop-
ment in cognition. As a check, we run regressions using only the data from the first wave
of the CFPS. Results of using only first wave in 2010 is also informative on the impact of
sample attrition between the first wave in 2010 and the last wave in 2014. Indeed, we
lost around 30% percent of observations due to attrition (see section 3.3). The results in
Panel D show that the results remain close to our baseline specification and confirm our
main findings.
We also used a slightly smaller sample window by restricting individuals born be-
tween July 1991 and June 1999. The advantage is a lower attrition rate in wave 2014 as
older cohorts (born in 1990) are more likely to have left home. Moreover, the trimming
of the left and right tail of the age distribution makes the sample more homogeneous.
A downside of this age/cohort restriction is a smaller sample size and hence less power.
Still, however, all four estimates in Panel E remain to be significant and close to the base-
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line estimates in Table 3.2.
We also performed a placebo test, where use parental education (which was used as
a control variable in the main specifications) as outcome variables. The idea of this test
is that parental education should not be affected by future exposure to iodized salt, and
if we do find an effect, it may suggest that our results may be driven by parental back-
ground. Indeed, both mother and father’s education (measured by education attain-
ment or years of schooling) are not affected by future exposure (results available upon
request).
Finally, we further verify our identification assumptions and demonstrate the statis-
tical power of our inferences by conducting falsification tests where we assign a pseudo-
treatment. More precisely, we randomly assign province of birth and thus pre-intervention
goiter rates to each respondent in our sample. If our identification strategy is valid, we
would expect estimates using those pseudo-samples to be centered around zero. We
can then confront our baseline estimates with the results from the pseudo-sample. In
the Figure 3.4, we plot the distribution of the t-statistics from 5,000 estimated pseudo-
treatment effects on educational attainments, schooling, math and verbal ability, re-
spectively. As expected, all four distributions are centered around zero. Together, these
results imply that assumptions in our empirical model are unlikely to be violated. To
address the statistical power of our model, we mark within the distribution of pseudo-
treatment effects the location of the t-statistic of the baseline treatment effects in Ta-
ble 3.2. We also report at the top of each figure the share of the pseudo-treatment t-
statistics that exceed the actual t-statistic of the baseline model (in absolute values).20
These p-values give confidence in our design and statistical power of our exercises.
3.5.4. ENDOGENOUS SEX SELECTION
In this section, we address the potential threat posed by endogenous sex selection. Goi-
ter rates may influence the gender ratio for biological reasons. Alternatively, there could
be parental motives related to goiter prevalence rates to sex select. In the presence of
ultrasound techniques, such selection effects are not inconceivable. In either case, this
would imply that the marginal girl born in a high goiter area would be different from the
marginal girl born in a low goiter area, which may pose a threat to the interpretation of
our findings.
To rule this out, we test directly whether the provincial sex ratio is correlated with io-
dine deficiency (goiter prevalence rates). More importantly, we test whether the associa-
20These p-values can be seen as alternatives to the p-values obtained from our clustered standard errors re-
ported in Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.4: Falsification Tests
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Notes: Pseudo-treatment vs. actual policy intervention: the distribution of t-statistics
resulting from 5,000 random assignments of treatment to individuals, as well as the t-
statistics from the actual treatment through the policy intervention (red line). “p-values”
report the share of the pseudo-treatment t-statistics that is larger than the actual t-
statistics.
tion changes after 1994. Following Edlund, Li, Yi, and Zhang (2013) we use the Census of
2000 to calculate the sex ratio by the birth year (1987 to 1999) at the province level. Link-
ing this data with provincial goiter rates, we display in Figure 3.5 the results of an event
study regression that relates provincial sex ratios to goiter prevalence rates. As may be
clear from the graph, there is no association between the sex ratio and iodine deficiency,
and the association does not change after introducing the salt iodization policy.
3.5.5. COMPARISON WITH OTHER COHORT-BASED IODINE STUDIES
Some recent studies (Field, Robles, and Torero, 2009; Feyrer, Politi, and Weil, 2017; Ad-
hvaryu, Bednar, Molina, Nguyen, and Nyshadham, 2020) also analyze the long-run im-
pacts of iodine deficiency in early-life. Field, Robles, and Torero (2009) was one of the
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Figure 3.5: Sex Ratio and Iodine Deficiency
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Notes: Sex ratios are aggregated from microdata of the 2000 Census. Following Edlund,
Li, Yi, and Zhang (2013), we calculate the sex ratio at province level for each birth year
between 1987 and 1999. In the event study regression, we control for province fixed
effects and year of birth fixed effect. Therefore, cohort who were born 1999 is the baseline
group and the coefficient of the cohort 1999 is then omitted in the graph. Standard errors
are clustered by province.
first to provide evidence at the micro-level of the effect of iodine availability in utero
on schooling attainment in Tanzania. Feyrer, Politi, and Weil (2017); Adhvaryu, Bed-
nar, Molina, Nguyen, and Nyshadham (2020) exploit a nationwide salt-iodization pro-
gram initiated by the public health authorities in Michigan in 1924.21 Similar to our
study, they use pre-program geographical information on goiter prevalence along with
the time variation in the introduction of iodized salt to assess the causal effect of iodine
on later life outcomes. Feyrer, Politi, and Weil (2017) find strong effects for males: iodized
salt in utero leads to a 15 point increase in I.Q. Interestingly, Adhvaryu, Bednar, Molina,
Nguyen, and Nyshadham (2020), using census data, find no effects for males, but strong
increases in income (11%), labor force participation (0.68%) and full-time work (0.9%)
for females. Field, Robles, and Torero (2009) also find stronger effects for girls. Like
Adhvaryu, Bednar, Molina, Nguyen, and Nyshadham (2020), we only find effects for fe-
males. Relating our findings to Field, Robles, and Torero (2009) and Adhvaryu, Bednar,
Molina, Nguyen, and Nyshadham (2020), we find that the introduction of iodized salt
leads to 0.441 additional years of schooling (see panel A of Table 3.3). This estimate is
in line with Field, Robles, and Torero (2009), who find that the iodine supplement pro-
gram increased schooling years with 0.35-0.56 years. Wang (2013) finds for China that
one year of additional schooling raises income with 15%, which translates to an about
21Morton’s salt, the largest producer in the U.S. at that time, began selling iodized salt in the fall of 1924.
3.6. MORE ON GENDER DIFFERENCES
3
67
5% (0.441×0.11) increase in income for females in our study.
Our strong effects of iodine in utero for females is consistent with the medical liter-
ature that posits that female fetuses are more sensitive to maternal thyroid deficiency
than male fetuses Zimmermann (2011). However, this does not imply the absence of
effects for males (see, for instance, the findings of Feyrer, Politi, and Weil (2017) and
Field, Robles, and Torero (2009)). In developing countries, gender differences in socio-
economic outcomes are bigger than in developed countries, and cultural gender norms
may contribute to gender differences in human capital outcomes. These gender norms
may already have an impact on children very early in life and might explain heteroge-
neous gender effects found in the literature on long-run effects of early life shocks.22 In-
deed, parents’ preferences for boys make these parents to desire more sons than daugh-
ters, but it may also result in parents choosing to invest more in sons than in daughters
(Jayachandran, 2015). The former mechanisms may result in a male-skewed sex ratio.
Almond and Edlund (2008); Abrevaya (2009) find that son preferences in Asian immi-
grants to the U.S. seem to persist with changing the economic environment, suggesting
a strong role for culture (i.e., preferences). Important for our study is that son prefer-
ences may imply not only more material and non-material resources in boys post-birth
but also that parental investments post-birth may mitigate some of the adverse effects
of iodine deficiency in boys more than in girls. This would be consistent with our finding
of the strong effects of the salt iodization policy for girls and no effect on boys. Below we
discuss the role of parental investments, which helps to explain the mixed finding in the
literature concerning gender.
3.6. MORE ON GENDER DIFFERENCES
3.6.1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
To explicitly consider possible interactions between gender preferences in receiving parental
investment and endowment early in life, we consider a slightly adjusted version of the
model of child human capital formation (Yi, Heckman, Zhang, and Conti, 2015; Almond,
Currie, and Duque, 2018). In the model, each child has two components of human
capital: cognitive skills (θC ) and non-cognitive skills (θN ). Parents can influence the
formation of human capital by making investments in the child’s skill dimensions I k ,
k ∈ {C , N }. The optimal investment decision follows from a maximization of the parents’
22This was recently also argued by Dinkelman (2017), who refers to the effects of local shocks to the environ-
ment in the Asian context that affect resource availability. Findings for Indonesia (Maccini and Yang, 2009)
and India (Pathania, 2007) point at more negative effects for girls.
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utility function:
U =U (c, q) = (1−αs ) logc +αs log q(θN ,θC ), (3.3)
subject to a budget constraint and the child’s human capital production function, where
s ∈ {boy s, g i r l s}, c parental consumption and q child quality. The parameter αs cap-
tures the preferences for child quality and may vary across families. Son preferences
imply higher values of αs for boys, αboy s > αg i r l s . From the optimization of the model, it
follows that the optimal investment depends on the child’s initial endowments, the price
of consumption, the price of investments in skills and preferences αs . Note that invest-
ments could be broadly interpreted. It could be well-targeted efforts aimed at improving
specific skills as well as the provision of an environment (e.g., food, housing, attention,
etc.) that foster child well-being and child outcomes. In this multidimensional model of
human capital formation, investment strategies of parents depend not only on parental
preferences but also on the production technology and the budget constraint.23
Following Yi, Heckman, Zhang, and Conti (2015); Almond, Currie, and Duque (2018),
the total effect of a shock early in life (e) on cognition can be decomposed into two parts:
dθC
de︸︷︷︸
A
= ∂θ
C
∂e︸︷︷︸
B
+ ∂θ
C
∂I C︸︷︷︸
C
× ∂I
C
∂e︸︷︷︸
D
. (3.4)
A similar expression can be obtained for non-cognitive outcomes (θN ). The term (A)
on the left-hand side of (3.4) is the total effect of an early-life shock and corresponds to
the usual reduced form estimates in the empirical literature. In our study, before the
salt-iodization policy, the term (A) would be the effect of iodine deficiency, i.e., the pre-
intervention cognitive outcomes in late childhood due to geographical variation in io-
dine levels. The first term on the right-hand side (B) is the biological effect that directly
operates through the production function. The second term (C×D) is a behavioral effect
from the parental investment response, where (C ) is the productivity effect of the invest-
ment (the marginal Efficiency of Investment) and (D) the resource allocation effect. The
resource allocation effect (D) depends on parental preferences αs . The total effect of the
shock (A) will be less than the biological effect (B) in case parents respond with invest-
ments to counter the adversity of the early-life shock. High values αs imply more weight
to child outcomes and imply higher levels of parental investment to counter the early-
life shock. Conversely, given a biological effect (B), a higher weight (αs ) for boys than for
23Almond and Mazumder (2013) give examples that show that compensation for an early-life shock is optimal
in some settings and not in others. Moreover, the absence of behavioral responses could also be the result of
a family being financially constrained. See Almond and Mazumder (2013) for more details.
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girls implies more investments for boys than for girls and hence smaller reduced form
effects of iodine deficiency for boys at later ages. This is in line with the findings of some
empirical studies.
The salt iodization policy neutralizes geographically determined iodine deficiency
rates. The policy has, therefore, two consequences. First, it reduces the negative cogni-
tion effects of iodine deficiency for both genders. In the presence of gender preferences,
the reduction in female disadvantage in cognition due to the reform will be more sub-
stantial than for boys (holding the biological effect (B) constant). This is consistent with
our finding of positive and significant cognition effects of the salt iodization policy for
girls and small and insignificant effects for boys. Second, the salt ionization program will
alter parental investment decisions. The need to invest in cognition is reduced or may
even be absent, and parents may divert (part of the) investments into other dimensions
of human capital (notably non-cognitive skills). For example, parents may set a particu-
lar target for schooling for their children. When after the salt iodization program targets
for schooling are met, parents may shift some of their investment skill dimensions.
Although the literature on non-cognitive skills in developing countries is still very
limited, there are several reasons to hypothesize that parents will invest in non-cognitive
skills. Firstly, parents can easily observe emotions, mental and physical health. Sec-
ondly, parents might believe that non-cognitive skills could improve the child’s welfare.
Although there is little evidence about the returns to income from non-cognitive skills
in a developing country, parents may be convinced that non-cognitive skills can benefit
their child’s welfare via other dimensions (e.g., the marriage market).
Although the literature on non-cognitive skills in developing countries is still limited,
there are several reasons to hypothesize that the parental can and will respond to and
invest in non-cognitive skills. Firstly, non-cognitive skills might be quite salient. Parents
can easily observe their child’s mental health and emotion, mainly targeted by the CES-
D questionnaire. Secondly, parents might reasonably believe that non-cognitive skills
could substantially affect children’s welfare. Even there is very little evidence around
the returns to non-cognitive skills in a developing country context in terms of income,
parents can still reasonably conclude that non-cognitive skills can benefit their children
in other dimensions (e.g., the marriage market).
Note that this does not imply that cognitive and non-cognitive skills are substitutes
and that this behavior does not contradict skill complementarity in the sense of Heck-
man (2007).24 Indeed, a prediction from the model (Yi, Heckman, Zhang, and Conti,
24It needs to be pointed out that here that dynamic complementarities, as discussed in the literature by Heck-
man (2007), only imposes restrictions on the functional form of the human capital production technology.
Importantly, the dynamic process of human capital formation is jointly determined by parental preferences,
3
70 3. IODINE
2015; Almond, Currie, and Duque, 2018) is that parents can compensate and reinforce
initial shocks along different dimensions of human capital. Or, related, via “cross-productivity”
(Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov, 2006), changes in one dimension of human
capital may also affect the accumulation of other dimensions.25 Therefore, although the
medical literature primarily documents neuro-developmental impairments as a con-
sequence of in-utero exposure to iodine deficiency (Zimmermann, 2011), it cannot be
ruled out that elimination of iodine deficiency also impacts non-cognitive dimensions
of human capital (such as physical health, personality traits, risk attitude, etc.). The ef-
fect (sign and magnitude) of the salt iodization on non-cognitive outcomes is ultimately
an empirical matter.
We use the baseline specification (3.1) to estimate the effect of the salt iodization
policy on five different measures of non-cognitive skills. The first four measures are ob-
tained from the 20 questions in the CES-D module of CFPS-2012. See Appendix C for
details about the construction of the four measures. The fifth measure of non-cognitive
skills is derived from a question in CPFS-2014: “How well are you getting along with
others?". The results of the difference-in-differences regressions for the non-cognitive
skill measures are displayed in Table 3.4. The table shows that the salt-iodization policy
significantly improved retarded somatic activity, depressed affect, interpersonal prob-
lems, and social skills for boys. The corresponding coefficients for females are much
smaller and insignificant. This finding is consistent with the idea that when the salt-
iodization policy eliminates the cognitive disadvantage at birth, parental investments in
boys that were initially geared towards cognitive skills are now diverted to other dimen-
sions of human capital. Two alternative explanations are biological pathways and “self-
productivity of skills” denoted by Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010). To the best
of our knowledge, there is no medical evidence that iodine deficiency in utero is related
to the non-cognitive skills development. Therefore, the biological pathway is not likely
to be the main explanation. And recall that we do not find significant impacts of the
policy on boy’s cognitive abilities, “self-productivity of skills” is also not likely to explain
the positive effects on the non-cognitive skills of boys. However, it cannot be ruled out
budget constraints, and the production technology. So, even if there are dynamic complementarities in the
technology of human capital formation such that “capabilities beget capabilities”, parents can still respond
endogenously by mitigating or reinforcing disadvantages early in life. Similar arguments have been made by
Malamud, Pop-Eleches, and Urquiola (2016) and were confirmed by a series of empirical studies (Adhvaryu,
Molina, Nyshadham, and Tamayo, 2015; Gunnsteinsson, Adhvaryu, Christian, Labrique, Sugimoto, Shamim,
and West Jr, 2018; Duque, Rosales, and Sanchez, 2018; Aguilar and Vicarelli, 2018; Rossin-Slater and Wüst,
2018).
25Note, however, that in our simple model there is no role for “cross-productivity” and this is thus not captured
in the decomposition (3.4). An example of decomposition which includes “cross-productivity” can be found
in Grönqvist, Nilsson, Robling et al. (2018).
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that primarily, the production technology of cognitive and non-cognitive skills and their
interaction drives our findings (Almond, Currie, and Duque, 2018). We also used the to-
tal CES-D score as a measure for non-cognitive skills. We find a sizable and significant
coefficient of -0.912 (with a p-value of 0.044).
Table 3.4: Iodine Exposure and Non-Cognitive Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Somatic Depressed Positive Interpersonal Social
Complaints Affect Affect Problems Skills
Panel A: Males
Post × Goiter -0.354 -0.453 0.0612 -0.147 0.772
[0.134]** [0.162]** [0.205] [0.0765]* [0.447]*
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.331 2.542 4.783 0.555 22.33
Observations 1216 1218 1218 1218 950
Panel B: Females
Post × Goiter 0.104 -0.0147 0.111 -0.0689 -0.0150
[0.195] [0.233] [0.151] [0.0702] [0.474]
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.539 3.259 4.898 0.657 22.46
Observations 1180 1180 1179 1180 915
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. All regressions control for fixed effects specific to
birth province and birth year, birth order, family size, parents’ education, region-specific linear trends
and age. Mean-reversion controls include hospitals per capita in 1991, hospital beds per capita in
1991, and the sex ratio in Census1990 all interacted with cohort dummies. Standard errors clustered
by province appear in square brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
Data: CFPS-2012 and CFPS-2014.
3.6.2. GENDER ATTITUDES
Although differences in parental preferences can rationalize gender differences in the
effects of the iodization policy, we cannot rule out the possibility that biological differ-
ences between men and women entirely drive all such gender differences. Therefore, in
this section, we put the focus on within-gender analyses. We exploit plausibly exogenous
variation on the resource allocation effect (D) generated by parental preferences (αs in
the utility function). Assuming that for a given gender, the biological effect (B) is inde-
pendent of parental preferences (αs ), then the total reduced form effect (A) will not vary
with parental preferences if there are no behavioral effects. On the other hand, reduced
form estimates that vary with gender preferences hint at the relevance of behavioral re-
sponses of parents.
The assumption that gender preferences play no role in the biological effect requires
more discussion. With the introduction of ultrasound techniques, parents could re-
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spond prenatally, either with selective abortion or with increased antenatal investments
when a male fetus is identified (see Bharadwaj and Lakdawala, 2013). In the latter case,
we take the position that antenatal investments are included in parental investment de-
cisions. As regards selective abortions, our empirical analyzes in the next section rely on
within gender variation in parental preferences. This allows us only to need the much
weaker assumption that for a given gender, the biological effect does not depend on αs .
We provide a test based on sex-ratios that supports this assumption later in section 3.6.3.
We do not directly observe gender preferences and rely on a plausibly exogenous
proxy for parental gender preferences. We take the advantage that the CFPS-2014 in-
cludes a module with several questions on gender equity attitudes.26 This module cov-
ers topics on gender roles within the household and in public life and asked respondents
whether they agree with six statements phrased against gender equality and women em-
powerment. The response categories ranged from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 5 “Strongly
agree”. See Table C1 of the Appendix C for the statements and average responses for
adult males and females. The gender attitude index at the two bottom rows are the mean
and normalized mean of the individual responses for the six statements. A lower gender
index means more gender-equitable views. Ideally, we would like to have gender atti-
tudes measured 10 to 20 years before so that they coincide with the period during which
investments were made. Unfortunately, this information is not available. Therefore, we
approximate gender attitude measured in 2014, by which we have to assume that gender
attitudes differences are relatively stable over time. For example, Attané (2012) found
that the percentage of women(men) who agree with “Men are turned toward society,
women devote themselves to their family” actually increased by only 4.4% (7.7%) from
50.4% (53.9%) from 2000 to 2010. The fact that percentage remains stable both in men
and women reveals the deep-seated internalization of gender inequality.
Gender attitudes have drawn great interest in the recent literature (see Dahl, Kot-
sadam, and Rooth, 2017; Dhar, Jain, and Jayachandran, 2018; Dossi et al., 2019). For
instance, Dossi, Figlio, Giuliano, and Sapienza (2019) explicitly link son preference to
under-performance of girls in the U.S. We follow the design of Dossi, Figlio, Giuliano, and
Sapienza (2019) to examine the association between gender attitudes and parental in-
vestment. The parental investment is measured by an unweighted average of the z-score
of 5 variables: breastfeeding practices, whether the child went to kindergarten, how of-
ten the parent read to their child, how often the parent buys books for their child; and
26An alternative proxy could be the sex ratio (see Edlund et al., 2013, for instance). Selective abortion may be
higher in regions where preferences for boys are stronger than in other regions. We do not use sex ratio as a
proxy for gender preferences as it is not a measure of son preference per se, but rather the realization of the
family’s son preference combined with the preferences over the family size Jayachandran (2015).
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how often they travel with their child. Unfortunately, who do not observe such parental
investment score for the parents of our target sample of children born between 1991 and
2000. We do, however, observe the parental investment score for children younger than
6 in CPFS.
We regress the parental investment score on gender attitude, an interaction of gender
attitude with gender, and a set of individual characteristics (Table C4 in Appendix C). We
find gender attitudes to be strongly associated with parental investments in children,
and boys’ investments are higher in areas where preferences favoring boys are stronger.
This finding remains robust when we exploit within province variation in the gender
attitude variable by adding province fixed effects. This is important for the next sub-
section, where we exploit within province variation in gender attitudes to identify the
effect of the iodization policy on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes by gender.
3.6.3. GENDER ATTITUDES AND THE EFFECT OF THE SALT IODIZATION
Assuming that the biological effect does not depend on gender preferencesαs , the model
in section 3.6.1 hypothesizes that systematic variation of the reduced form estimate (A)
with gender preferences hints at an important role for parental gender preferences in hu-
man capital investments in children. Gender preferences can be incorporated by gen-
der specific preference weights αs and to test for this we specify the following triple-
difference equation that we separately estimate per gender:
Yi j pt =β0+β1Postt ×Goi terp ×G A j +β2Postt ×Goi terp +β3Postt ×G A j +β4G A j +Xi ptρ+δp +γt +ϵi pt
(3.5)
Yi j pt is the human capital outcome of child i , living in village/community j of province
p at time t . Postt , Goi terp and Xi pt are defined as before. The proxy for gender pref-
erences G A j is taken at the village/community level. The mean gender attitude for an
individual i is calculated among adults born between 1951 and 1986 (about the same
age as the parents of our target sample) for the village/community that child i resides
in. One concern is that gender norms are effectively not randomly allocated across com-
munities. Therefore, we also estimate the model with additional controls on communi-
ties’ characteristics interacted with cohort dummies. We construct 15 communities’ pre-
policy characteristics from the village module of the CFPS-2010.27 Estimates controlling
for communities’ characteristics doesn’t alter the results (see Appendix C, Table C2). As
in the main analyses, we condition on province fixed effects (δp ). Therefore, our empir-
ical specification absorbs differences in child human capital across provinces and solely
relies on within province community/village level variation in gender preferences. By
27The information in village module was collected from a knowledgeable individual who has access to statis-
tical materials in the village, such as the director or the accountant of the community committee.
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conditioning on birth cohort fixed effects (γt ), we aim to absorb all variation across age
groups. We also include Xi pt to control for individual, family and provincial characteris-
tics.
The main coefficient of interest is β1, and, as we estimate the model separately by
gender, the coefficient measures the within gender differential effect of the iodine forti-
fication program across families with varying levels of son preferences. Mapping β1 to
the decomposition (3.4), the first term (B) on the right-hand side is the biological effect,
which we assume to be homogeneous for a given gender and thus independent from
parental gender preferences (αs ). As a consequence, β1 will reflect the extent to which
the behavioral response (C ×D) depends on αs . We expect preferences to primarily have
a role via D , the parental investment response to the salt-iodization program. The term
C is the efficiency of the investment and depends on the health production technology.
While C might be related to gender preferences αs , it is expected that αs plays a more
direct role in D .28 Note that the Gender Attitude variable is normalized with zero mean,
and therefore the estimate of β2 can be compared with the reform effect of section 3.5.
Table 3.5 reports the results by gender for cognitive outcomes. For females, high val-
ues of G A mean lower values of αs in the theoretical model. The estimates of β1 are
reported in the first row of panel A (for males) and B (for females). The estimates of β1
show large and significant effects (specifically for Math and Schooling) for females and
(slightly) smaller and significant effects for males. Girls residing in villages/communities
with strong preferences for boys benefit more from the universal salt iodization pro-
gram than otherwise similar girls in communities/villages with less strong preferences
for boys. The effects for boys is slightly smaller but with an opposite sign. Recall that
high values of G A mean high values of αs for boys in the theoretical model. Therefore, a
negative estimate of β1 suggests that boys from villages/communities with strong prefer-
ences for boys benefit benefit less from the universal salt iodization program. Estimates
from both boys and girls suggest that the son preferences of parents drive at least part of
the differential effects by gender of the effect of the salt iodization program on cognitive
outcomes. Parental investments (D) in cognition in boys are partially crowded out by
the universal salt-iodization program.
One concern for our triple-difference results in Table 3.5 is that the gender selection
could also drive these results. With boy biased gender preferences, parents could selec-
tively abort female fetuses. In this case, the marginal girl born in a village with strong
boy preferences may differ from the marginal girl in a gender-neutral village. We link
28The The efficiency of the investment may vary with gender preferences if, for instance, parents do not mon-
itor the investment’s effect. It is expected that an effect of αs on C (if present) is a second-order effect.
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Table 3.5: The Impact of Iodine Exposure by Gender Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Test Verbal Test Primary Schooling
ln(scores) ln(scores) School ln(years)
Panel A: Males
Post × Goiter × Gender Attitudes -0.0617 -0.0748 -0.0613 0.00322
[0.0335]* [0.0535] [0.0325]* [0.0477]
Post × Gender Attitudes -0.140 -0.143 -0.00764 -0.00815
[0.137] [0.123] [0.0872] [0.0886]
Post × Goiter 0.0533 0.0815 0.0311 0.0224
[0.0498] [0.0489] [0.0247] [0.0365]
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.517 3.083 0.497 2.107
Observations 3302 3302 3780 3644
Panel B: Females
Post × Goiter × Gender Attitudes 0.176 0.0800 0.0333 0.0977
[0.0558]*** [0.0409]* [0.0249] [0.0486]*
Post × Gender Attitudes -0.0566 -0.0232 -0.0541 0.0620
[0.175] [0.129] [0.144] [0.261]
Post × Goiter 0.120 0.116 0.0342 0.0885
[0.0391]*** [0.0536]** [0.0103]*** [0.0220]***
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.543 3.171 0.529 2.122
Observations 3109 3109 3507 3383
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. All regressions control for fixed effects specific to
birth province and birth year, birth order, family size, parents’ education, region-specific linear trends,
survey wave by age interactions and survey wave by cohort interactions. Mean-reversion controls
include provincial average educational attainment in the 1990 Census interacted with the dummy for
treated cohorts, hospitals per capita in 1991, hospital beds per capita in 1991, and the sex ratio in
Census1990 all interacted with cohort dummies. Standard errors clustered by province appear in square
brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Data: CFPS-2010 and CFPS-2014
the community/village level gender attitudes to sex ratio data to address this potential
threat of endogenous sex selection. Ideally, we would like to construct sex ratio infor-
mation at the community/village level. Unfortunately, this information is not available.
Therefore, we rely on sex-ratio information at the city unit (the next level of spatial ag-
gregation).29 Like the event study design in section 3.5.4 we relate city level sex-ratios to
gender attitudes by year, controlling for province fixed effects. The results of this event
study are depicted in Figure 3.6. There is no association between gender attitude and sex
ratios, and, importantly, the association doesn’t change after introducing the salt iodiza-
tion policy. Combining the evidence of this analysis with the event study analyses in
section 3.5.4, we can conclude that sex selection is not a likely driver of our findings in
Table 3.5.
29There are 128 city units, each consisting of on average four communities/villages.
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Figure 3.6: Sex Ratio and Gender Attitudes
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Notes: Sex ratios are aggregated from microdata of the 2000 Census. Following Edlund,
Li, Yi, and Zhang (2013), we calculate the sex ratio at city level for each birth year between
1987 and 1999. In the event study regression, we control for province fixed effects and
birth year fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by city.
The salt-iodization program did not affect parental investment in cognitive skills for
boys. As argued before (section 3.5.4), parents could divert their investments in cogni-
tive skills for boys to other dimensions of human capital, notably non-cognitive skills
such as physical health, mental health, social skills, non-cognitive skills that enhance la-
bor market outcomes, etc. Indeed, the results in Table 3.4 showed that boys do benefit
along some non-cognitive skill dimensions. To see whether the program effects on non-
cognitive factors vary with gender preferences, we also estimated the triple-difference
model for the set of non-cognitive variables available for our cohorts, born between
1991-2000. This includes the subscores of the CES-D test and self-reported social skills.
The estimates in the third row of Panel A (Boys) and B (Girls) in the Table C3 are the ef-
fects of the implementation of the salt iodization program (β2) and are in line with the
findings in Table 3.4. However, none of the effect estimates of β1 in the first row of Panel
A and B are significant for our set of non-cognitive skill measures, suggesting that the ef-
fect of the salt-iodization program does not vary by gender attitude. An explanation for
this can be found in the primary impact of the salt-iodization program. In utero expo-
sure to iodine deficiency has effects on fetal brain development primarily, and therefore,
the reform’s first order effects are on cognition. The reform also affects the allocation
of resources over the different dimensions of human capital. This second-order effect
is reflected in the estimates of the impact of the policy (β2). Therefore, to what extend
the impact of the policy on non-cognitive skills for boys (or girls) varies within gender by
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gender preferences (β1) can be considered a third-order effect. Indeed, this effect might
be small. It might be too demanding for the data and the measures of non-cognitive
skills that we have at our disposal.
3.7. CONCLUSION
Currently, about 2 billion people suffer from iodine deficiency. The medical literature
documents that iodine deficiency can lead to neurodevelopmental problems when fe-
tuses are exposed in utero. This can lead to a reduction in children’s cognitive skills and,
consequently, adverse labor market outcomes later in life. This paper evaluates the ef-
fect of a nationally implemented salt iodization program on cognition of school-aged
children in China. It differs from previous work as we explicitly focus on the role of gen-
der preferences and how this may affect the effectiveness of large scale public programs.
Gender preferences may also explain gender differences in the empirical literature on
the long-run effects of adverse conditions early in life. Our difference-in-differences
analyses find strong positive effects of the program for girls. A one standard deviation
decrease (12%) in the pre-intervention children goiter rate is associated with math and
vocabulary scores increasing by roughly 15%. We also see large increases in the educa-
tional attainment of females. Using the simple back of the envelope calculation, we infer
that this translates to income increases of about 6,6%. Yet, we do not find any effects for
boys.
These findings are robust against alternative specifications and falsification tests.
These findings thus support the effectiveness of important, low costs, public health in-
tervention. Indeed, compared to other interventions to raise education, the cost of salt
iodization is extremely low. The costs associated with the intervention are about 0.05$
per person per year (WHO, 2005). This contrasts sharply with other interventions, such
as class size reductions, costing over $5,000 (2010 dollars) per year per student (Chetty,
Friedman, Hilger, Saez, Schanzenbach, and Yagan, 2011).
We proceed by further looking into these gender-specific findings and argue that
gender preferences may play an important role. We do this in the context of a sim-
ple model along the lines of Yi, Heckman, Zhang, and Conti (2015); Almond, Currie,
and Duque (2018) that explain how parental investments respond to (adverse) effects of
shocks early in life. We show that gender preferences may lead to different investments
in boys and girls. Following Yi, Heckman, Zhang, and Conti (2015); Almond, Currie, and
Duque (2018) we use that total effect of an early life shock can be decomposed into a
biological effect and a behavioral effect. The behavioral effect includes the parental in-
vestment decision, which mitigates or reinforces the biological effect. This behavioral
3
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(“resource allocation effect”) depends on child preferences that may differ by gender.
This simple model can explain the policy effect on girls and the absence of an effect
on boys. Prior to the salt iodization policy, parents may have countered initial adverse
shocks for boys and less so for girls. Therefore, when boy preferences are important, girls
may benefit more from a nationally implemented programs. This also suggests that the
salt-iodization program crowds out private parental investments in cognition. Another
consequence of this may be that parents divert their investments into other skill dimen-
sions, notably for boys. Indeed, we find program effects on non-cognitive skills for boys,
but not for girls.
We test this hypothesis by explicitly accounting for gender preferences and proxy
gender preferences with an index for gender attitudes. We estimate a triple-difference
model per gender. Hence, the model identifies the effect of gender preferences from
within gender variation in community/village gender attitudes. In line with the model
and expectations, girls’ program effects on cognition are stronger in communities/villages
where preferences favoring boys are stronger. We do not find such effects for boys. Nor
do we find such triple-difference effects for non-cognitive skills, both for boys and girls.
Cultural or other contextual factors that feed attitudes favoring boys are not restricted to
China but also hold for other countries in South-East Asia, the Middle East, and North
Africa. The idea that gender preferences play a role in the western world can not be
excluded either. Our findings, therefore, do not only speak to the external validity of the
current study but also suggest that later life gender differences in labor market outcomes
observed in many countries may be rooted early in life. The findings also indicate that
generally large-scale programs may reduce gender inequalities and contribute to gender
convergence.
Preferences favoring boys may lead to unequal investments in girls and justify poli-
cies that aim to reduce the consequences of such preferences. Also, improved economic
circumstances may reduce such gender preferences, but as earlier work has shown (Al-
mond and Edlund, 2008; Abrevaya, 2009) gender biases persist even with improved eco-
nomic circumstances. This then calls for policies such as increasing mandatory school-
ing for both genders and other public programs that affect all, such as the public health
campaign in this paper. Parental preferences are important, but this does not exclude the
relevance of other factors such as financial constraints and the production technology of
human capital formations. Indeed, for a significant part, these general investments can
only improve outcomes as long as the investments translate into human capital; in terms
of the model, the efficiency of investment (i.e., the term C in the decomposition (3.4)).
With low values in the efficiency of investment, the impact of any investment (public or
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private) remains modest. The key to understanding the factors that drive the efficiency
of the investment effect lies in understanding the human capital production technology.
Indeed, this is one of the topics that require further development (see, e.g. Cunha, Heck-
man, and Schennach, 2010; Agostinelli and Wiswall, 2016; Attanasio, Meghir, and Nix,
2018). Unfortunately, with the data at hand, we can not competently tackle this problem
and therefore leave this to future research.
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A. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
In the analyses, we use a series of province-level pre-policy characteristics. We list all
these variables here and describe how we construct each variable.
• Hospital per capita: Number of hospital per 1000 (Statistics yearbook 1991).
• Hospital beds per capita: Number of hospital beds per 1000 (Statistics yearbook
1991).
• School per capital: Number of primary schools per 1000 (Statistics yearbook 1991).
• Sex ratio: Sex ratio of the cohort 1991 calculated from Census 2000.
• Rural income: Average rural household income calculated from NFPS 1991.
• Poverty: Poverty rates in 1993 are obtained from Woo, Li, Yue, Wu, and Xu (2004).
Table A1: Regional Classification of Provinces
Region Provinces
North China Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi and Inner Mongolia
Northeast China Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang
East China Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi and Shandong
South Central ChinaHenan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan
Southwest China Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan and Tibet
Northwest China Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang
Notes: Author’s tabulations
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3
81
Table A2: Summary Statistics
High Goiter Provinces Low Goiter Provinces
Females Males Females Males
Outcomes
Educational Attainment 2.02 1.94 2.04 1.95
[0.79] [0.79] [0.83] [0.79]
Illiterate 0.28 0.33 0.30 0.32
Primary School 0.46 0.42 0.40 0.44
Middle School 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.22
High School or above 0.028 0.014 0.029 0.024
Schooling 7.35 7.08 7.49 7.25
[2.52] [2.45] [2.51] [2.42]
Math Test Scores 12.2 11.9 12.5 12.2
[5.23] [5.25] [5.13] [4.79]
Verbal Test Scores 23.8 22.3 24.2 22.5
[7.32] [7.64] [7.01] [7.29]
Demographics
Age 14.5 14.4 14.3 14.4
[2.52] [2.50] [2.48] [2.48]
Father’s Educational Attainment 2.19 2.20 2.46 2.48
[0.94] [0.95] [0.88] [0.88]
Mother’s Educational Attainment 1.68 1.69 2.16 2.13
[0.85] [0.83] [0.92] [0.88]
Birth Order 1.56 1.69 1.63 1.72
[0.73] [0.86] [0.96] [0.92]
Family Size 5.13 4.80 5.10 4.78
[1.57] [1.45] [1.66] [1.54]
Number of observations 956 1028 997 1007
Notes: Author’s tabulations of CFPS-2010 and CFPS-2014. Sample consists individuals born in rural area
between July 1995 and June 2000. We label a province as high/low goiter if its goiter rate is above/below
17% (median).
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B. ADDITIONAL RESULTS: IODINE AND LONG-RUN OUTCOMES
Table B1: Robustness Checks (Male)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Test Verbal Test Primary Schooling
ln(scores) ln(scores) School ln(years)
Panel A: raw test scores
Post × Goiter 0.108 0.405 0.0202 0.0878
[0.333] [0.473] [0.0233] [0.169]
Mean of Dep. Var. 13.59 23.72 0.499 8.569
Observations 3310 3310 3803 3654
Panel B: additional controls
Post × Goiter -0.0588 -0.0580 -0.00554 -0.0143
[0.0507] [0.0538] [0.0297] [0.0686]
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.517 3.083 0.499 2.108
Observations 3310 3310 3803 3654
Panel C: drop partial exposed group
Post × Goiter 0.0296 0.0575 0.0260 0.0216
[0.0517] [0.0524] [0.0230] [0.0403]
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.514 3.081 0.497 2.106
Observations 3235 3235 3706 3560
Panel D: only using baseline wave 2010
Post × Goiter 0.0551 0.0809 -0.00890 0.0111
[0.0567] [0.0666] [0.0290] [0.0369]
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.486 3.046 0.344 1.978
Observations 1992 1992 2028 2028
Panel E: small sample window
Post × Goiter 0.0633 0.0668 0.0223 0.0344
[0.0584] [0.0660] [0.0213] [0.0465]
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.549 3.108 0.516 2.129
Observations 2643 2643 3047 2920
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. All regressions except Panel B use the same
controls as the baseline model in Table 3.2. In Panel B, we control for birth-region and birth-year specific
interaction instead, and we additionally control for schools per capital in 1991, poverty rates in 1993,
and average household income in 1991 all interacted with cohort dummies. Standard errors clustered
by province appear in square brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
Data: CFPS-2010 and CFPS-2014
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Figure B1: Event Study (Male)
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Notes: The sample includes all male respondents from two waves of the survey (CFPS-
2010 and CFPS-2014). Each point reflects the coefficient estimated on an interaction
term between the birth year (compared to 1995) and the pre-intervention (base) level
of the goiter rate in the birth-province. Capped spikes represent 95 percent confidence
intervals. All models condition upon birth province and birth year fixed effects and the
full set of controls used in our main analysis.
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C. ADDITIONAL RESULTS: MORE ON GENDER
IODINE EXPOSURE AND NON-COGNITIVE SKILLS
CES-D includes 20 questions, which were aggregate to four categories: somatic com-
plaints (Q1, Q2, Q5, Q7, Q11, Q13, Q20); depressed affect (Q3, Q6, Q9, Q10, Q14, Q17,
Q18); positive affect (Q4, Q8, Q12, Q16)30; interpersonal problems (Q15, Q19).
Questions: Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved. Please tell me how
often you have felt this way during the past week with a score: 1 for rarely or none of the
time (less than 1 day ); 2 for some or a little of the time (1-2 days); 3 for occasionally or a
moderate amount of time (3-4 days); 4 for most or all of the time (5-7 days).
1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me.
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends.
4. I felt I was just as good as other people.
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.
6. I felt depressed.
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort
8. I felt hopeful about the future.
9. I thought my life had been a failure.
10. I felt fearful.
11. My sleep was restless.
12. I was happy.
13. I talked less than usual.
14. I felt lonely.
15. People were unfriendly.
16. I enjoyed life.
30We reverse the score of each question in the positive affect according to the literature (i.e., 1 means most or
all of the time (5-7 days) and 4 means rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day ); 2 for occasionally or a
moderate amount of time (3-4 days); 3 for some or a little of the time (1-2 days)).
C. ADDITIONAL RESULTS: MORE ON GENDER
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17. I had crying spells.
18. I felt sad.
19. I felt that people dislike me.
20. I could not get “going”.
Table C1: Summary Statistics of Gender Attitudes
Males Females
Son should live together with his parents. 3.49 3.47
[1.34] [1.38]
Every family should at least have a son. 3.46 3.36
[1.48] [1.55]
The husband takes care of the business, and the wife takes care of the family. 4.08 4.07
[1.10] [1.15]
Woman’s marriage is more important than her career. 3.50 3.75
[1.33] [1.27]
Every woman should have a child. 4.08 4.33
[1.17] [1.02]
Disagree: The husband should do half of the housework. 1.95 1.84
[1.10] [1.05]
Gender index 3.43 3.47
[0.70] [0.71]
Normalized gender index -0.031 0.030
[0.99] [1.01]
Number of observations 10070 10455
Notes: Sample includes all individuals born between 1951 and 1986 in CFPS-2014. Surveyed respondents
were asked if they agree with these six statements. The respondents report how much they agreed with
a certain statement on a scale of 1-5, with 1 being Strongly agree and 5 being Strongly disagree. Gender
index is the average of the 6 indicators. Normalized gender index is calculated by subtracting the mean
and dividing by the standard deviation.
ADDITIONAL RESULTS ON GENDER ATTITUDES
To show that parental attitudes reflect parental preferences is related to parental invest-
ment in children, we exploit the fact that CFPS does include some information about
parental investments behavior for a different sample of children younger than 6 years
of age. For this sample we construct a “parental investments index” by calculating an
unweighted average of the z-score of 5 variables: breastfeeding practices; whether the
child went to kindergarten; how often the parent read to their child; how often the par-
ent buys books for their child; and how often they travel with their child.31 Breastfeeding
31Iodine could also be obtained from food such as vegetables, eggs, fish and meat. The composition of the diet
as well as the quantity of food may therefore influence the iodine intake of pregnant women and infants.
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Table C2: The Impact of Iodine Exposure by Gender Attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Math Test Verbal Test Primary Schooling
ln(scores) ln(scores) School ln(years)
Panel A: Males
Post × Goiter × Gender Attitudes -0.0757 -0.102 -0.0518 -0.0284
[0.0430]* [0.0607] [0.0423] [0.0447]
Post × Gender Attitudes -0.0931 -0.0180 0.105 0.105
[0.153] [0.110] [0.0928] [0.138]
Post × Goiter 0.0310 0.0689 0.0235 0.0112
[0.0475] [0.0445] [0.0227] [0.0360]
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.517 3.082 0.497 2.107
Observations 3257 3257 3731 3598
Panel B: Females
Post × Goiter × Gender Attitudes 0.136 0.0209 0.0517 0.0750
[0.0671]* [0.0599] [0.0301]* [0.0433]*
Post × Gender Attitudes 0.0124 0.0644 -0.0741 0.171
[0.217] [0.157] [0.137] [0.284]
Post × Goiter 0.110 0.125 0.0307 0.0857
[0.0339]*** [0.0499]** [0.0124]** [0.0208]***
Mean of Dep. Var. 2.541 3.171 0.528 2.122
Observations 3062 3062 3457 3334
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. All regressions control for fixed effects specific to
birth province and birth year, birth order, family size, parents’ education, region-specific linear trends,
survey wave by age interactions and survey wave by cohort interactions. Mean-reversion controls
include provincial average educational attainment in the 1990 Census interacted with the dummy for
treated cohorts, hospitals per capita in 1991, hospital beds per capita in 1991, and the sex ratio in
Census1990 all interacted with cohort dummies. Additionally, communities controls include cohort
dummies interacted with 15 communities’ pre-policy (1991) characteristics: access to electricity, radio,
satellite TV, post services, phone, mobile phone, highway, rail, tap water, gas, local factory, hospital, local
election, urbanization, and land property rights. Standard errors clustered by province appear in square
brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Data: CFPS-2010 and CFPS-2014
is a dichotomous variable whether the duration of breastfeeding was longer than three
months. Kindergarten is an dichotomous variable indicating whether the child has at-
tended kindergarten. The last three variables are categorical variables for the frequency
of the event ranging from 0 (“never”) to 5 (“every day”). We take higher values of the score
to be associated with more investments in the child. It is not obvious that this also holds
for the kindergarten indicator. Recent papers on the effect of day care (children aged
0-2) find mixed results. Positive effects are found for Norway (Drange and Havnes (2019)
shown signicant gains in language and mathematics at age 6–7 of childcare enrollment
The eating of healthy and nutritionally rich food could be viewed as an antenatal investment and may dif-
fer with knowledge of the gender of the unborn child. Unfortunately we do not have information on food
consumption of pregnant women and infants.
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Table C3: Iodine Exposure and Non-Cognitive Skills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Somatic Depressed Positive Interpersonal Social
Complaints Affect Affect Problems Skills
Panel A: Males
Post × Goiter × Gender Attitudes 0.143 -0.288 -0.680 -0.139 0.737
[0.243] [0.331] [0.292]** [0.119] [0.649]
Post × Gender Attitudes -0.740 -0.655 0.287 -0.0193 0.320
[1.267] [0.971] [1.534] [0.452] [2.525]
Post × Goiter -0.487 -0.438 0.121 -0.0852 0.710
[0.197]** [0.166]** [0.168] [0.0496]* [0.346]*
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.340 2.587 4.808 0.576 22.29
Observations 1554 1556 1556 1555 1064
Panel B: Females
Post × Goiter × Gender Attitudes -0.559 -0.289 -0.129 -0.245 0.495
[0.418] [0.365] [0.325] [0.182] [0.835]
Post × Gender Attitudes -0.415 0.519 0.107 0.544 -0.00960
[1.305] [1.105] [0.902] [0.407] [2.011]
Post × Goiter -0.0797 -0.114 0.0518 -0.00230 -0.180
[0.217] [0.299] [0.172] [0.0726] [0.350]
Mean of Dep. Var. 3.515 3.259 4.872 0.653 22.43
Observations 1436 1436 1435 1436 1017
Notes: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. All regressions control for fixed effects specific to
birth province and birth year, birth order, family size, parents’ education, region-specific linear trends
and age. Mean-reversion controls include hospitals per capita in 1991, hospital beds per capita in
1991, and the sex ratio in Census1990 all interacted with cohort dummies. Standard errors clustered
by province appear in square brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
Data: CFPS-2012 and CFPS-2014.
using childcare assignment lotteries.) and Germany (Felfe and Lalive (2018) shown early
child care has a strong positive effects on children’s motor and socio-emotional skills.)
while the recent paper by Ichino, Fort, and Zanella (2019) find negative effects, in partic-
ular for girls.32 Note that kindergarten usually concerns older infants (age 4 and older).
Also, for our sample of rural families interaction with other infants may be more benefi-
cial and can be viewed as an investment.
For this sample of parents who have children younger than 6, we run a regression
that relates the parental investment index to our proxy for gender preferences:
Ii j =β0 +β1M alei ×G A j +β2M alei +β3G A j +Xiρ+ϵi , (3.6)
32They examine the effects of extended day care of children aged 0-2 on cognitive and non-cognitive skills.
The idea is that daycare implies fewer one-to-one interactions with adults as inputs in the technology of skill
formation and therefore be more harmful for infants. Girls at age 0–2 are relatively more capable of making
good use of stimuli that improve their skills. Extended exposure to daycare may therefore be particularly
harmful for girls.
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where Ii j is parental investments index for child i from village/community j . M alei
is dummy variable indicating the gender of the child, and G A j is the gender attitude at
the village/community j .33 Similar to Dossi, Figlio, Giuliano, and Sapienza (2019), we
also control for a series of variables Xi such as parental education, birth order, family
size and province fixed effects. Prime interest is in the parameter β1, the association
between gender preferences and parental investment in young children.
The results of the regression are reported in Table 3.5. In first three columns, we
gradually add family background controls to the regression. In the fourth column, we
also control for province fixed effects. In this specification the estimates solely rely on
within province variation in gender attitudes. The estimates of β1 are reported in the first
row of Table 3.5 and show that gender attitudes are strongly associated with parental in-
vestments in children and that investments in girls are lower in areas where preferences
favoring boys are stronger. Adding controls does not affect the estimate of β1. The small
change in β1 when we add province fixed effects (column 4) also underlines that there is
substantial within province variation in the gender attitude variable. This is important
for the section 3.6.3 where we exploit this variation to identify the role of preferences in
the effect of the iodization policy on cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes.
Table C4: Gender Attitudes and Parental Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parental Investment Index
Gender Attitudes × Male 0.163 0.189 0.186 0.165
[0.0834]∗ [0.0816]∗∗ [0.0824]∗∗ [0.0846]∗
Male -0.0665 -0.0495 -0.0489 -0.0381
[0.0329]∗∗ [0.0325] [0.0321] [0.0330]
Gender Attitudes -0.315 -0.248 -0.221 -0.170
[0.0771]∗∗∗ [0.0711]∗∗∗ [0.0728]∗∗∗ [0.0791]∗∗
Parental Education No Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order & Family Size No No Yes Yes
Province Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642
Notes: Each column is from a separate regression. Standard errors clustered by village/community
appear in square brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Data: CFPS-2010, CFPS-2012 and CFPS-2014
33With this regression we do not aim to make causal statements. Nevertheless, in the calculation of the vil-
lage/community level average we left out the individual response to minimize confounding.
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4.1. INTRODUCTION
Lacking enforcement of existing regulations is widely regarded as a serious impediment
to welfare in developing countries. This is particularly the case for environmental policy.
Despite a substantial increase in both the number and the strictness of environmental
regulations across the globe during the past 50 years, enforcement of these laws has been
limited (UN, 2019). According to the UN (2019), this lack of enforcement is one of the
greatest obstacles to combat climate change and pollution. Since most regulations are
set at the national (or international) level, and the implementation of policies is typically
left to local officials – this leads to a classical principal-agent problem. Holding officials
accountable in this setting is particularly challenging for both central governments and
citizens since information on local environmental outcomes is often missing or of poor
quality. One explanation for this is that information is often provided by local officials
themselves, who have incentives to misreport (Banerjee, Duflo, and Glennerster, 2008;
Fisman and Wang, 2017; Acemoglu, Fergusson, Robinson, Romero, and Vargas, 2018).
In this paper, we investigate whether better monitoring of the environment can strengthen
local officials’ accountability and improve environmental outcomes. We study this issue
in the context of air pollution monitoring in China – a setting that we argue is particu-
larly important. Combating air pollution is a global policy priority motivated by well-
documented health and productivity consequences of exposure to pollution (Neidell
1This chapter is based on Axbard (2020).
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and Currie, 2005; Greenstone and Hanna, 2014; Ebenstein, Fan, Greenstone, He, and
Zhou, 2017; Jia, 2017; Barwick, Li, Rao, and Zahur, 2018). Despite international efforts
in recent years to improve air quality, 91% of the world’s population in 2018 still lived
in areas where air pollution exceeded WHO guidelines. A large part of this population
is living in emerging economies, including China, where pollution levels have exceeded
the highest levels ever recorded in rich countries.
To study this issue, we exploit the introduction of more than 550 air pollution moni-
tors in 177 Chinese prefecture-level cities in 2015.2 Each monitor provides high-quality
information to the central government on a range of different air pollutants close to the
monitor. Hence, the larger the number of monitors installed in a city, the better able
it is for the central government to track overall air quality in a city. Local officials, in
turn, have incentives to decrease pollution close to the monitors since readings from the
monitors feed into their performance evaluations, and these evaluations are based on
achieving predetermined pollution reduction targets.
We start by estimating the causal impact of the number of monitors on actual air
pollution. In general, there are two main empirical challenges to overcome. The first
challenge is related to data availability: before the introduction of monitors, there is no
reliable information on local pollution. To overcome this issue, we use satellite data that
covers the period before and after the introduction of the monitors to capture changes
in pollution.3 The second challenge is related to identification: the number of monitors
that a city chooses to install is potentially endogenous. For example, cities with more
ambitious environmental goals might choose to install more monitors to get better in-
formation about the distribution of pollution. To overcome this challenge, we exploit a
government program that assigns monitors to cities based on their population and ge-
ographical size. Using this information, we estimate a difference-in-differences model
as well as instrumental variables and a regression discontinuity design using the assign-
ment criteria set up by the central government. All three empirical strategies produce
consistent results, and our preferred DiD estimate shows that one additional monitor
reduces pollution by about 3%. This is a sizeable effect given that the median number of
monitors in our sample is 3.
To bring clarity to how this reduction in pollution came about, we construct a novel
data set of all air pollution enforcement activities by city governments from 2010 to 2017.
We then use similar estimation strategies to those above to document that an additional
monitor leads to a 20% increase in the number of regulatory enforcement activities. To
2The prefecture-level city is an administrative division ranking below a province and above a county. Figure
B1 shows a picture of the type of monitors that we study.
3We provide validation of the satellite data using ground station measures in subsequent periods.
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further validate that the monitors indeed drive this increase, we geo-reference enforce-
ment activities and show that the increase in enforcement is driven by firms located
within 20km from a monitor, whereas firms beyond 20km face no change in enforce-
ment.
We explore two potential mechanisms for why monitors increase enforcement and
reduce pollution: political promotion incentives and citizen pressure. The first mecha-
nism is plausible in this setting since local mayors’ performance is evaluated based on
their achieved reduction of pollution. To assess this first mechanism, we follow Xi, Yao,
and Zhang (2018) and exploit discontinuities in promotion incentives caused by the age
of local mayors at the time of the National Congress (mayors can be promoted if they
are below the age of 57, but not otherwise). The second mechanism is also a poten-
tial driving force of what we find since recordings of pollution data are made publicly
available on the website of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Since more and
more empirical studies (Chen, Pan, and Xu, 2016) have found that authoritarian regimes
are also responsive to citizen pressure, it is plausible that citizens better informed about
pollution will put pressure on the local government to act. This mechanism is evalu-
ated by using data on online searches for pollution-related keywords. We find strong
evidence that the results of both enforcement and reduction in pollution are driven by
mayors with incentives to be promoted, while we find limited evidence that monitoring
increases citizens’ awareness of pollution.
Finally, to understand how the quality of the information provided by the monitors’
matters, we study the reassignment of control of the monitors from the local government
to external third parties. This reassignment was conducted after it was discovered that
several local governments tried to manipulate the data from the monitors. By exploit-
ing information from the monitors and satellites, we show that the monitor recordings
are more strongly correlated with the satellite data when they are under the control of
a third party - suggesting a reduction in manipulation. Following this logic, we further
document that when monitors are under the control of an independent third party, the
effect of an additional monitoring on enforcement and reductions in pollution are sub-
stantial.
The paper relates to three strands of literature. First, the paper relates to a growing
empirical literature studying pollution reduction in developing countries. Several pa-
pers in this literature have investigated the effect of changes in environmental policies
(Greenstone and Hanna, 2014; Tanaka, 2015; Kahn, Li, and Zhao, 2015; Bombardini and
Li, 2016; Ebenstein, Fan, Greenstone, He, and Zhou, 2017). These studies commonly use
data from pollution monitors, and hence a key contribution of this paper is establishing
4
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the impact of monitors themselves on pollution levels. If this effect is not taken into ac-
count when evaluating environmental policies, conclusions might be misleading.4 Be-
sides, we contribute to this line of work by directly investigating government enforce-
ment activities. While prior work has recognized that enforcement is a major challenge
(see, e.g., discussion in Greenstone and Hanna, 2014), we document how enforcement
can be strengthened. Finally, close to our study is also the work by Duflo, Greenstone,
Pande, and Ryan (2013, 2018), studies how changes to the incentive structure for third
party auditors of polluting firms in India affect emissions. While the third-party auditors
studied in these papers have a similar role to the private firms to which monitoring is as-
signed in this paper, the main difference is that we are concerned with how monitoring
affects pollution reduction and data manipulation within the government rather than
the firm.
Second, we contribute to studies showing that the provision of information can im-
prove accountability and government performance (see review by Kosack and Fung,
2014). While most of this literature focuses on providing information to citizens about
the performance of their politicians (e.g. Besley and Burgess, 2002; Snyder and Ström-
berg, 2010), this study is most closely related to the part of the literature that improves
the flow of information from local to central government. This includes the work by
Olken (2007) on the effect of top-down monitoring on corruption in village road projects
in Indonesia as well as the studies by Reinikka and Svensson (2005, 2011) showing that
providing information about schooling funds that local communities were supposed to
achieve can reduce leakage of funds and improve test scores. Besides, it relates to studies
of interventions aimed at improving the monitoring of local officials (e.g. Duflo, Hanna,
and Ryan, 2012; Dhaliwal and Hanna, 2017). Our main contribution to this literature is
acknowledging the role that local governments have in everyday information provision
and how that affects top-down accountability. Besides, we study an autocratic setting
where citizen accountability arguably plays less of an important role.
Third, it relates to literature investigating the potentially distorting effect of high-
powered incentives. Studies have documented that such incentives can lead to manip-
ulation of data (Banerjee, Duflo, and Glennerster, 2008; Fisman and Wang, 2017; Ace-
moglu, Fergusson, Robinson, Romero, and Vargas, 2018), including reporting on pollu-
tion (Andrews, 2008; Chen, Jin, Kumar, and Shi, 2013; Ghanem and Zhang, 2014; Oliva,
2015). We contribute to this literature by going beyond establishing that manipulation
exists to study if and how it can be mitigated and whether such mitigation strategies
4This would, for example, be the case if pollution levels around the monitors are not representative of the
overall pollution in a country.
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affect actual policy performance (pollution reduction in this setting). This is made pos-
sible since we can observe not only the potentially manipulated data (reported from the
monitors) but also the true outcome (observed via satellite).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the context as well as the
roll-out of the pollution monitoring program investigated. After that, the data used in
this study is described (Section 4.3). The first analysis, which aims at estimating the
causal effect of pollution monitoring on actual pollution, is presented in Section 4.4.
This section discusses both the empirical strategy as well as the results. The analysis of
the enforcement of environmental regulations is developed in 4.5, and mechanisms are
discussed in Section 4.6. Finally, Section 4.7 offers concluding remarks.
4.2. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
This section provides background information and describes why the national monitor-
ing program studied in this paper was introduced. In the first sub-section (4.2.1), we
describe the environmental policies in place in China during this period and discuss the
role of local leaders in achieving these. After that, the implementation of the program is
described in detail in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN CHINA
The concentration of air pollutants in China is among the highest in the world and a
problem with serious health consequences. Average P M2.5 (particulate matter with a
diameter of 2.5 µm or less) concentrations in 2013 were 91 µg /m3, which is nine times
the amount that the World Health Organization considers safe. Estimates by Greenstone
and Schwarz (2018) suggest that if such levels of pollution are sustained, it will result in
a 6.5 years decline in life expectancy for the average resident. While the government’s
priority during the past decades has largely been to stimulate economic growth, atten-
tion has lately shifted towards environmental policies. Air pollution monitors have been
installed through a nationwide program to track the impact of such policies.
Starting in 2013, the National Air Quality Action Plan was set up to improve air qual-
ity by the end of 2017. Specific targets of the plan were gradually laid out. The first broad
goal of the plan was to lower urban concentrations of P M10 (particulate matter with a di-
ameter of 10 µm or less) by 10 percent relative to 2012 levels. The second ambition was
to reduce concentrations of P M2.5 in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei provinces, the Yangtze
River Delta and the Pearl River Delta by 25, 20, and 15 percent, respectively. After the
plan was set up, the government took concrete steps to follow through on the broad goals
outlined in the Action Plan. One particular action taken by the central government was
4
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to set up pollution reduction targets for all provinces outside the three areas above. In
January 2014, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) entered into “contracts”
with all 31 provinces and set up a three-year air quality plan to decrease P M concentra-
tions in the whole country.5 In each “contract” an air quality target for 2017 was set –
resulting in different percentage reduction targets of P M2.5/P M10 for each province.6
The implementation of these targets is carried out by local government units while
the national government sets targets. To ensure efficient implementation of the targets,
local officials are incentivized through performance-based promotions. Promotions are
the key instrument used in China to ensure that local officials carry out policies in line
with the goals set up by the central government (see Zheng and Kahn, 2013, 2017, for fur-
ther discussion). For a long time, the central government focused on economic perfor-
mance and emphasized economic growth as the key evaluation criteria for local officials’
promotion opportunities (Chen, Li, and Lu, 2018). In 2011, the 12th Five-Year Plan set
the goal of reducing energy consumption. Shortly after that, the central government in-
cluded environmental protection as one of the criteria when evaluating local governors’
performance. Since then, the performance in terms of environmental protection is con-
sidered in promotion decisions of local mayors (Zheng and Kahn, 2013). As discussed
in the previous section, the National Air Quality Action Plan (2013) imposed explicit tar-
gets to improve air quality by the end of 2017 for each province. However, it is hard to
verify whether the targets set by the central government have been obtained without
credible information about air pollution. Facing this challenge, the central government
decided to expand and upgrade the national air quality monitoring system, the focus of
this study.
4.2.2. NATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM
The first air pollution monitoring in China began in the 1980s and was subsequently
expanded during the next decade. In the 1990s, the number of cities covered had in-
creased to 46. However, the data from the monitoring system during this period were
never made public. It was not until 2000 that daily reports of air pollution data for 42
cities were published for the first time on the website of the Ministry of Environmen-
tal Protection (MEP). By 2012, the year before the program we study was launched, 113
cities, all provincial capitals, and some large industrial cities were required to measure
three pollutants (i.e., P M10, SO2 and CO) and the measures of each pollutant were pub-
lished online. Based on these measures, an Air Pollution Index (API) was constructed and
5The targets remained unchanged for provinces in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl
River Delta.
6For the list of targets by province, see Table A1 in Appendix A.
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disclosed to the public. The central government aimed to use this information disclosure
to create an incentive for local governments to engage in air pollution reduction. How-
ever, the usefulness and reliability of this data has been questioned. First and foremost,
it does not capture smaller particulate matter (P M2.5), which is the most detrimental
for health. Second, since monitors were only installed in large cities, a substantial part
of the Chinese population was not covered by the monitors. Third, a discrepancy be-
tween the MEP data and measurements reported by the U.S. embassy in Beijing (which
started measuring and publishing data on P M2.5 in 2008) further questions whether the
data captured actual pollution levels. This concern has later been validated in academic
work (see, e.g. Ghanem and Zhang, 2014; Greenstone et al., 2019).
Upgrade and Expansion between 2013 - 2015 To address these issues, the government
introduced a new monitoring system in its 2013 National Air Quality Action Plan. Fol-
lowing revised air pollution standards implemented in 2012, which included three ad-
ditional pollutants (P M2.5, O3, and NO), existing monitors were updated. At the same
time, the monitor network was also expanded to cover all prefecture-level cities that pre-
viously had no systematic air pollution monitoring in place. It is this expansion that we
focus on in this paper. One of the key features of these new monitors is the ability to
accurately record information on P M2.5, widely regarded as the key measure of ambient
air pollution. The second key feature is that all monitor stations report all six pollutants
to the central government in real-time (Greenstone, Guojun, Ruixue, and Tong, 2019).
Additionally, the hourly pollution data is automatically published online by the central
government.
The installation of these new monitors was conducted for three years. In the first
two years, the focus is on the upgrading of existing monitors in big cities, where existing
manual stations in 113 cities were replaced with automatic stations. For some cities, ad-
ditional monitors were installed since the city had expanded rapidly in the last few years.
Cities in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei province, the Pearl River Delta, and the Yangtze River
Delta, as well as the capital cities of each province, were assigned to upgrade/build mon-
itor stations in 2012. All those monitor stations were connected with the environmental
monitor network from the 1st of January 2013 onward. In the second year, 30 environ-
mental role model cities and 28 experimental cities from one province (Shandong) had
set up local monitor stations and were connected to the network from the 1st of January
2014. The largest expansion, which is also our research focus, took place the following
year. From the 1st of January 2015, all the remaining 177 cities were connected to the
monitoring network. The location of these monitors is depicted in the map in Figure B2.
After the final expansion, all prefecture-level cities had at least one air pollution monitor.
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All monitor stations were built in the built-up area of each city.7 The Ministry of
Environmental Protection (MEP) provided instructions to provincial environmental de-
partments for how the building/upgrading of monitors should be conducted. First, the
minimum number of stations in each city is determined by the population of the city
and the geographical size of the built-up area jointly. The detailed assignment criterion,
which we use for identification in this paper, is presented in Table 4.1. Second, strict
rules determine the placement of monitors to ensure that they are evenly distributed to
cover the whole built-up area. These include applying a simulation method that takes
surrounding buildings, traffic, and the direction of seasonal winds into account to make
sure that the location of monitors is representative.
The provincial environmental departments were responsible for purchasing all the
material, installing the monitor stations, testing the equipment, and overseeing daily
operations. Once all equipment is put in place, the local environmental department
is responsible for providing hourly measures of six pollutants to the Ministry of Envi-
ronmental Protection, which in turn makes the information available to the public. The
local governments, who face strong pressure from the central government to reduce pol-
lution (see above), have the incentive to manipulate the data submitted to the environ-
mental monitor network. The fact that local departments are in control of the monitors
makes such manipulation feasible. A large number of media sources have reported that
such manipulation has been extensive. Figure B9 shows an example of such manipula-
tion.
Table 4.1: Monitor Assignment Criteria
Population (10,000) Size of Buildup Area (sq. km) Min # of Monitors
< 25 < 20 1
25−50 20−50 2
50−100 50−100 4
100−200 100−200 6
200−300 200−400 8
> 300 > 400 > 10
Sources: Technical regulation for selection of ambient air quality monitoring
stations (the Ministry of Environmental Protection)
Retraction of Monitoring Stations Realizing that the data provided by local environ-
mental protection departments might be manipulated, the Ministry of Environmental
7The built-up area is the urban area of the city as defined by the central government.
4.3. DATA
4
97
Protection (MEP) decided to contract the operation of monitor stations to private com-
panies. According to official documents from the MEP, all the monitors were operated
by private companies from the 1st of November 2016. Monitors were procured through
twelve contracts. Each contract was designed to involve monitors in different provinces
spread out over the country, to make it difficult for rms to select into a given area. Six
companies won the procurement, and each of them won two contracts. Importantly, af-
ter the operation of the monitors is taken over by the firms, all the operation costs are still
paid by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) instead of the local government.
4.3. DATA
This section documents the main data used in this study. Section 4.3.1 describes the
two sets of data that we use to measure air pollution: a satellite-based measure of the
aerosol optical depth and data from the monitoring stations. After that, we describe
the local air pollution enforcement records that we use. In Section 4.3.3, we discuss the
additional data used, including satellite-based luminosity data, information about local
leader characteristics, Baidu searches, and weather data. Finally, Section 4.3.4 discusses
the summary statistics for our main sample.
4.3.1. AIR POLLUTION DATA
Satellite Data: Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD) Before the 2013-2015 expansion of the
monitor system, most cities did not have any valid pollution monitoring. Even in cities
covered by the old system, P M2.5 information was not available. To address the problem
of missing data before new monitors were built, we use Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD)
provided by NASA to measure pollution. AOD measures the degree to which aerosols
prevent the transmission of light by absorption or scattering of light, which is highly
correlated with air quality (Gupta, Christopher, Wang, Gehrig, Lee, and Kumar, 2006).
Monthly information on AOD is available at 0.1 by 0.1 degrees since 2000. In this project,
we combine measures from the MODIS Aqua and Terra satellites to calculate the mean
of AOD in a given month in a city. To deal with potential within city spillovers in pollu-
tion, we calculate this measure based on the whole prefecture-level polygon, as depicted
in Figure B2. The mean of AOD in the data is 0.34, and the standard deviation is 0.23. To
facilitate interpreting the magnitude, we use the natural logarithm of the AOD measure.
Air Pollution Data from Monitors Air pollution data is published online by the MEP.
As discussed in the previous section, all 337 prefecture-level cities have at least one
air pollution monitor since Jan 2015. Hourly and daily observations of SO2, NO2, CO,
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P M10, P M2.5, and O3 from 1,436 monitoring stations in 337 prefecture-level cities were
recorded and published. Additionally, An Air Quality Index (AQI) was developed based
on these six pollutants. The AQI scale ranges from 0 to 500. It is further divided into six
ranges: 0−50, 51−100, 101−150, 151−200, 201−300 and 301−500. In public reports,
these are categorized as good, moderate, unhealthy for sensitive groups, unhealthy, very
unhealthy, and hazardous, respectively.
Aerosol Optical Depth (AOD) data has been used in various studies (Chen, Jin, Ku-
mar, and Shi, 2013; Jia, 2017) to measure air pollution. Only a few studies have ver-
ified the correlation between AOD and the concentrations of fine particulate matter
(P M2.5). For example, Wang and Christopher (2003) finds that the correlation coecient
between the monthly means of AOD and P M2.5 is around 0.7 using data in Alabama
in 2002. Using much more comprehensive data, Gupta, Christopher, Wang, Gehrig,
Lee, and Kumar (2006) finds that the correlation varies between 0.14 and 0.6. Since we
are studying a monitor expansion program, we take advantage of the ground measure-
ments of P M2.5 that are available after the expansion. We study the correlation between
P M2.5/P M10/AQI and the AOD data. The estimates are listed in Table 4.2, where we
control for monitor fixed effects and time fixed effects in all regressions. Columns (1)
show results for P M2.5. The correlation is around 0.4 and that estimates, therefore, are
comparable with Gupta, Christopher, Wang, Gehrig, Lee, and Kumar (2006). Columns
(2) report the results for P M10 and show a similar pattern to that for P M2.5. A similar
pattern is also found for the correlation between the Air Quality Index (AQI ) and the
AOD , as shown in columns (3). The correlation between P M2.5 and AOD is stronger
then the one between P M10/AQI and AOD . Not surprisingly, the correlation between
AQI and AOD is the lowest since the Index also aggregates information from pollutants
that are less correlated with AOD . All the evidence above supports that AOD is a suitable
measure for local air pollution.
4.3.2. ENFORCEMENT RECORDS
We construct a new dataset on the enforcement activities of cities’ environmental bu-
reaus based on data provided by The Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs (IPO).
IPO has, in turn, collected this data from all prefecture-level cities. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the most reliable coverage of enforcement records in China. Our sam-
ple consists of the yearly number of records related to air pollution in each city between
2010 and 2017. Figure B4 in Appendix B provides an example illustrating the informa-
tion contained in an enforcement record. Each record includes information about the
violating firm, a description of the violation, a reference to the regulation that has been
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Table 4.2: Validating Satellite Data
(1) (2) (3)
log(PM2.5) log(PM10) log(AQI)
log (AOD) 0.38*** 0.32*** 0.27***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011)
Monitor FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23831 23817 25232
R-squared 0.79 0.80 0.80
Notes: This table reports the AOD elasticity of P M2.5. Each column is from a separate regression. All
regressions control for fixed effects specific to monitor and time (month by year). Robust standard errors
clustered on the monitor in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
violated, and the action taken by the local environmental bureau. These actions involve,
e.g., suspending production, ordering upgrading of the equipment, and fines levied.
Based on the information provided about firm names, we link the enforcement records
to the Environmental Survey and Reporting Database (ESR). The ESR database is a com-
prehensive environmental data set covering the majority of polluting industrial rms and
their geographical location. These firms contribute to approximately 85% of China’s to-
tal pollution. In this study, we keep only the ESR firms that are related to air pollution.
Among a total of 22,000 records related to air pollution, 8,000 are enforcement actions
against the firms in the ESR database.
4.3.3. ADDITIONAL DATA
Satellite Data: Luminosity Data To capture economic activity, we also rely on satellite-
based measure of lights emitted during nighttime. The luminosity data has been used
as a robust proxy for economic activity across and within countries since Henderson,
Storeygard, and Weil (2012). We use data from the new Visible Infrared Imaging Ra-
diometer Suite (VIIRS) instrument, which provides several improvements over the data
of the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) (used in Henderson, Storey-
gard, and Weil (2012)). These include higher spatial resolution as well as a better abil-
ity to capture low-light emissions. Nighttime lights from VIIRS is available at the pixel-
month level (roughly 0.86 square kilometers at the equator) since 2012. VIIRS light data
is reported in Watts/m2. Following Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012), we calculate
simple area averages of emitted light among the pixels within each county/district. This
4
100 4. MONITOR
is standard practice in the literature (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2018).
Local Leader Characteristics Information on local officials is collected from the database
compiled by Jiang (2018). The database contains extensive demographic and career in-
formation about over 4,000 key city, provincial and national leaders in China since the
late 1990s. For each leader, the database provides standardized information about the
time, place, organization, and rank of every job assignment listed in their curriculum
vitae. Data is collected from government websites, yearbooks, and other trustworthy In-
ternet sources. We merge this information of mayors to our panel data, with which we
can calculate mayor’s age in office for each month. This can, in turn, be used to infer the
promotion incentives faced by the mayor, as discussed above.
Baidu Search Index To study the impact of new air pollution information, we collect data
about local awareness of air pollution information from the Baidu Search Index. Simi-
lar to Google Trends (GT), Baidu Search Index provides a measurement of the search
volume of a keyword in a given period from both computers and mobile devices. The
Index is constructed by summing the weighted frequencies of all search queries for a
specific keyword by city and by day. However, the exact algorithm of the Baidu Index is
confidential and unknown to the public. Previous studies (Qin and Zhu, 2018; Barwick,
Li, Rao, and Zahur, 2018) argue that the correlation between the Index and actual on-
line search volume is linear. To match the frequency of our analysis on the air pollution
data, we collect the monthly search volume from the Baidu Search Index of each city for
the following keywords (in Chinese): air pollution, haze/smog, PM2.5, air mask, and air
purifier.8
Weather Variables To control for local weather conditions, which are important determi-
nants of the concentration of air pollution in prior work, we collect data from the China
Meteorological Administration. This data uses the ANUSPLIN meteorological interpola-
tion model to calculate average monthly temperature and precipitation at a 0.5-degree
spatial resolution. We match this data to our prefecture-level cities to get a local measure
of weather conditions.
4.3.4. SUMMARY STATISTICS
Summary statistics for the variables described above are presented in Table 4.3 for our
main sample. This data covers the 177 cities that all installed monitors in 2015 and covers
the period 2010-2017 for most variables.9 The majority of the data is provided at the
8The Chinese translation of these five keywords are:空气污染,雾霾, PM2.5,口罩,空气净化器.
9VIIRS Light data is only available from 2012 onward.
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monthly level.
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. dev. Observations
Panel A:
Number of monitors 2.751 1.082 16,992
Urban Population (10,000) 31.56 22.16 16,992
Size of built-up area (km2) 44.65 26.31 16,992
Aerosol Optical Depth 0.335 0.232 16,319
VIIRS Light 0.492 0.571 11,337
Panel B:
Number of Enforcement 15.861 37.822 1,416
Number of Enforcement (ESR) 2.711 5.538 1,416
Panel C:
Age of mayor 50.66 4.486 16,992
Precipitation (mm) 76.45 86.19 16,992
Mean Temperature 10.81 11.61 16,992
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the samples used in our analyses. Data in Panel A and
Panel C is provided at the monthly level. Enforcement data in Panel B is provided at the yearly level.
Our sample contains the 177 cities that installed new monitors in 2015. This focus is
motivated by three main reasons. First, we do not want to mix cities that had monitors
in the past (old monitors) with those that got a monitor for the first time (new monitors).
The key reason for this is that the new information gained from an updated monitor is
different since it captures recordings on a much wider set of pollutants. Second, cities
with old monitors are dramatically different from cities with new monitors. In Table A2
we compare the descriptive statistics of cities with new monitors to those that had air
pollution monitors before the reform. We see that the urban population and the size of
the built-up area in cities with old monitors are 5-6 times larger. The size of the econ-
omy is also substantially different, as captured by the VIIRS light emission during night
time. Finally, we exclude cities that received monitors at an earlier stage due to targeting
related to proximity to industrial hubs (that faced different environmental policies) or
environmental quality. This leaves us with our final sample in column (3).
4.4. MONITORING AND POLLUTION
This section presents our main analysis, i.e., estimating the impact of the number of
monitors on a city’s aggregate pollution. Section 4.4.1 describes the baseline empiri-
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cal strategy (difference-in-differences) and reports the results. Section 4.4.2 discusses
the robustness of the results of using an instrumental variable approach. We also con-
sider different specifications and sample definitions in this section. Finally, Section 4.4.3
explores the third identification strategy (regression discontinuity) as an additional ro-
bustness check.
4.4.1. DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATIONS
To study the effects of monitoring, we run regressions of the following form:
AODi t = δi +γt +β1Moni tor si t +δXi t +ϵi t , (4.1)
where the outcome AODi t is the Aerosol Optical Depth for city i , in month t . Moni tor si t
is the number of monitors in city i in month t and δi and γt are city and time fixed ef-
fects. Xi t represent time varying characteristics of each city including: monthly precip-
itation, monthly average temperature and the age fixed effects of the mayor in office.
The inclusion of weather controls is motivated by the fact that ambient pollution has
been shown to be affected by local weather conditions in previous work (Schlenker and
Walker, 2015; Barwick, Li, Rao, and Zahur, 2018). To ensure that the number of monitors
installed does not depend on the motivation of the local leaders, we check the robust-
ness of our results to controlling for mayor characteristics. The identification of a causal
effect relies on the common trend assumption.
Table 4.4 reports the main results from the estimation of Equation 4.1, showing the
effect of monitoring on air pollution measured by the logarithm of monthly Aerosol Op-
tical Depth (AOD). We look at all cities that built monitor stations in 2015. All four
columns use the difference-in-differences strategy by comparing the change in pollu-
tion before and after the policy between cities that installed a different number of mon-
itors. We only control for city fixed effects and time fixed effects in the first column. We
add controls for time-varying weather conditions in column 2. And in the third column,
we also control for the characteristics of the mayor in office. In the last column, we add
controls for region-specific linear trends.10 These are included to ensure that results are
not driven by a different number of monitors installed in cities that face different targets
of pollution reduction. The standard errors in the regressions are clustered at the city
level. The estimates consistently show that one more monitor leads to a 2-3 percent de-
crease in air pollution. A causal interpretation requires the common trend assumption
that cities that installed a different number of monitors would have had similar pollution
10The regions consist of several provinces and are defined according to the Table A1.
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trends in the absence of monitors.
Table 4.4: Impact of Monitoring on Pollution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: AOD
Monitors -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.026***
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038)
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Mayor Controls No No Yes Yes
Region Trend No No No Yes
Observations 16319 16319 16319 16319
Notes: This table reports estimates of one additional monitor effects on air pollution. Each column is
from a separate regression specified in Equation 4.1. All regressions control for fixed effects specific to
city and time (month by year). Weather controls include precipitation and average temperature at month
level. Mayor controls include age fixed effects of the mayor in office. Robust standard errors clustered on
the city in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
To test for differential pre-trends, we conduct event studies based on the specifica-
tions used above - setting the average pollution in the year before monitors were in-
stalled as the baseline. Figure 4.1a presents graphical evidence for our event study, where
we look at the same dependent variable, AOD , as in our baseline model. We also control
for time-varying weather conditions and the characteristics of the mayor in office. In
Figure 4.1a, there is no evidence of differential trends leading up to the intervention. In
the year of adoption, we see a substantial drop in pollution for cities with more monitors
compared to cities with fewer.11 These effects are even stronger in the second and third
years.
4.4.2. ROBUSTNESS: SPECIFICATIONS AND SAMPLE DENITIONS
In this section, we explore some additional specification checks to make sure that our es-
timates from the previous section can be interpreted as the causal effects of the monitor
program. Table 4.5 presents these additional results.
Our baseline model using OLS might lead to biased results if the number of moni-
tors installed is endogenous. The estimates would be biased if, for example, cities that
expected lower pollution in the future installed a larger number of monitors. To address
11Note that monitors are operational from the first of January, so all periods in the year of adoption are treated.
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Figure 4.1: Event Study
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Notes: The figures present the results from an event study estimating the effects of monitoring using
two different specifications (DiD, DiD+IV). The figures plot the coefficients from the event study.
Capped spikes represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Both estimates control city fixed effects,
time fixed effect, weather conditions and the characteristics of the mayor. See the text for further
details.
these concerns, we propose to use the minimal number of monitors set by the Ministry
of Environmental Protection (MEP) as an exogenous source of variation. More specifi-
cally, we explore the variation created by the rule which determines the minimal number
of monitors in each city. As outlined in Table 4.1, larger cities (measured by population
and the geographical size of the built-up area) were requested to build more monitor
stations. Therefore, the first specification uses the minimum number of monitors ac-
cording to the rule as the instrument for the actual number of monitors (Moni tor si t ).
Therefore, the causal effect relies on the common trend assumption between cities with
different sizes of the population and the built-up area.
Panel A in Table 4.5 displays the instrumental variable estimates. As in our baseline
DiD model, we gradually add time-varying controls: weather conditions, the mayor’s
age in office, and regional specific linear trends. Results are very similar to what we find
in the baseline model (point estimates in the most conservative specification are the
same), are robust across specification, but are somewhat less precisely estimated than
in the baseline DiD. To test for the common trends assumption, we implement an event
study specification for this strategy. Figure 4.1b presents the results from this exercise
and again shows no evidence of pre-trends and point estimates and timing of the effect
similar to the results from the baseline specification.
In Panel B of Table 4.5, we drop data from both Xinjiang and Tibet since the area
covered by each city in these two provinces is much larger than for the rest of the country.
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Table 4.5: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome: AOD
Panel A: Instrumental Variable
Monitors -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.026***
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0053)
F-Stat of 1st stage 161.5 160.7 151.1 147.8
Observations 16319 16319 16319 16319
Panel B: Sample Restriction
Monitors -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.024***
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Observations 14625 14625 14625 14625
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather Controls No Yes Yes Yes
Mayor Controls No No Yes Yes
Region Trend No No No Yes
Notes: This table reports estimates of one additional monitor effects on air pollution. Each column in
each panel is from a separate regression specified in Equation 4.1. Panel A uses the minimal number of
monitors set by MEP as the instrumental variable. Panel B drops sample from both Xinjiang and Tibet. All
regressions control for fixed effects specific to city and time (month by year). Weather controls include
precipitation and average temperature at month level. Mayor controls include age fixed effects of the
mayor in office. Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
The OLS estimates using the restricted sample is slightly smaller if we do not include any
time-varying controls. But when we consider all time-varying controls, the results are
very similar to what we find in the DiD model. All the evidence above shows that our
results are robust to different specifications and sample selections.
4.4.3. ROBUSTNESS: EVIDENCE FROM RD
While all results from the above implemented empirical strategies and specification checks
suggest that we capture the causal effect of the number of monitors on pollution, a po-
tential remaining concern is that cities of different sizes face different incentives to re-
duce pollution after the reform. To address this concern, we explore the variation caused
by discontinuities in the number of monitor stations at city size and population cutoffs
(as documented in Table 4.1).
The strategy is essentially a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, where the identifi-
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cation relies on the assumption that all other city characteristics change smoothly at the
cutoffs. Table 4.1 shows the criteria determining the minimum number of monitors for
each city. Compared to the standard regression discontinuity design using one running
variable and cutoff, we have two running variables and multiple cutoffs. In practice, we
notice that the population’s size is not a good predictor of the realized number of mon-
itors. Hence, we only use the size of the buildup area as the running variable. And to
improve the statistical power of regression discontinuity analysis, especially that only a
limited number of cities are close to the cutoffs, we pool all observations together, re-
gardless of the number of cities around the cutoff, and make inferences as in a standard
RD design with a single cutoff. As documented in Table 4.1, there are 5 cutoffs in total.
However, our sample only contains middle and small-sized cities, and there are only a
sufficient number of cities on both sides of the threshold for the first two cutoffs. Among
the 177 cities, only three cities have a population larger than 1 million or a geographical
size of the built-up area that is larger than 100 km2. We, therefore, focus on the first two
cutoffs.
First-stage estimates for these two cutoffs are reported in Figure 4.2a, where we draw
scatters and quadratic fits of the number of monitors in each city. Cutoff fixed effects
are absorbed before plotting the regression discontinuities. These graphs allow us to see
the first-stage regression discontinuity estimates. The number of monitors exhibits a
sharp jump when moving from the left to the right of the threshold. The first-stage es-
timates show that cities just above the threshold have installed approximately 1.5 addi-
tional monitors. Figure 4.2b shows the reduced-form estimates on AOD, where we draw
scatters and quadratic fits of the AOD values. We see clear jumps in AOD when moving
from the left to the right of the threshold.
Table 4.6 quantifies the graphical findings in Figure 4.2. First three columns report
the RD regression using different kernel weighting methods. The discontinuities are
estimated using local linear regressions. RD regressions control for cutoff fixed effects
and baseline average AOD. The last column reports the estimate from a Difference-in-
Discontinuities regression proposed by Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016), which
also exploit the longitudinal nature of the data. The idea is essentially to estimate the
baseline non-parametric RD model while interacting every term with a dummy vari-
ables indicating “post-2015”.12 In all different specifications, we cluster standard errors
on the city. The evidence is very clear that cities have substantially lower satellites mea-
sured AOD than those slightly smaller cities whose size of the buildup area are just above
the cutoff. The drop in AOD across the cutoff is related to an increase in enforcement.
12More details about the Difference-in-Discontinuities strategy can be found in the Appendix C.
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Figure 4.2: Regression Discontinuity Plots
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Notes: Cutoff fixed effect are absorbed before plotting the regression discontinuities. Baseline AOD
are also controlled for Panel 4.2b and 4.2d. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level. Error
spikes represent 95 percent confidence intervals.
Although less precise, all regression discontinuity estimates are very close to the coun-
terparts using the difference-in-differences specification. The results are also robust to
alternative bandwidths, as shown in the Figure 4.3.
The above estimation results rest on the standard assumption that there is no ma-
nipulation of the running variable and that other characteristics of cities are smooth at
the thresholds. If mayors were able to manipulate population size and the size of the
built-up area and sort below the threshold to avoid an additional monitor, our estimates
would still suffer from the selection bias. Figure B5 is reassuring about the absence of
manipulation, as there is no jump in the distribution at each threshold. To test the sec-
ond assumption, we study the main threat to this identification strategy - that cities with
a different number of monitors face different pollution reduction targets. We look at
targets for cities close to the thresholds using the same cross-sectional specification as
used above to estimate the first stage impact on the number of monitors. Figures 4.2c re-
4
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Table 4.6: Estimates from RD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RD Diff-in-Disc
Monitors -0.024** -0.027* -0.028** -0.025*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Obs. 3960 2376 2448 9216
Bandwidth 12.8 8.57 8.91 12.8
First stage 1.50*** 1.61*** 1.79*** 1.50***
(0.26) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26)
Kernel Uniform Epanechnikov Triangle Uniform
Notes: This table reports estimates of one additional monitor’s effects using a regression design. First
three columns report the RD regression using different kernel weighting methods. The discontinuities
at the normalized cutoff are estimated using local linear regressions and MSE-optimal bandwidth pro-
posed by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) for repective kernel weighting methods. RD regressions
control for cutoff fixed effects and baseline average AOD. The last column reports the diff-in-dist regres-
sion proposed by Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Robust standard errors clustered on the city in
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Figure 4.3: Alternative Bandwidths
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Notes: Vertical axis: RD coefficients. Horizontal axis: bandwidth used to estimate the reported RD
coefficients. The blue dashed line marks the optimal bandwidth (12.8) of AOD selected following
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014).
port the results from this exercise and show that pollution reductions targets are smooth
around the thresholds. This suggests that differential pollution reduction targets do not
drive our results. As additional checks, we present RD plots (Figures 4.2d) of AOD for
pre-policy periods (2012-2014). To the contrary of the post-policy periods (2015-2017),
we see no jumps at the threshold of the normalized the running variable. If there is any
jump in other characteristics of cities at the thresholds, the violation of the second as-
sumption would be reflect in these two figures.
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The regression discontinuity estimates corroborate the results from the main panel
specification, indicating large pollution drop following the set up of the air quality mon-
itor. The strength of the regression discontinuity approach is its reliance on a few as-
sumptions for causal inference. But the power of the test is limited, as well as the restric-
tion of the sample close to the threshold. We, therefore, focus on the panel specifications
in the section on treatment heterogeneity below.
4.5. ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
In previous sections, we have documented the causal relationship between the decline
in air pollution and the number of air pollution monitors. We hypothesize that this re-
duction is driven by local governments being stricter in the enforcement of air pollution-
related regulations in the areas close to a monitor. An additional monitor increases cov-
erage of total city pollution and therefore causes a decrease in air pollution.
To explicitly test this hypothesis, we collect data on the yearly number of the en-
forcement records of each city in our sample. For a total of 177 cities, 22,000 official en-
forcement records were recorded for the period from 2010 to 2017. A large share (75%)
of the enforcement measures were taken after air pollution monitors were introduced.
The identification strategy is the same as our main empirical strategy in section 4.4.1.
The only difference is that we control for year fixed effects instead of month fixed effects
since the data is now provided at this more aggregate level. Table 4.7 shows estimates
using the difference-in-differences strategy. The first column reports the effects of one
additional monitor on total enforcement. We see that one additional monitor leads to a
20% increase in the number of enforcement activities related to air pollution. The event
study graph B7 in Appendix B verifies that the common trend assumption is indeed valid
in this case as well.
To ensure that air pollution monitors drive the effects on air pollution and enforce-
ment practices, we zoom in on the data by looking at the geographical pattern of en-
forcement practices. As most of the monitors were placed in the built-up area of each
city, emission from plants located far away from urban areas will have less impact on
readings of these monitors. Therefore, we expect that firms would be treated differently
based on their location relative to the monitors. Firms that are located close to air pol-
lution monitors might be subjected to tighter environmental enforcement compared to
firms located far away. The literature has documented this phenomenon in some other
settings, such as tax collection (Liu, 2017). To test this hypothesis in our setting, we link
the enforcement data set with the Environmental Survey and Reporting Database (ESR),
which provides us with location information for these firms. We aggregate the total num-
4
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Table 4.7: Impact of Monitoring on Enforcement Practices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total ESR Firm 0-20 km 20-40 km 40-60 km 60- km
Outcome: log(# Enforcement)
Monitors 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.034 0.038 0.026
(0.051) (0.042) (0.037) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030)
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1416 1416 1416 1416 1416 1416
Notes: This table reports estimates of one additional monitor effects on city-level environmental enforce-
ment. Each column is from a separate regression. All regressions control for fixed effects specific to city
and year. Column (1) reports the estimate using all firms. Column (2) reports the estimate using firms in
the Environmental Survey and Reporting Database (ESR). Column (3) to (6) report estimates using ESR
firms in four different distance bands. Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parenthesis. *, **,
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
ber of enforcement activities against ESR firms in each city. In column 2 of Table 4.7, we
look at the effects of an additional monitor on enforcement that targets ESR firms. The
DiD estimate shows that one additional monitor increases enforcement by 16% , which
is slightly lower than the increase in total enforcement.
We geo-coded all firms in the ESR database and calculated the distance of each firm
to the city center. Records of enforcement practices for all firms in the ESR database are
aggregated using four distance bands: 0-20 kilometers from the city center, 20-40 kilo-
meters, 40-60 kilometers, and over 60 kilometers. The same model is then estimated
separately for each group, and the estimates are displayed in columns 3-6 of Table 4.7.
We notice that one additional monitor increases enforcement practices by 16% for firms
located within 20km from the city center, while enforcement records barely increase for
firms located further away from the city center. The steep gradient over distance in en-
forcement supports our hypothesis that local governments do put stricter standards on
environmental regulations in areas close to a monitor.
One caveat in the above analyses is that the density of firms is higher in areas close
to the city center.13 Therefore, it might be the case that the larger increase in areas closer
to built-up areas is simply due to the larger number of firms in this area. To address this
concern, we construct a balanced panel of firms, where we examine the effects of an ad-
ditional monitor within 20km. The estimates are shown in Table 4.8. In the first column,
13The distribution of distance between firms in the ESR database with the city center is displayed in Figure B6.
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we control for the county (lower admin-level than city) fixed effects and year fixed ef-
fects. The estimates show that a firm is subject to around 2.4 percent more enforcement
if one additional monitor is located within 20km. In the second column, we control for
firm fixed effects and document similar estimates. In the third column, we also control
whether the firm is located within 20km from the city’s geometric center. We find that
the estimate remains similar, and there is no effect of locating close to the city center. We
rule out an alternative explanation that the increase of enforcement is targeted at firms
in the city center. The fourth column displays the results of using a non-parametric ap-
proach concerning distance to estimate treatment effects. The effects of monitors more
than 20km away are all much smaller and not significantly different from 0. The esti-
mates again verify that the enforcement practices are only centered around air pollution
monitors. In the last column, we use the continuous measure, log (di st ance) to the
closest monitor, as the measure of distance. Again, we see that firms located closer to
the monitor have more enforcement records after 2015. As the identification strategy is
again difference-in-differences, we also show the event study graph B7 in Appendix B
to verify the common trend assumption. All the above evidence shows that local offi-
cials have increased the enforcement of environmental regulations in areas close to air
pollution monitoring stations. These results are also consistent with the evidence docu-
mented in He, Wang, and Zhang (2020).
4.6. MECHANISMS
4.6.1. PROMOTION INCENTIVES
Our empirical analyses have shown that air pollution and the enforcement of regula-
tions are affected by air quality monitoring. We rationalize our findings that monitor
readings are politically important, and local officials, therefore, have incentives to en-
gage in stricter enforcement against firms located close to the monitor. In this section,
we investigate this proposed mechanism more directly by a series of heterogeneity anal-
yses by promotion incentives of local officials. The first variation we exploit is the age of
the mayor in each city. Mayors of prefecture-level cities are required to retire at age 60
at the same time as these officials are supposed to serve for at least three years in a post.
Therefore, city officials above the age of 57 face a discontinuously lower probability of
being promoted and, therefore, weaker performance incentives.
We use this age cutoff to capture officials’ promotion incentives. More specifically, we
collect data on all mayors in office the year before the introduction of monitors and cal-
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Table 4.8: Impact of monitoring on Enforcement Practices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome: log(# Enforcement)
# monitors within 20km 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.032* 0.021*
(0.0088) (0.0082) (0.016) (0.011)
Within 20km from City Center -0.028
(0.051)
# monitors in 20-40km -0.0031
(0.012)
# monitors in 40-60km -0.010
(0.013)
log(distance) to -0.021*
the closest monitor (0.012)
County FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes No No No
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8808 8808 8808 8808 8808
Notes: This table reports estimates of one additional monitor effects on firm-level environmental en-
forcement. Each column in each panel is from a separate regression. All regressions control for fixed
effects specific year. Column (1), (3), (4) and (5) control for fixed effects specific to county. Column (2)
controls for fixed effects specific to firm. Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parenthesis. *,
**, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
culate their age at the 13th National People’s Congress, which was held in March 2018.14
Hence, what will matter for promotion is the age of an official at the time of the congress.
If local officials’ incentive is complementary to the new monitoring system in reducing
pollution, we would expect smaller effects of monitoring when cities have mayors above
57 years of age at the time of the congress. Mayors who are not facing promotion in-
centives are arguably less likely to make efforts to reduce pollution, such as enforcing
stricter pollution regulations (e.g., car pollution standards, stubble burning), monitor-
ing environmental compliance of local rms and choosing whether to subsidize cleaner
energy.
To test our hypothesis about promotion incentives formally, we employ specifica-
tion 4.1 and further add an interaction term between Moni tori t and a dummy variable
for whether the mayor is older than 57. The regression results are reported in Table 4.9,
14The National Congress, which is held every five years, determines political cycles in China. As documented
in Xi, Yao, and Zhang (2018), the average probability of promotion for a city official in the last year of a
political cycle is nearly three times that of the first year in a cycle.
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where Panel A displays the results on air pollution, and Panel B displays the results on
enforcement. In the first column, we use the full sample as in our main analyses in Sec-
tion 4.4.1. The coefficients for Moni tor si t are also almost identical to the ones obtained
in our previous analyses. The interaction term’s coefficient has the opposite sign, which
means that the effect is smaller in cities with a retiring mayor. The magnitude in Panel A
is also close to the effect of having one additional monitor – suggesting that there is no
effect of having one more monitor when there are no promotion incentives. The mag-
nitude of the interaction term in Panel B is about half of the effect on the enforcement
of having one more monitor – suggesting that retiring mayors enforce significantly less.
The full sample includes mayors of all different ages, which contains much younger may-
ors. Since mayors’ work experience might confound our analysis, we use a similar idea
as in the RD design and restrict the sample by mayors’ age to check the robustness of
our analysis. We gradually reduce the age bandwidth in columns (2)-(4), and the coeffi-
cients are only slightly smaller and remain significant when we decrease the bandwidth.
In graphs B8a and B8b, we plot the differential effects (i.e. the interaction terms) of an
additional monitor on both pollution and enforcement by the age of the mayor at the
time of the congress. We normalize the effect to 0 for cities with a mayor who would be
50 years old in 2018. A distinctive feature of both graphs is that the effects are not distin-
guishable from 0 if the mayor is younger than 58. At age 58, we see a substantial jump
of the estimates in both graphs. Therefore, it is most likely that the results we show are
driven by the promotion incentives of mayors instead of by other characteristics such as
mayors’ work experience. We conclude from the analyses that pre-existing promotion
incentives are key for monitoring to have an impact on air pollution.
4.6.2. CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT
A growing literature (Chen, Pan, and Xu, 2016; Meng, Pan, and Yang, 2017) has found
that authoritarian regimes are responsive to societal actors. For example, Chen, Pan,
and Xu (2016) find that approximately one-third of local county governments in China
respond to citizen demands expressed online. Local governments are more responsive
to the threats of collective action, which are often seen in environment-related issues.15
Coupled with the fact that the awareness of the health impact of P M2.5 has increased
since 2010 (Barwick, Li, Rao, and Zahur, 2018), we believe that another possible mech-
anism is that information from additional monitors increases citizen awareness about
pollution levels and their engagement. Such engagement could potentially further drive
15See https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/china/2015/06/150624_shanghai_chemicalplant as
an example.
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Table 4.9: Promotion Incentives
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age bandwidth: Full ±10 Years ±7 Years ±5 Years
Panel A: AOD
Monitors -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.022***
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0044)
Monitors × Above 57 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.021***
(0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0030)
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16319 15208 14000 11084
Panel B: log(# Enforcement)
Monitors 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.16**
(0.051) (0.053) (0.057) (0.064)
Monitors × Above 57 -0.11** -0.10** -0.098* -0.10*
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.055)
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1416 1280 1176 936
Notes: This table reports heterogeneous effects of one additional monitor on air pollution (Panel A) and
environmental enforcement (Panel B). Each column in each panel is from a separate regression. All re-
gressions control for fixed effects specific to city and time (month by year in Panel A and year in Panel B).
Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively.
up efforts to protect the environment after the air pollution information is released. To
formally test this hypothesis, we estimate Equation 4.1 to identify the causal effects of
monitoring on online search behavior. Table 4.10 shows the estimates for five pollution-
related keywords. Column 1 documents that search on air pollution increases by around
1% for one additional monitor station. However, all other estimates are not significantly
different from 0. We believe these effects are likely too small to explain the decrease in
air pollution that we document in the previous section – especially considering that real
action or engagement would probably be lower than the increase in online searches.
4.6. MECHANISMS
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Table 4.10: Impact of monitoring on Online Searches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Key words air pollution haze/smog PM2.5 air mask air purifier
Outcome: log(Search Index)
Monitors 0.0095*** 0.026 0.00010 0.0074 0.023
(0.0033) (0.017) (0.00060) (0.0098) (0.017)
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14610 14610 14610 14610 14610
Notes: This table reports estimates of one additional monitor effects on online search behavior. Each
column is from a separate regression looking at different key words. All regressions control for fixed
effects specific to city and year. Robust standard errors clustered on the city in parenthesis. *, **, ***
indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
4.6.3. QUALITY OF INFORMATION
Although providing incentives for performance is a common approach to deal with the
principal-agent problem, it has long been recognized that high powered incentives can
also distort the type of effort exerted or even encourage various harmful activities fo-
cused on improving indicators of performance. Manipulating indicators of performance
is a typical strategy that has been documented in a series of studies. In this section, we
study whether the party in control of the monitors matter for the quality of the informa-
tion provided and whether such quality improvements can, in turn, strengthen account-
ability and government performance.
Several media sources reported on extensive manipulation of the pollution data by
local government officials. Such manipulation took many different forms – ranging from
directly adjusting the numbers to spraying the monitors with water, as shown in Figure
B9 in the Appendix. Following this reporting, the central government decided to reassign
the control of monitors to external parties, as documented above. In this section, we take
advantage of this retraction policy to see whether increasing the cost of manipulation is
an effective way to improve monitoring, reduce manipulation, and through that, enforce
environmental policy.
In order to identify the impact of the reassignment on the quality of information, we
study how the AOD elasticity of P M2.5 changes when the way information is provided
4
116 4. MONITOR
changes (It ). More specifically, we estimate:
log (P M2.5)i t = δi +γt +β1log (AOD)i t +β2It +β3log (AOD)i t × It +ϵi t , (4.2)
where log (P M2.5)i t is the natural logarithm of monthly average concentrations of P M2.5
reported from monitor i at time t . δi and γt represent fixed effects for monitors and
time. The variable log (AOD)i t captures the Aerosol Optical Depth for the pixel covering
monitor i at time t .16 It is a dummy variable indicating whether the data is reported
after the retraction. Therefore, the main coefficient of interest is β3. If the retraction
increased the quality of information, we would expect that AOD and P M2.5 measures
are more aligned and therefore that β3 > 0.
The results from estimating Equation 4.2 are reported in the first column of Table 4.11.
We find a positive estimate for the interaction term. This shows that the elasticity is 0.1
larger (corresponding to a 29% increase in the elasticity) after the third party takes over
the monitoring stations – suggesting that there is less manipulation and that monitors
provide higher quality information. To further understand the mechanism behind this,
we exploit heterogeneity in the relationship between these private firms and the local
governments. We identify such relationships by exploiting whether the firm in control
of a monitor is located in the same province. A local firm might be subject to political
influence by the local government or have political connections to local officials, allow-
ing manipulation to continue. The results are shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table A3
in Appendix A. In line with such an interpretation, we find that non-local firms drive the
entire increase in the elasticity (i.e., the decrease in manipulation). The coefficient for
local firms is negative, which suggests that they might collude with the government and
help local officials to manipulate the data. The takeaway of the above findings is that a
third-party may not be sufficient for preventing manipulation if they are not sufficiently
insulated from government influence.
The next excise we carry out is to check whether local governments exert more ef-
fort to decrease pollution after the cost of manipulation has increased. The results are
reported in the second and the third column of Table 4.11. The second column shows a
1.1 percent stronger decrease in pollution measured using satellite data after the retrac-
tion. Compared to the baseline estimates, one more monitor increased by one third after
the operation was handed over to private firms. The larger drop in air pollution due to
an additional monitor is related to a larger increase in enforcement efforts. As shown in
column 3, the effect of one more monitor is 44% larger than in the baseline. These two
16To deal with the fact that data is sometimes missing for the pixel just above the monitor, e.g. because of
cloud coverage, the value for missing pixels is interpolated from surrounding cells.
4.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
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Table 4.11: Retraction and Manipulation
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome: log(PM2.5) AOD log(# Enforcement)
log(AOD) 0.35***
(0.023)
log(AOD) × Post Retraction 0.10***
(0.029)
Monitors -0.022*** 0.18***
0.0038 0.047
Monitors × Post Retraction -0.011*** 0.082*
0.0024 0.049
Monitor FE Yes No No
City FE No Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17957 15938 1384
Notes: Each column is from a separate regression. Column (1) reports the change of AOD elasticity of
P M2.5 after the third party takes over the monitoring stations. Column (2) and (3) reports heterogeneous
effects of one additional monitor on air pollution and environmental enforcement. Robust standard
errors clustered on the city in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
pieces of evidence support our hypothesis that if it is difficult for local governments to
manipulate data, they exert more effort into enforcing environmental regulations.17
4.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study uses the introduction of a nationwide pollution monitoring program in China
to investigate the impact of installing additional monitors on both pollution concentra-
tion and government enforcement of pollution regulations. We show that installing an
additional pollution monitor reduces actual pollution by 2-3% as measured by satellite
data. This reduction in air pollution is arguably driven by a 20% increase in the number
of regulatory enforcement activities. Exploiting geo-referenced enforcement records, we
find that the increase in enforcement is driven by firms located within 20km from a mon-
itor, whereas firms beyond 20km face no change in enforcement.
An examination of possible mechanisms shows that the career concerns of the local
officials can explain a big part of our findings. This suggests that accurate monitoring
of environmental quality can strengthen accountability and improve policy outcomes.
17He, Wang, and Zhang (2020) also documented a similar phenomenon around water monitor stations.
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On the contrary, we find little evidence that citizen engagement is affected by additional
monitors. Finally, we document that when monitors are insulated from government in-
fluence and external parties are responsible for the provision of information, the effect
of an additional monitor on enforcement and reductions of pollution are both stronger.
Our findings are broadly related to a literature looking into the principal-agent prob-
lem in bureaucracies. Local officials have the incentive to game the system by shirking or
manipulating the data, especially when local information is costly to verify. Our paper
provides new empirical results on local officials’ efforts and the environmental conse-
quences of introducing high-quality information. This finding relates to a large theoret-
ical literature that tries to design optimal incentive and information structures.
Due to the recency of the reform that we study, the availability of economic data is
limited. Therefore, we are not able to say much about the impact of monitoring on eco-
nomic outcomes (such as local economic growth or the exit/entry of firms). Given a
strong emphasis on economic performance by many developing countries, understand-
ing whether improved monitoring and enforcement have implications for economic per-
formance and whether there is a trade-off between improved environmental and eco-
nomic outcomes is a promising question for future research.
A. ADDITIONAL TABLES
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Table A1: Targets by Province
Targeted Pollutants Target Provinces
P M2.5 -25% Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei
P M2.5 -20% Shagxi, Shandong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang
P M2.5 -15% Guangdong, Chongqing
P M2.5 -10% Inner mongolia
P M10 -15% Henan, Shannxi, Qinghai, Xinjiang
P M10 -12% Gnasu, Hubei
P M10 -10% Sichuan, Liangning, Jilin, Hunan, Anhui, Ningxia
P M10 -5% Guangxi, Fujian, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang
P M10 0% Hainan, Tibet, Yunnan
Sources: The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP)
Table A2: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)
Old Monitors New Monitors 2015 Sample
Outcomes
AOD (Aqua) 0.43 0.35 0.32
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23)
AOD (Terra) 0.46 0.38 0.35
(0.25) (0.25) (0.24)
AOD 0.45 0.37 0.34
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23)
VIIRS light 2.28 0.69 0.49
(2.85) (1.10) (0.57)
Controls
Number of Monitors 6.26 3.24 3.12
(2.75) (1.20) (1.26)
Urban Population 195.1 39.5 33.8
(303.7) (26.9) (21.0)
Size of Buildup Area 257.7 60.2 46.8
(345.1) (74.1) (27.2)
New City 0 1 1
Number of observations 10848 21600 16992
Notes: Author’s tabulations.
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Table A3: Retraction and Manipulation
(1) (2) (3)
Outcome: log(PM2.5)
log(AOD) 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.36***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
log(AOD) × Post Retraction 0.10***
(0.029)
log(AOD) × Post Retraction × Non-Local Firm 0.11***
(0.029)
log(AOD) × Post Retraction × Local Firm -0.14* -0.14*
(0.076) (0.076)
log(AOD) × Post Retraction × Never Local 0.14***
(0.033)
log(AOD) × Post Retraction × Local Elsewhere 0.036
(0.041)
Monitor FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 17957 17957 17957
Notes: Each column is from a separate regression. All regressions control for
fixed effects specific to monitor and time (month by year). Robust standard errors
clustered on the city in parenthesis. , , indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
B. ADDITIONAL FIGURES
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B. ADDITIONAL FIGURES
Figure B1: Air-Quality Monitor
Sources: https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20170124015370
Figure B2: Map of Monitor Location
Notes: This figure shows the location of monitors used in the analysis. The main analysis uses
monitors installed in 2015 (shown in red on the map). The map also reports the location of monitors
installed in the three major urban areas Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Pearl River Delta, and Yangtze River
Delta (in yellow) as well as the location of monitors in environmental role model cities (in blue).
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Figure B3: Aerosol Optical Depth over Time
Notes: This figure shows the change in average Aerosol Optical Depth in China from 2010 to 2018.
B. ADDITIONAL FIGURES
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Figure B4: An Enforcement Issued by Fuxin Government
The	decision	on	administrative	penalties	from	Environmental	Protection	Agency	in	Fuxin	City	
	
[2017]	 No.	 18	
	
To	 	
Fuxin	Electricity	Company	Limited	
Social	credit	code:	91210900121562106B	
Legal	representative:	Zhiqing	Jiang	
Address:	Huodian	Street	No.	10,	Taiping	district,	Fuxin	city	
	
The	Fuxin	Environmental	Monitoring	Bureau	investigated	you	(Fuxin	Electricity	Company	Limited)	
on	the	11th	of	Oct.	in	2017,	and	found	below	violations:	
	
You	(Fuxin	Electricity	Company	Limited)	didn’t	take	effective	measure	to	prevent	dust	pollution.	
	
Above	facts	can	be	verified	and	checked	by	the	evidences	such	as	site	survey	record	and	inquiry	
record	made	by	Environmental	Protection	Agency	of	Fuxin	City	on	the	11th	of	Oct.	in	2017.	
	
Above	facts	violated	the	first	paragraph	of	Article	72	of	the	Law	of	the	People’s	Republic	of	China	
on	Prevention	and	Control	of	Air	Pollution.	
	
We	notified	you	about	your	right	to	state,	defend	and	apply	for	hearing	by	sending	you	“The	
Prior	Notice	of	Administrative	Penalties	from	Environmental	Protection	Agency	in	Fuxin	City”	
([2017]	No.	18)	on	the	29th	of	Nov.	in	2017.	You	didn’t	provide	any	defense	and	application	for	
hearing	within	legal	period.	
	
According	to	Regulations	(1)	and	(2)	of	Article	117	of	the	Law	of	the	People's	Republic	of	China	
on	the	Prevention	and	Control	of	Air	Pollution,	we	decided	to	impose	below	administrative	
penalties	on	you:	
	
1. Order	you	to	take	effective	measures	to	prevent	dust	pollution	in	open-pit	coal	storage	yard;	
2. Administrative	fine	up	to	100,000	yuan.	
	
You	must	present	yourself	at	the	Fuxin	Environmental	Monitoring	Bureau	to	receive	“General	
Non-Tax	Income	Payments”	and	pay	the	fine	to	the	designated	bank	and	account	number	within	
15	days	from	the	date	of	receipt	of	this	penalty	decision.	If	the	fine	is	not	paid	within	the	time	
limit,	the	Office	may	impose	an	additional	fine	of	3%	of	the	original	fine	amount	on	a	daily	basis	
in	accordance	with	the	first	paragraph	of	Article	51	of	the	Administrative	Punishment	Law	of	the	
People's	Republic	of	China.	
	
If	you	refuses	to	accept	this	penalty	decision,	you	may	apply	to	the	Fuxin	Municipal	People's	
Government	or	the	Liaoning	Provincial	Environmental	Protection	Department	for	administrative	
reconsideration	within	60	days	from	the	date	of	receipt	of	this	penalty	decision.	You	may	also	file	
an	administrative	lawsuit	with	the	People's	Court	within	6	months.	Applying	for	administrative	
reconsideration	or	filing	an	administrative	lawsuit	does	not	stop	the	execution	of	the	
administrative	penalty	decision.	
	
If	you	do	not	apply	for	administrative	reconsideration	within	the	time	limit,	do	not	file	an	
administrative	lawsuit,	and	fail	to	perform	the	decision	on	this	penalty,	the	bureau	will	apply	to	
the	people's	court	for	compulsory	execution	according	to	law.	
	
The	Environmental	Protection	Agency	in	Fuxin	City	
4th	of	Jan,	2018	
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Figure B5: Histogram of Running Variables
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Notes: The figures provide histograms of the urban population and the size of the built-up area of
our sample over two cutoffs. Please note that the Size of the built-up area and the Urban Population
were normalized.
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Figure B6: Histogram of the Distance
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Notes: The figure shows the histogram of the distance between ESR firm and the closest Monitor.
We restrict the sample to firms that locate within 100 kilometers.
Figure B7: Event Study
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Notes: The figures provide graphic analyses of the effects of monitoring on the enforcement using
DiD specification. The left figure display the event study for the estimate of Column 1 in Table 4.7.
The right figure display the event study for the estimate of Column 1 in Table 4.8. The figure plots
the coefficients of the event study. Capped spikes represent 95 percent confidence intervals. See
the text for further details.
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Figure B8: Promotion Incentive
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Notes: The figures display the effects of an additional monitor on both pollution and enforcement
by the age of the mayor in 2018. The effect is normalized to 0 for cities with a mayor who would be
50 years old in 2018. The figure left is the effect on the pollution reduction. The figure right is the
effect on the increase of the enforcement.
Figure B9: Manipulation
Sources: http://hsb.hsw.cn/2015-01/20/content_8562907.htm
C. DIFFERENCE-IN-DISCONTINUITIES
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C. DIFFERENCE-IN-DISCONTINUITIES
We also exploit the longitudinal nature of our data using a “Difference-in-Discontinuities”
(or Diff-in-Disc) design Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016). Several studies in the
literature have exploited the longitudinal nature of the data in an RD framework, such
as the fixed-effect RD estimator in (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2012), the first-difference RD
estimator in (Lemieux and Milligan, 2008), or the dynamic RD design in (Cellini, Fer-
reira, and Rothstein, 2010). The Diff-in-Disc design essentially combines a difference-
in-differences (comparing the air pollution in cities with a different number of monitors,
before and after 2015) with a regression discontinuity design (comparing the air pollu-
tion of cities just above or below certain cutoffs). To estimate the Diff-in-Disc model,
we follow the common practice of using local linear regression. More specifically, we
estimate the following equation:
AODi t = δ0 +δ1Di +Si (γ0 +γ1Di )+Tt [α0 +α1Di +Si (β0 +β1Di )]+ξi t , (4.3)
where Si is a dummy for cities above cutoffs, Tt an indicator for the period after 2015,
and Di the normalized running variable. Standard errors are clustered at the city level.
Treatment is captured by Tt × Si and the coefficient of interest is therefore β0. This is
the Diff-in-Disc estimate and identifies the reduced-form effect of being just above the
cutoff. We normalize the estimates to the treatment effect of one additional monitor by
dividing β0 by the first-stage RD estimates. Results of the Diff-in-Disc regressions are
shown in Column (4) of the Table 4.6.
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SUMMARY
This thesis consists of three empirical studies that center around development, environ-
mental, and health economics. This chapter summarizes the main findings and conclu-
sions from the previous chapters.
Chapter 2 leverages newly collected individual-level hunger recall information of the
China Family Panel Survey to estimate the causal effect of undernourishment on later-
life health. We develop a Two-Sample Instrumental Variable (TSIV) estimator that can
deal with heterogeneous samples. The new estimator includes a first step which pre-
processes the data by methods such as the nearest-neighbor matching. The matching,
which homogenizes covariates’ distributions in different samples, decreases the para-
metric choice’s dependence in the second-step regression. Using the new estimator,
we find a nonlinear relationship between the widely used indicator of famine intensity
and personal exposure (measured by hunger recall among famine survivors). The non-
linearity in famine exposure may explain the variation in the famine’s effect on later life
health found in previous studies, as studies explore different parts of this non-linear re-
lation. We furthermore find that exposure to famine induced hunger early in life leads
to worse health among females fifty years later. This effect is more significant than the
reduced-form effect of previous studies. For males, we find no impact. This chapter
belongs to the mounting concurrent evidence that malnutrition around birth affects a
broad range of late-life health outcomes. However, previous studies are significantly
constrained as the information on individual exposure is not available. In our study, the
information on personal exposure helps in the justification of instruments used in this
literature, as well as providing insight into the proper specification of the reduced-form
regressions used in the extensive famine literature. More importantly, the lack of infor-
mation on personal exposure is not unique in the famine literature. The method devel-
oped in this paper can be used in other similar studies, primarily when key variables for
identification are constructed from historical information. The strategy complements
the efforts in collecting data on exogenous variation.
Chapter 3 examines the effects of a massive salt iodization program on the human
capital formation of school-aged children in China. To identify the salt iodizing policy’s
long-term benefits, we use the national salt iodizing program as a quasi-experiment and
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exploit geographic variation in goiter prevalence before the intervention. So, we essen-
tially compare improvements in math and vocabulary ability and educational attain-
ment and years of schooling of cohorts conceived before and after the salt iodization in
provinces with varying pre-intervention goiter prevalence. Our difference-in-differences
estimates show that the salt iodization policy has strong and significant effects on cog-
nition for girls. We find robust positive effects of the program for girls. A one standard
deviation decrease (12%) in the pre-intervention goiter rate is associated with math and
vocabulary scores increasing by roughly 15%. We also see substantial increases in the
educational attainment of females. Using a simple back of the envelope calculation, we
infer that this translates to income increases of about 6%. Yet, we do not find any effects
for boys. We show in a simple model of parental investment that gender preferences
can explain our findings. We consider the role of gender preferences and how this may
affect large-scale public programs’ effectiveness. Gender preferences may also explain
gender differences in the existing empirical literature on the long-run effects of adverse
conditions early in life. Analyses exploiting within the province, village-level variation
in gender attitudes find that the gains in cognition are most significant for girls born in
regions with the strongest son preferences. The policy’s heterogeneous impact confirms
the importance of parental gender preferences. Consequently, large scale programs can
have positive (and possibly) unintended effects on gender equality in societies with son
preference.
Chapter 4 turns the research focus to the implementation of environmental regula-
tions in developing countries. Despite ambitious environmental laws in many countries
worldwide, the enforcement of these regulations is often weak. Holding government of-
ficials accountable for this lack of enforcement is, in turn, often marred by inadequate
information about environmental quality. In this chapter, we study whether better en-
vironmental monitoring can solve this issue and improve the policy’s effectiveness. We
focus on air pollution in China and investigate the impact of a nationwide monitoring
program. Using identification strategies that exploit strict assignment criteria set up
by the central government, we show that an additional air pollution monitor reduced
satellite-based pollution measures by 2-3% and increased enforcement of air-pollution
regulations by 20%. To clarify how this pollution reduction came about, we construct
a novel data set of city governments’ air pollution enforcement activities from 2010 to
2017. We geo-reference enforcement activities and show that the increase in enforce-
ment is driven by firms located close to those monitors, whereas firms faraway face fewer
enforcement changes. These effects are caused by local officials that face strong incen-
tives to reduce pollution and are stronger when there is limited scope for data manipu-
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lation – suggesting that better quality information can strengthen the accountability of
implementing officials and improve policy outcomes.

SAMENVATTING
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie empirische studies rondom ontwikkelings-, milieu- en
gezondheidseconomie. Dit hoofdstuk vat de belangrijkste bevindingen en conclusies
uit de voorgaande hoofdstukken samen.
Hoofdstuk 2 maakt gebruike van nieuw verzamelde gegevens op individueel niveau
over herinneringen aan honger van de China Family Panel Survey om de causale ef-
fecten van ondervoeding op gezondheid in het latere leven te schatten. We ontwikke-
len een Two-Sample Instrumental Variable (TSIV) schatter die kan omgaan met hetero-
gene steekproeven. Deze nieuwe schatter bevat een eerste stap de de gegevens voorbe-
werkt met methodes zoals de nearest neighbor matching. De “matching” methode, die
de verdelingen van covariaten in verschillende steekproeven homogeniseert, vermindert
de afhankelijkheid van de parametrische keuze in de regressie in de tweede stap. Met de
nieuwe schatter vinden we een niet-lineaire relatie tussen de de veelgebruikte indica-
tor van hongersnood-intensiteit en persoonlijke blootstelling (gemeten aan de hand van
herinneringen aan honger onder overlevenden van de hongersnood). De niet-lineariteit
in blootstelling aan hongersnood kan de variatie verklaren in het effect van de honger-
snood op gezondheidsuitkomsten op latere leeftijd die in eerdere studies werd gevon-
den, aangezien studies verschillende delen van deze niet-lineaire relatie onderzoeken.
Verder vinden we dat blootstelling op jonge leeftijd aan door hongersnood veroorzaakte
honger leidt tot slechtere gezondheid van vrouwen vijftig jaar later. Dit effects is signif-
icanter dan het “reduced-form” effect van eerdere onderzoeken. Voor mannen vinden
we geen impact. Dit hoofdstuk behoort tot het groeiende bewijs dat ondervoeding rond
de geboorte een breed scala aan gezondheidsuitkomsten op latere leeftijd beïnvloedt.
Eerdere onderzoeken zijn echter aanzienlijk beperkt omdat informatie over individuele
blootstelling niet beschikbaar is in deze onderzoeken. In ons onderzoek helpt de infor-
matie over persoonlijke blootstelling bij het rechtvaardigen van instrumentele variabe-
len die in deze literatuur worden gebruikt, en geeft het inzicht in de juiste specificatie van
de “reduced-form” regressies die in de uitgebreide hongersnood-literatuur worden ge-
bruikt. Nog belangrijker is dat het gebrek aan informatie over persoonlijke blootstelling
niet uniek is in de hongersnood-literatuur. De methode ontwikkeld in dit artikel kan in
andere vergelijkbare onderzoeken worden gebruikt, voornamelijk wanneer de belangri-
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jkste variabelen voor identificatie worden geconstrueerd op basis van historische infor-
matie. De strategie vormt een aanvulling op inspanningen om gegevens over exogene
variatie te verzamelen.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de effecten van een grootschalig overheidsprogramma waar-
bij jodium aan zout is toegevoegd (jodiumprogramma) op de ontwikkeling van menselijk
kapitaal bij schoolgaande kinderen in China. Om de langetermijnvoordelen van beleid
om jodium toe te voegen aan zout te identificeren, gebruiken we het nationale jodi-
umprogramma als een quasi-experiment en benutten we geografische variatie in de
prevalentie van struma vóór de interventie. We vergelijken dus in wezen verbeteringen
in de wiskundige en vocabulaire bekwaamheid, opleidingsniveau en het aantal school-
jaren van cohorten die zijn verwekt voor en na de invoering van het beleid om jodium
toe te voegen aan zout in provincies met een variërende prevalentie van struma vóór
de interventie. Onze verschil-in-verschillen schattingen laten zien dat het jodiumbeleid
sterke en significante effecten heeft op de cognitie van meisjes. We vinden robuuste
positieve effecten van het programma voor meisjes. Een afname van één standaard-
deviatie (12%) in het percentage struma bij kinderen vóór de interventie wordt geas-
socieerd met een stijging van de scores voor wiskunde en woordenschat met ongeveer
15%. We zien ook substantiële stijgingen in het behaalde opleidingsniveau van vrouwen.
Met behulp van een eenvoudige back-of-the-envelope berekening, leiden we af dat dit
zich vertaalt in inkomensstijgingen van ongeveer 6 %. We vinden echter geen effecten
voor jongens. We laten in een eenvoudig model van ouderlijke investeringen zien dat
geslachtsvoorkeuren onze bevindingen kunnen verklaren. We nemen de rol van ges-
lachtsvoorkeuren in aanmerking en de wijze waarop dit de effectiviteit van grootschalige
publieke programma’s kan beïnvloeden. Geslachtsvoorkeuren kunnen ook geslachtsver-
schillen verklaren in de bestaande empirische literatuur over de langetermijneffecten
van ongunstige omstandigheden op jonge leeftijd. Analyses die binnen de provincie
gebruik maken van variatie in gender-opvattingen op dorpsniveau benutten, de ver-
beteringen in cognitie het meest significant zijn voor meisjes die geboren zijn in re-
gio’s met de sterkste geslachtsvoorkeuren voor een zoon. De heterogene impact van
het beleid bevestigt het belang van geslachtsvoorkeuren van ouders. Zodoende kun-
nen grootschalige programma’s positieve (en mogelijk) onbedoelde effecten hebben op
geslachtsgelijkheid in samenlevingen met een voorkeur voor zonen.
Hoofdstuk 4 richt de aandacht van het onderzoek op de implementatie van milieuregel-
geving in ontwikkelingslanden. Ondanks ambitieuze milieuwetgeving in veel landen
over de hele wereld, is de handhaving van deze regulering vaak zwak. Het verantwo-
ordelijk houden van overheidsfunctionarissen voor dit gebrek aan handhaving wordt
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op zijn beurt vaak belemmerd door ontoereikende informatie over de milieukwaliteit.
In dit hoofdstuk onderzoeken we of een betere monitoring van het milieu dit prob-
leem kan oplossen en de effectiviteit van het beleid kan verbeteren. We richten ons
op luchtverontreiniging in China en onderzoeken de impact van een landelijk monitor-
ingsprogramma. Met behulp van identificatiestrategieën die gebruik maken van strikte
toewijzingscriteria opgesteld door de centrale overheid, laten we zien dat een extra mon-
itor om luchtverontreiniging te meten de uitkomsten van vervuiling, gemeten door satel-
lieten, verminderde met 2-3% en de handhaving van voorschriften voor luchtveron-
treiniging met 20% verhoogde. Om te verhelderen hoe deze vermindering van vervuil-
ing tot stand kwam, construeren we een nieuwe dataset over handhavingsactiviteiten
van stadsbesturen met betrekking tot luchtverontreiniging van 2010 tot 2017. We geo-
refereren handhavingsactiviteiten en laten zien dat de toename de handhaving wordt
gedreven door bedrijven die dicht bij die monitors zijn gevestigd, terwijl bedrijven ver
weg met minder wijzigingen in handhaving te maken hebben. Deze effecten worden
veroorzaakt door lokale ambtenaren die sterke prikkels hebben om de vervuiling te ver-
minderen en die sterker zijn wanneer er beperkte mogelijkheden zijn voor datamanipu-
latie – wat suggereert dat informatie van betere kwaliteit de verantwoordingsplicht van
uitvoerende ambtenaren kan versterken en de beleidsresultaten kan verbeteren.
